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INTRODUCTION

To what extent may governmental actors other than the Supreme

Court function as independent, authoritative interpreters of the
federal Constitution? Dicta in the 1958 case of Cooper v. Aaron,'
asserting that the Supreme Court's interpretations bind all other
government actors, purported to answer this question. But noted
scholars from across the political spectrum-including Professors
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Mark Tushnet, Sanford Levinson, and John
Harrison-have sharply challenged this view of judicial supremacy
and argued that other branches of the federal government not only
have the power, but the duty, to serve as independent authoritative
interpreters of the Constitution.2 Even the most ardent advocates of
Cooper, moreover, cannot deny that the federal executive and
legislative branches function as the final interpreters of several

1. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of
the law of the Constitution.").
2. See John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Erecutive Branches in
Interpreting the Constitution, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 371, 372-74 (1988) (arguing that
legislative and executive branches have power to offer independent interpretations);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most DangerousBranch: Executive Power to Say What
the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217, 228-62 (1994) (noting that the executive branch has this
power); Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 Tul. L Rev. 1071,
1075-78 (1987) (legislative and executive branches). Similarly, Thomas Merrill
apparently embraces the view that judicial opinions are "merely explanations for
judgments" and accordingly "lack the power to bind the other branches." Thomas W.
Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15
Cardozo L. Rev. 43,76,79 (1993). Also, David Cole has argued that Congress has the
power to independently construe due process and equal protection under Section V
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things
Differently: Boeme v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights,
1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 31. For other examples of scholarship that, like this Article,
consider potential interpreters of the Constitution aside from federal actors, see Mark
Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away From the Courts 181-82 (1999) (the people as
interpreters), and Harold J. Krent, The Supreme Court as an Enforcement Agency, 55
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1149, 1188-1201 (1998) (States). For an unqualified defense of
Cooper, see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On ExtrajudicialConstitutional
Interpretation,110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359,1362 (1997).
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constitutional provisions3 and play important roles in construing many
others insofar as the Court gives their interpretations near complete
deference. 4
With respect to sub-federal governmental actors, however, it has
been settled since the 1816 Supreme Court case of Martin v. Hunter's
Lesseei that States can never serve as independent and authoritative
interpreters of the Constitution because of "the importance, and even
necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United
States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution."
Otherwise, noted Justice Story's majority opinion, the "[C]onstitution
of the United States would be different, in different [S]tates, and
might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation
or efficacy, in any two states. The public mischiefs that would attend
such a state of things would be truly deplorable." 6
This Article is the third installment of a project that offers an
important refinement of Martin's unqualified rejection of multiple7
authoritative interpreters of the Constitution at the subnational level.
The project demonstrates that Congress may have the constitutional
power to delegate independent interpretive authority over select
federal constitutional provisions to a small number of "community3. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (stating that what
constitutes the power to "try" impeachments for purposes of the Impeachment Clause
is to be determined solely by the Senate); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42
(1849) (holding that the meaning of Guarantee Clause is to be determined exclusively
by Congress).
4. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-66 (1981) stating:
Whenever called upon to judge the constitutionality of an Act of Congress'the gravest and most delicate duty this court is called upon to perform'- the
court accords great weight to the decisions of Congress. The Congress is a
coequal branch of government whose members take the same oath we do to
uphold the Constitution of the United States ....
[W]e must have 'due
regard to the fact that this Court is not exercising a primary judgment but is
sitting in judgment upon those who also have taken the oath to observe the
Constitution and who have the responsibility for carrying on
government ....
This is not, however, merely a case involving the
customary deference accorded congressional decisions. The case arises in
the context of Congress' authority over national defense and military affairs,
and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater
deference.
Id. (citations omitted).
5. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816).
6. Id. at 348. For an elaboration of this idea, see 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries
on the Constitution of the United States §§ 383-386 (1833).
7. The other two parts are Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community SelfGovernance in ResidentialAssociations, Municipalities,and Indian Country: A Liberal
Theory, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1053 (1998) [hereinafter Rosen, Outer Limits], and Mark D.
Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of Constitutional
Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1129 (1999) [hereinafter
Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution]. One part remains. See Mark D. Rosen, The
Possibility of Limited Community-Based Interpretation of the Constitution
(manuscript on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Rosen, Limited
Community-Based Interpretation].
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based courts" located in special federal enclaves. Like the criticisms
that have been leveled at Cooper, the project challenges the deeply
held convictions of many that the Supreme Court's constitutional
interpretations must be supreme. In addition, creating such
community-based courts would be a way to grant extraordinary
political power to select communities because the community courts
could interpret constitutional provisions, such as the due process and
free exercise clauses, in light of their community's values and needs.
Recognizing that such remarkable political empowerment is a
doctrinal option, even if utilized only infrequently, is critical.
Foundational liberal commitments may well require that American
society grant extraordinary powers of self-governance to a small
number of communities.8 Thus, even though there is less free land
today than in the nineteenth century when communities like the
Mormons with ideologies requiring that they be largely free to govern
themselves were given land on which they could run their lives as they
saw fit, 9 there is a doctrinal vehicle for granting comparable political
autonomy to deserving contemporary communities with isolationist
needs akin to the Mormons.' 10
Rather than relying on Martin's untested assumption that multiple
authoritative interpreters of the Constitution at the subnational level
necessarily would lead to "deplorable" results, this Article empirically
examines a regime of multiple authoritative interpreters currently
operating on American Indian" reservations. Presently, each tribe's
courts are empowered to provide their own interpretations of "due
process," "equal protection," "search and seizure," and the like,
without review from federal courts. The result is that due process
means one thing in Manhattan, another in the 25,000 square miles of
Navajo land, and yet something else on the Winnebago reservation.
Reporting and analyzing the findings of a comprehensive study of
tribal case law, this Article demonstrates that the tribal regime of
multiple authoritative interpreters works well. This finding is very
& See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 7; Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community
and Culture 5 (1989) (similar conclusion on the basis of liberal principles); see also
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 297-331 (1974) (similar conclusions
derived from libertarian premises); Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L.

Rev. 4, 68 (1983)

("[C]onstitutionalism may legitimize ...

communities and

movements."); Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1996) (concluding that "the American constitutional order is best

understood as... allow[ing] homogenous nomic communities to exercise public as
well as private power, provided that the communities exercise public power in a

constitutional fashion").
9. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 7, at 1071-74.
10. For an extensive discussion of the criteria for deciding which communities
ought to be granted such extensive powers of self-governance, see Rosen, Outer
Limits, supra note 7, at 1089-1106, 1126-27.
11. This Article uses the terms "Native American" and "Indian" interchangeably,
reflecting the variety of terms deployed in federal and tribal law.
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pertinent to American constitutional law because Congress may have
the power to create community-based courts for non-Indians that, like
the tribal courts, would be empowered to independently construe
select federal constitutional provisions without review from Article III
courts.12 There is a tight analogy between tribal courts and such 13
a
regime of multiple authoritative interpreters of the Constitution.

For this reason, the Article's findings suggest that such a regime of
community-based courts may be able to generate important benefits
without yielding the anarchy that Martin feared.14 This finding is
germane to community-based courts because an assessment of the
likely practical consequences of a regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters is relevant as a doctrinal matter to determining the
constitutionality of creating community-based courts in the first
place.15

This Article also sheds critical light on several important issues in
federal American Indian law. The Article corrects the acute
misunderstanding held by some federal courts that the substantive

content of due process and other rights does not vary between Indian
country16 and American society in general. Other federal courts have
held that tribal courts may create novel doctrines only when Indian
12. A preliminary sketch of this scheme can be found in Mark D. Rosen,
Defrocking the Courts: Resolving "Cases or Controversies," Not Announcing
Transcendental Truths, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 715, 732-33 (1994). The final
installment of my project provides a comprehensive doctrinal exposition of the regime
of "community-based" courts. See Rosen, Limited Community-Based Interpretation,
supra note 7; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
13. Although a study of State court interpretation of State constitutional
provisions paralleling federal provisions also might be instructive, tribal courts are a
superior model for community-based courts. Tribal courts have more interpretive
freedom than state courts, because no federal constitutional floor of protections exists
in Indian country. See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of
Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1167, 1218
(1999) ("If a state court is addressing an issue to which both the U.S. Constitution and
the applicable state constitution have applicable clauses ... then the court has some
obligation to use the federal authority to define the minimum applicable threshold
concerning individual rights."). Furthermore, tribes are more akin to the likely
beneficiaries of community-based courts in that both are communities with norms
distinctively different from general society; scholars of state constitutional law largely
agree that distinctive State norms that inform State constitutional interpretation do
not exist. See James A. Gardner, Southern Character,Confederate Nationalism, and
the Interpretation of State Constitutions: A Case Study in ConstitutionalArgument, 76
Tex. L. Rev. 1219, 1227 (1998) (concluding that "the character differentiation
hypothesis," which seeks to explain state constitutional interpretation on the basis of
distinctive state characteristics, "does not hold up"); Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and
Interpretationin State ConstitutionalLaw, 84 Va. L. Rev. 389, 389-96 (1998) (same).
14. To be sure, there would remain important differences between tribal courts
and "community-based" courts. The limits of the analogy between the two are
discussed infra Part V.B. and in Rosen, Limited Community-Based Interpretation,
supra note 7, at 121-23.
15. See Rosen, Limited Community-Based Interpretation,supra note 7, at 15, 40.
16. "Indian country" is a statutory term denoting places of tribal jurisdiction. See
18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1994).
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practices differ significantly from those in general American society.
This Article will show that this approach is also misdirected. Perhaps
most importantly, this Article's findings cast doubt on several
proposals to curtail tribal court jurisdiction due to presumed tribal
court biases, which have been advanced by several academic
commentators and members of Congress. This Article also identifies
certain aspects of tribal court practice that merit additional study and
suggests that federal funds be allocated to support more widespread
publication of tribal court decisions.
Part I of this Article explains the doctrine that has created a regime
of multiple authoritative interpreters of quasi-constitutional federal
law in American Indian tribal courts. Parts II, III, and IV report and
analyze a comprehensive empirical study of all reported tribal court
case law over a 13-year period.1 7 Part II presents two analytical tools
for evaluating the regime of multiple authoritative interpreters in
Indian country. The first tool permits analysis of the character of
tribal court deviations from standard American doctrines, while the
second is a framework for assessing the benefits and costs of the
regime. After providing important background information about the
study's methodology in Part III, Part IV uses the two analytical tools
to analyze tribal court case law. Part IV demonstrates that tribal
courts have taken seriously their interpretive tasks and have provided
significant protections to individuals against tribal governments.
Study of the tribal case law also discloses a remarkable cultural
syncretism: tribal courts have deeply assimilated many Anglo political
values even though they give them variant expressions that reflect and
support tribal culture. These and other findings suggest that the
regime of multiple authoritative interpreters in Indian country works
well. Part V summarizes the study's findings, explains its relevance to
non-Indian communities, and draws on the Article's empirical study
to clarify several important issues in the field of American Indian law.
A brief conclusion follows.
I. THE REGIME OF MULTIPLE AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETERS OF
FEDERAL LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY

A. The Doctrine That Creates Multiple Authoritative Interpretersof
Quasi-ConstitutionalFederalLaw
A combination of six factors has created the regime of multiple
authoritative interpreters of quasi-constitutional federal law in Indian
country. In this regime, tribal courts are empowered to provide
independent interpretations of due process, equal protection, and the
17. There have been a few studies of tribal court case law. See infra Part III.C.

Though most are very good, none has provided a set of analytical tools for evaluating
the findings or a comprehensive study of the reported case law.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

like, without review from any Article III courts in virtually all cases.
The first factor is that the federal Constitution does not apply to tribal
governments. 18 Second, in 1968 Congress imposed statutory
obligations on tribal governments in the Indian Civil Rights Act
("ICRA") that virtually track verbatim the language of the Bill of
Rights. ICRA statutorily imposed all provisions of the Bill of Rights
against tribal governments, with only a few exceptions. 19 Thus, for
example, as a matter of federal statutory law "[n]o Indian tribe in
exercising powers of self-government shall.., make or enforce any
law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances."2 Similarly, a
tribe may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property
without due process of law," or undertake "unreasonable searches
and seizures."21
The third factor is the Supreme Court's ruling in Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez,' that largely eliminated federal court subject matter
jurisdiction over ICRA claims. The only express remedy in Article III
courts provided by ICRA is a habeas provision in 25 U.S.C. § 1303,
which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be
available to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the
legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe." In Martinez, the
Supreme Court held that habeas corpus review under § 1303 is the
exclusive path for federal court review of alleged violations of ICRA
in light of the Act's "distinct and competing purposes" of
guaranteeing the rights of individual members of the tribe and
encouraging Indian self-government. 23 Federal courts accordingly
have subject matter jurisdiction over ICRA claims only when the
plaintiff is in "detention," and virtually all ICRA claims-that is, all
claims advanced when the plaintiff is not in detention-can be heard
only in tribal courts.24 Derivatively, there can be no appellate review
18. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,210-11 (1978); Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376,381-83 (1896).
19. The Bill of Rights provisions not statutorily applied against tribes are the

prohibition concerning the establishment of religion and the requirements of jury
trials in civil cases and appointment of counsel for indigents in criminal cases. See 25
U.S.C. § 1301, et. seq. (1994); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63 (1978).
20. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1).
21. Id. § 1302(2), (8).
22. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
23. Id. at 62, 66-70.
24. The Tenth Circuit has created a narrow exception to this doctrine, holding
that a federal court can hear an ICRA claim brought by a non-Indian if there is no
tribal court forum. See Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes, 623
F.2d 682, 683-84 (10th Cir. 1980). Other courts have refused to follow Dry Creek. See,
e.g., Whiteco Metrocom Div. of Whiteco Indus., Inc. v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 902
F.Supp. 199, 202 (D. S.D. 1995). The Tenth Circuit itself has narrowed Dry Creek to
its facts. See Enters. Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 890, 892 (10th
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by federal courts of tribal court interpretation of ICRA's substantive
provisions apart from circumstances where a federal court has subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1303.15
The fourth factor is that even in the post-Martinez circumstances
where federal courts have jurisdiction over ICRA claims, their6
jurisdiction is concurrent with tribal courts. For several reasons,1
most ICRA claims asserted by plaintiffs in "detention"-i.e., by
criminal defendants-have been brought in tribal courts. This has
provided tribal courts the opportunity to construe even those
substantive ICRA provisions typically at issue when there is
detention, such as search and seizure and the right against selfincrimination. 27

The fifth factor is the well-established doctrine that ICRA's
statutory terms need not be ascribed the same meaning as their sister
terms in the federal Constitution.28 Tribal courts have the authority to
construe ICRA provisions in light of tribal needs, values, customs, and
traditions.2 9 Although the issue has not been presented in the case
law, this tribal interpretive authority presumably would remain even if
a federal court were to have construed a particular ICRA provision
because the tribal court always would be in the better position to
ascertain tribal needs, values, customs and traditions. Thus, it would
appear that tribal courts enjoy the power to independently interpret
even those ICRA provisions over which federal courts have
concurrent jurisdiction. 30
The sixth and final factor is that each tribe can interpret ICRA's
provisions in light of its unique needs, values, customs, and
Cir. 1989) (limiting Dry Creek to its "highly unusual" facts). As previously noted, the
result is that virtually all ICRA claims are brought in tribal courts.
25. The federal courts of appeals are without jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that
lower federal courts generally are without subject matter jurisdiction under the
Martinez decision, and there is no special appellate statute granting jurisdiction. See
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). Despite the fact that ICRA is federal law, there are no
jurisdictional statutes that appear to grant the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review
tribal court opinions that are not already subject to federal appellate court review. See
id §§ 1253,1254, 1257, 1258. The question of whether the Supreme Court can review
such tribal court decisions has never been presented, and the Court has not heard any
challenges to tribal court interpretations of ICRA's substantive provisions since
Martinez.
26. Several factors likely account for this, the most prominent being: (1)
defendants' greater familiarity with, and trust in, tribal courts and; (2) the cost and
effort of filing a separate federal lawsuit.
27. See infra Part IV.B.4(c) & (f)(i).
28. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 55 ("[R]ecognizing that standards of analysis
developed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause [are] not
necessarily controlling in the interpretation of [the ICRA] . . .

29. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
30. See, eg., Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Williams, 19 Indian L Rep. 6001,
6002-03 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1991) (applying distinctive tribal
interpretation to ICRA guarantee with regard to search and seizure).
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traditions.3 1 In other words, there is no requirement that ICRA's
provisions-even though they are federal law-have a uniform
meaning across Indian country. This wise policy reflects the reality
that Native Americans are not a single community, but rather a
plurality of tribe-based communities.
As a consequence of these six factors, the tribal courts have
doctrinally developed the meaning of ICRA's substantive provisions.
Furthermore, each tribe has been free to develop its own notions of
"due process," "equal protection," "search and seizures," and the like
in light of its own needs and values. Thus, although the United States
Supreme Court has articulated a specific interpretation of (let's say)
due process, there is nonuniformity of interpretation of "due process"
as between general society and the enclaves of Indian country. There
is also nonuniformity of interpretations between different Native
American communities.
B. Non-ICRA Limits on TribalPowers
Tribal court freedom to interpret ICRA does not mean that tribal
governments can do whatever they please within Indian country.
There are numerous non-ICRA limitations on tribes' powers. These
limitations can be divided into two useful general categories: (1)
limits on what the governments can do to their own people (Indians
who are members of the tribe, generally known as "members" within
the parlance of Native American law) and; (2) limits on what the
governments can do to "outsiders." Outsiders include Indians who
are not members of the tribe, known as "non-members," and nonIndians.
Tribal civil law powers are at their zenith with respect to members
because they are limited only by ICRA (and, presumably, by
international human rights law).32 The tribe's criminal authority vis-avis members, however, is subject to significant limitations; federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over fourteen statutorily
enumerated "major crimes, ' 33 and the tribe can imprison members no
more than one year for committing all non-major crimes. Tribes'
powers vis-a-vis outsiders are even more limited. Tribal civil authority
over outsiders, both legislative and adjudicatory, is governed by
federal common law, as articulated by federal courts.'
Although
tribes' criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians is identical to

31. See, e.g., Rave v. Reynolds, 22 Indian L. Rep. 6137, 6139 (Winnebago Tribal
Ct. 1995) (noting that other tribes' holdings are "not binding on this court").
32. International human rights law, however, provides a floor of protections
considerably lower than federal constitutional law.

33. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153 (1994).
34. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 44548 (1997) (identifying case law
defining the "limited circumstances" in which tribes have jurisdiction over outsiders).
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their power over members3 s tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians.36

II. TOOLS To ANALYZE ICRA's REGIME OF MULTIPLE
AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETERS

This part develops two important analytical tools for evaluating
ICRA's regime of multiple authoritative interpreters. The first tool is
a system for analyzing the nature of tribal court deviations from
ordinary federal doctrine. The second tool is a framework that
identifies the considerations relevant to judging how well ICRA
operates.
A. The Five PossibleApproaches to Past Supreme Court
Pronouncements
When courts other than the Supreme Court are given the power to
offer authoritative interpretations of a quasi-constitutional provision,
there are five possible approaches they can take to past Supreme
Court pronouncements. Clarifying each is important for several
reasons. First, the patterns bring order to the tribal case law. Second,
each approach is capable of producing a distinct range of variations
from ordinary doctrine.
1. A Simple Model for Describing Constitutional Doctrine
]The five approaches to past Supreme Court pronouncements can
best be appreciated in relation to a simple model that describes the
state of development of any particular constitutional doctrinef
Understanding the model, in turn, requires appreciation of the widely
discussed distinction between "rules" and "standards."''
Standards
are legal edicts that "describe a triggering event in abstract terms that
35. As is the case with members, tribes can prosecute non-member Indians only
for crimes that are not enumerated in the Major Crimes Act. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 11521153.
36. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that
tribes are without power to criminally prosecute non-Indians as a matter of nonICRA federal law).
37. This is a refinement of a model of constitutional interpretation that I
developed in an earlier article. See Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note

7, at 1141-44.
38. There is a long lineage of scholarly literature that discusses rules and
standards. See Frederick Schauer, Playing By the Rules: A Philosophical Examination
of Rule-Based Decisionmaking in Law and in Life (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke LJ. 557, 574-77 (1992); Mark D.
Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?-Recent American Codifications,
and Their Impact on Judicial Practiceand the Law's Subsequent Development, 1994
Wis. L. Rev. 1119, 1162-64 [hereinafter Rosen, Recent American Codifications];
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justicesof Rules and Standards,106 Harv. L Rev. 24,57-69
(1992).
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refer to the ultimate policy or goal animating the law. '' 39 Rules, by
contrast, are legal edicts that "describe the triggering event with
factual particulars or other language that is determinate within a
community." 40
Now to the simple model. All the ICRA provisions take the form
of standards that require active interpretation to identify concretely
the actions that are required, permitted or proscribed in particular
circumstances.
The interpretive process can be usefully
conceptualized as involving three, and sometimes four, steps. The
steps do not necessarily correspond to the chronology of the
constitutional provisions' interpretation.41 Identifying the steps is
useful because they provide a means of assessing the nature and scope
of tribal court deviations from ordinary doctrine.
First, the provision can be identified with a general "Goal," by
which I mean a broad-stroke description of what the provision
attempts to accomplish. 42 The Goal sets the parameters within which
subsequent doctrinal development occurs. 43 For example, the Goal of
the Fourth Amendment has been identified as protecting various
"personal and societal values" including a "right to privacy." 44 It is
easy to forget that the Goal is almost always a nonaxiomatic
translation of the constitutional provision and instead view the
contemporarily understood Goal as inevitable.45 Understanding that
the Goal is part of the process of doctrinal development, however, is
vital to appreciating the scope of a multiple authoritative interpreter's
deviations from ordinary doctrine.
The second step in the interpretive process is the creation of a
"Legal Test" to determine whether the identified Goal is met. 46 This
39. Mark D. Rosen, Nonformalistic Law in Time and Space, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev.
622, 623 (1999) [hereinafter Rosen, Nonformalistic Law].
40. Id.
41. See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
42. It does not matter for present purposes on what basis the Goal is identified.
For one influential topology, see Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 11-22
(1991).
43. This does not mean that identification of the Goal is what happens first in time
during the interpretive process-it frequently is not, see infra notes 45-46 and
accompanying text-but just that doctrinal development is affected by the Goal after
it has been identified.
44. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177,181-83 (1984).
45. This explains why the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872)
Court's understanding of the Goal of equal protection (that equal protection is
intended solely to protect African-Americans) and Professor Currie's suggestion that
due process could plausibly be understood as limiting only the executive branch, see
David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years,
1789-1888 272 (1992), typically are shocking to people.
46. Frequently the identified Goal implies a limited set of possible Legal Tests,
but it also frequently is the case that two or more possible Goals could lead to an
identical Legal Test, the significance of which is that the chosen Goal is reflected only
in the Legal Test's application.
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second step is necessary because the Goal inevitably is too abstract
and, consequently, unworkable for the judiciary's institutional needs
of having a shorthand method for decisionmaking that identifies only
a subset of the infinite facts that characterize any given circumstance
as legally relevant. The test almost always includes one or more
"Standards." For example, the Supreme Court has translated the
previously mentioned Fourth Amendment Goal into a Legal Test
comprised of several Standards that ask whether "the individual
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the
challenged search" and whether society is "willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable."47 This Legal Test helps to particularize
the Goal, but by deploying Standards such as "reasonable" and
"expectation of privacy" still leaves uncertainty as to what satisfies the
test.
Step three describes what occurs to the Legal Test's Standard over
time. As the Standard is applied over a series of cases, it almost
always becomes increasingly rule-like. This occurs because cases, by
nature, are disputes that involve particular facts. As the cases are
decided they become examples of what, as a concrete matter, the
Standard means.'
I dub this process the "Rulification of the
Standard" and will call step three's product a "Rulified Standard."
For example, do people have a "subjective expectation of privacy" in
open fields? The Court has said no.49 In curtilage surrounded by a
high double fence? Not from a naked-eye observation taken from an
aircraft, according to the Supreme Court. 0
This simple model of interpretation can be graphically depicted as
follows:

47. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
48. Over time, in fact, often the facts of decided cases substitute for the abstract
Standard, which is reflected in the phenomenon of courts reasoning analogically from
the facts of previously decided cases rather than considering the Standard. It is worth
noting that steps three and four occur in jurisprudential systems (like that of the
United States) where cases are reported and there is a strong expectation of
consistency from case to case. They would not occur in a legal culture where case law
is not reported or where judges are entrusted to make their best judgments in the case
at hand.
49. See Oliver,466 U.S. at 177.
50. See Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 213-14.
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MODEL OF INTERPRETATION
Constitutional or ICRA
Provision
1.

Goal

2.

Standard

3.

Rulified Standard

LEGAL
TEST

2. Five Possible Approaches to Federal Case Law
It is useful to distinguish among five possible approaches that can
be taken by the tribal courts when they exercise their power to
independently construe quasi-constitutional provisions.
First, the tribal court could ignore altogether the federal case law
and proceed to construe the provision wholly on its own. 5 1 Let us call
this the "Tabula Rasa" approach. For example, in Navajo Nation v.
Crockett, 3 the tribal court looked to "Navajo common law" rather
than American case law to define the contours of free speech. The
51. It should be noted that the mere fact that a tribal court does not cite to federal
case law does not mean it is engaging in Tabula Rasa. Federal standards sometimes
become so ingrained that courts invoke the formula (for example, due process
requires notice and hearing) without bothering to cite to federal case law. Such courts
do not ignore the federal case law but have deeply assimilated it. See infra note 203-23
and accompanying text. Sometimes it can be difficult to distinguish Tabula Rasa from
this type of deep assimilation.
52. To be sure, Tabula Rasa represents an idealization. Tribal court justices
frequently are aware of at least some of the Supreme Court precedent and hence
cannot be said to construe ICRA provisions without reference to the federal case law,
even if federal cases are not mentioned. Even so, the mere effort to take a Tabula
Rasa approach to interpreting a provision is significant for purposes of understanding
the nature of the resulting jurisprudence. Also, as we will see, it is sometimes the
approach taken by tribal courts and appears to largely succeed insofar as courts
sometimes articulate truly novel understandings of the provisions in question.
53. 24 Indian L. Rep. 6027, 6028 (Navajo 1996).
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court noted that a Navajo has a "fundamental right to express his or
her mind by way of the spoken word and/or actions." ' But this right

is limited insofar as there is "freedom with responsibility."55 The

Navajo concept of responsibility can impose permissible content
limitations. For example, "on some occasions, a person is prohibited
from making certain statements, and some statements of reciting oral
traditions are prohibited during specific times of the year."'
Responsibility also can impose limits with respect to style of
presentation; thus, "speech should be delivered with respect and

honesty."'
Finally, Navajo responsibility can impose "another
limitation on speech, which is that a disgruntled person must speak
directly with the person's relative about his or her concerns before
seeking other avenues of redress with strangers."8

In the

employment context, for example, the Navajo court held that an
employee dissatisfied with his supervisor "should not seek to correct
the person by summoning the coercive powers of a powerful person or
entity" but instead must first engage in the process of "talking things
out" with his superior. 9 As Crockett demonstrates, and as intuition

would suggest, the Tabula Rasa approach can create doctrines that are
virtually unrecognizable to students of American constitutional law. 0
54. Id
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id at 6029.
58. Id.
59. Id. The process of "talking things out" must be utilized unless the employee's
dissatisfactions concern matters of "public concern." Id.
60. Generally, the first time a court proceeds to construe a provision via the
Tabula Rasa approach it does not create "doctrines," but instead produces an ipse
dixit opinion in which the tribal court almost tautologically identifies a set of facts as
violative of an ICRA provision without attempting to formulate a Legal Test. See,
e.g., Rave v. Ho-Chunk Nation Gaming Comm'n, 25 Indian L Rep. 6042, 6044 (HoChunk Nation Tribal Ct. 1997) (identifying what a lower court had done and asserting
that "[t]his action is without foundation in law. It is arbitrary. It is capricious. It is an
abuse of discretion"). Although such an approach might appear at first to be lawless,
it parallels the reasoning found in the early Supreme Court opinions that provide the
first applications of constitutional provisions. See e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 633 (1886) (deploying similarly conclusive analysis bereft of any usable rule in
early self-incrimination decision) Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 594 (1880) ;
(same in early due process opinion); Currie, supra note 45, at 443 (stating that the
Supreme Court's analysis in its first First Amendment case was "wholly conclusory,"
noting considerations not taken account of by the Court, but then concluding "[a]l of
this, however, has developed through years of experience in first amendment
litigation and could scarcely have been expected to emerge full-blown in the Court's
first encounter with the clause"). Such a pattern of ipse dLrit outcomes followed by
rule synthesis is not surprising and is consistent with the common law method of
lawmaking that characterizes judicial constitutional interpretation. See generally
David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. Chi. L Rev. 877
(1996). Typically, it is not until there has been a minimum number of cases decided
that common law courts feel comfortable attempting to create Legal Standards or,
frequently, Goals.
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The remaining four approaches involve varying degrees of
engagement with, and adoption of, the federal case law. The second
approach can be conceptualized as the polar opposite of Tabula Rasa.
Under it, the tribal court completely incorporates the federal doctrine
to the extent the doctrine has been developed; the tribal court adopts
the Goal, Standard, or the Rulified Standard. I will call this
"Incorporation." It is important to note that when the tribal court
utilizes the Incorporation approach, the tribal court is not superfluous.
In respect of this, it is useful to distinguish between two types of
Incorporation. Sometimes tribal courts adopt the federal case law
without explanation 61-what I will label "Stock Incorporation." Stock
Incorporation is a mode of interpretation in which tribal courts
provide the least value added, but even in these circumstances, tribal
courts are not wholly superfluous insofar as Incorporation is their
decision, thereby advancing the value of self-government. More
frequently, however, tribal courts actively fit the federal doctrine to
the tribal context-what I call "Fitted Incorporation." This can take

several forms. First, tribal courts frequently engage in Incorporation
only after establishing that the federal approach fits well within the
tribal context,62 a determination that an ordinary federal court might
not be capable of making. 63 Second, the tribal court that Incorporates
61. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Navajo Nation, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6003, 6007-08
(Navajo 1990) (undertaking close analysis of federal self-incrimination case law to
determine whether the protection applies to personal diaries; "[w]hile the thrust of
Supreme Court decisions appears to be approaching such a holding, we are not
prepared to conclude that such is the actual state of the law").
62. In Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Williams, 19 Indian L. Rep. 6001, 6002-03
(Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1991) (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170
(1984)), for example, the tribal court adopted the federal "open fields" search and
seizure rule-under which an "open field is neither a house nor an effect, and
therefore the government's entrance upon open fields is not an unreasonable search
within the meaning of the fourth amendment" - only after determining that the
federal doctrine was the "most appropriate and just doctrine to apply in the tribal
context."
63. The recognition that general courts may not be capable of discerning the
needs of an idiosyncratic community has led the Supreme Court both to limit the
jurisdiction of general federal courts, see, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163,
166-69 (1994) (concluding that ordinary federal courts are without "competence" to
make what are "essentially military judgments" and holding that enlisted persons may
not bring Bivens actions against their superior officers in federal courts), and to
expand the jurisdiction of community tribunals to adjudicate matters affecting the
community. See e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978) (holding
that federal courts have only limited subject matter jurisdiction with respect to ICRA
claims because "resolution of statutory issues under [ICRA] ...will frequently
depend on questions of tribal tradition and custom which tribal forums may be in a
better position to evaluate than federal courts"). Similarly, in Corp. of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374
(D.C. Cir. 1987), the court upheld, against an equal protection challenge, the
American Samoa territory courts, whose rulings could not be reviewed by Article III
courts. The Hodel court cited to the reasons adduced by the district court such as
"American Samoa's relatively small size" and "its desire for autonomy in local
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a federal doctrine that is not developed far beyond a Standard still has
to apply the Standard to the tribal context, and the tribal court is
probably far better suited to undertaking this central aspect of legal
interpretation than a general federal court.' Third, tribal courts that
Incorporate may conceptualize the federal approach as being
consistent with, or derivable from, tribal culture and values, and such
a way of conceptualizing the legal rule may have important social
meaning to the tribal community that would be lost if the adjudication
took place in a general federal court.5 Although the federal Legal
Test is adopted in all three instances of Fitted Incorporation, the tribal
court plays an important role in bringing together tribal and Anglo
traditions.
The remaining three approaches involve rejecting federal doctrine
to varying degrees as being ill suited to the tribal context. Under the
third approach, the tribal court adopts the federal Standard but
disregards the Rulification of the Standard.66 Instead, the tribal court
applies the Standard in a manner that is closely tailored to the
context-at-hand. I will call this "Tailoring." Tailoring is well
illustrated by the case of Colville Confederated Tribes v. Bray,67 where
the issue was what due process protections nonwarrant arrestees
enjoyed. Federal case law had established that constitutional due
process requires that defendants arrested without a warrant be
brought "promptly" before a judge, and that this meant forty-eight
hours absent exceptional circumstances.68 The tribal court accepted
the Supreme Court's Goal and Standard, but not its Rulified
Standard. It invoked the Standard, that there be a "reasonable
accommodation of the competing interests,"'69 and ruled that the tribal
ordinance's seventy-two hour requirement satisfied the "promptly"
requirement. The tribal court's requirement avoided having to hold
weekend court for Friday night arrestees, and "[t]he cost to the Tribes

affairs" then noted that the scheme was a rational means of respecting Samoan
traditions concerning land ownership. Congress' policy of respecting traditional land

ownership "could be frustrated if the High Court's judgments in such cases were
reviewed by one of the circuit courts of appeal, which are Article III courts but which
lack expertise in Samoan law and culture." Id. at 386-87.

64. See supra note 63.
65. I develop this point in greater detail. See infra notes 121-28 and accompanying

text.
66. In practice, it can be difficult to distinguish between Tailoring and Fitted

Incorporation because it is not always clear whether a Standard has become a
Rulified Standard. Though the precise characterization may be a close call, the model
of interpretation presented here is useful because locating an interpretation on the
border between Tailoring and Incorporation still tells one much about the nature of
the court's reasoning and of the resulting deviation from ordinary doctrine.

67. 26 Indian L. Rep. 6061 (Colville Tribal Ct. 1999).
6& Id. at 6061 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-18 (1975)).
69. Id
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for this procedure would seem to outweigh the extra 24 hours for a
defendant."70
The fourth interpretive technique is to adopt federal courts'
description of the Goal but reject the federal courts' Standard. Call
this method "Re-standardizing." For example, in Hopi Tribe v.
Lonewolf Scott,7 the Hopi tribal court accepted that the Goal of due
process's void for vagueness doctrine is to ensure that persons have
fair notice of what conduct is criminally sanctionable. But instead of
deploying the ordinary Standard-an objective test that looks to the
mere "possibility of discriminatory enforcement" and lack of
notice 72 -the court applied a subjective test and analyzed how the
Native American community in question understood the ordinance
and how the tribal authorities had applied it.73
The fifth and final approach is to replace the Goal identified by the
Supreme Court. Call this "Re-Targeting." An example of ReTargeting can be seen in Downey v. Bigman,74 where the Navajo
Supreme Court decided that the Goal of the jury right was not only to
preserve litigants' rights, but also to advance the tribal community's
interest in "participatory democracy," that is, participation in lawmaking and law-application. This represents a Re-Targeting because
the United States Supreme Court's stated Goal behind Sixth and
Seventh Amendment jury rights concerns the rights of the litigant and
the integrity of the legal system, not rights of jurors to participate in
government. Re-Targeting of the jury right led the tribal court to
create a new jury procedure7 6 in which the jury was empowered to
direct questions to witnesses.

70. Id.
71. 14 Indian L. Rep. 6001, 6005 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1986).
72. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1082 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).

73. See Lonewolf Scott, 14 Indian L. Rep. at 6005.
74. 22 Indian L. Rep. 6145 (Navajo 1995).

75. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 335 (1996) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("The primary purpose of the jury in our legal system is to stand between
the accused and the powers of the State."); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530
(1975) ("The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power- to
make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the
overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps
over-conditioned or biased response of a judge."); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149,
157 (1973) ("[T]he purpose of the jury trial in criminal cases [is] to prevent

government oppression and, in criminal and civil cases, to assure a fair and equitable
resolution of factual issues." (internal citations omitted)). The Court, on occasion,
has alluded to the benefit to the community of participating in law-making, see, e.g.,
J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994), but this has not referred to
citizens' roles as lawmakers but instead to the harm caused by "the State's
participation in the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable
loss of confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the
courtroom engenders." Id.
76. Downey, 22 Indian L. Rep. at 6146-47.
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All that remains is the definition of a few more terms that cut across
the five approaches. Under all approaches except for Tabula Rasa,
the tribal court "adopts" federal case law.
Under Fitted
Incorporation, Tailoring, Re-standardizing, and Re-Targeting, the
tribal court also "adapts" the federal law to the tribal context. I will
refer to the last set of interpretive approaches collectively as
"Adapted Adoption." Finally, because tribal courts sometimes cite to
other tribal court opinions as precedent, it is important to distinguish
between "subjective" and "objective" adapted adoption. "Subjective
Adoption" refers to cases where the tribal court itself looks to federal
case law and either Tailors, Re-standardizes, Re-targets, or
Incorporates. "Objective Adoption" refers to a tribal court's de facto
adoption of the federal doctrine without its having cited to federal law
(as, for instance, when the tribal court cites to tribal case law as
precedent that itself utilized Subjective Adoption).
To summarize, the five approaches that a multiple authoritative
interpreter can take can be mapped onto the model of interpretation
as follows:
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MODEL OF
INTERPRETATION

FIVE APPROACHES TO
FEDERAL CASE LAW
ignores
federal approach in totQ

(1)

TABULA RASA:

(2)

INCORPORATION, FITTED
AND STOCK: adopts federal

approach in toto

ICRA
Provision

Goal

(3)

deviating

from federal approach here

I
(4)

RE-STANDARDIZING:

deviating from federal
approach here

Standard

I
(5)
Rulified
Standard

RE-TARGETING:

TAILORING: deviating
from federal approach
here
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3. Comparing the Five Approaches

Of the five approaches, Tabula Rasa and Re-Targeting can
potentially create the most radical departures from the meaning
ascribed to the Bill of Rights by federal courts.
After all,
Incorporation, Tailoring, and Re-standardizing accept the Goal
identified by the Supreme Court as representing the principle behind
the ICRA provision; what drives Tailoring and Re-standardizing is
simply the view that realizing the Goal in the context-at-hand requires
a deviation from behaviors that ordinarily are constitutionally
required, permitted, or proscribed. By contrast, Re-Targeting recasts
the Goal and thereby broadens the range of possible deviation, and
Tabula Rasa allows for this as well. Incorporation self-evidently leads
to the smallest deviation from the ordinary federal case law: none.
The differences between Tabula Rasa and Re-Targeting, in terms of
the potential deviation from ordinary doctrine, are subtle. On the one
hand, Tabula Rasa provides the same opportunity to alter the Goal as
does Re-Targeting. On the other hand, Re-Targeting does not
necessarily occur in Tabula Rasa. It is possible, after all, that the
tribal court could independently determine that an ICRA provision
has the same Goal or even Legal Test as does its Bill of Rights
counterpart. There is, however, one respect in which Tabula Rasa
provides a greater possibility for deviation than Re-Targeting.
Because Re-Targeting is performed in relation to the federal case law,
it is possible (if not likely) that the Goal identified by the Supreme
Court, even though it is rejected by the court that Re-targets, still
plays a role in limiting the range of considered goals. As a cognitive
matter, the identified Goal might circumscribe the range of imagined
alternatives.' To the extent that a tribal court could really approach
an ICRA provision without preconceived notions provided by federal
case law-an uncertain possibility, to be sure-the Tabula Rasa
approach is not so limited.
Though more limited than Re-Targeting and Tabula Rasa in terms
of creating deviations, Tailoring and Re-standardizing also have the
potential to create significant departures from ordinary requirements.
This can be illustrated most dramatically by examining Tailoring, the
method that generates the fewest deviations from ordinary
constitutionalism. Tailoring is the most limited approach because it
accepts more of the teachings of federal case law as relevant to the
context-at-hand (adopting both Goal and Standard) than do the other
methods. Even so, Tailoring can cause immense deviations from what
is ordinarily permitted or proscribed. The magnitude of the departure
is dependent on the character of the Standard and on how

77. Cf. Rosen, Recent American Codifications, supra note 38, at 1217-52
(observing a similar phenomenon that results from codifying common law).
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community-specific the court is willing to tailor. If the Standard itself
contains broad standards and the court does a highly context-sensitive
analysis, Tailoring can produce profound deviations. For example,
Tailoring has been utilized to uphold prior restraints in select places in
this country.78

B. Normative Frameworkto Analyze the ICRA Regime
This subsection creates a framework for evaluating ICRA's regime
of multiple authoritative interpreters.
1. Potential Benefits
Three core benefits result from ICRA's regime of multiple
authoritative interpreters. First, it increases tribes' powers of selfgovernance. Second, it permits variations in governmental structures
and accordingly extends the possible range of institutional diversity.
Third, and derivative of the first two, ICRA's regime of multiple
authoritative interpreters enables communities to flourish that
otherwise might not because some tribal communities' very selfdefinition turns on having the power to govern themselves or requires
governmental institutions that would not be compatible with standard
federal court interpretations of the Bill of Rights.
ICRA's regime of multiple authoritative interpreters has the
potential of bringing another benefit to non-Indian society. It can
help maintain, and may even assist, the legal imagination in general
society. The existence of precedent, particularly longstanding
precedent, may hinder people's ability to recognize a doctrine's
noninevitability and the fact that there are alternatives to it.79 ICRA's
regime of multiple authoritative interpreters can serve as a correction
for this tendency because alternative interpreters, though not deciding
that the Supreme Court's interpretation is wrong, may construe or
apply an ICRA provision that is analogous to a Bill of Rights
provision in a manner at variance from the Supreme Court's
interpretation. Deviations from the ordinary in any of the ways
discussed above-even Tailoring-can be illuminating 8 in much the
way that comparative law can be: it can provide alternative doctrinal
78. See Rosen, OurNonuniform Constitution, supra note 7, at 1148-49.
79. See Rosen, Recent American Codifications,supra note 38, at 1199-1252 (noting
similar phenomenon in context of codification); cf. Eric Talley, PrecedentialCascades:
An Appraisal,73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 87, 90-105 (1999) (discussing the possibility of similar

phenomenon of "precedential cascades," though ultimately concluding that such
events are unlikely).
80. Seeing the Tailoring performed by one of the tribal courts can be instructive to
courts in general society, for example, insofar as courts frequently "favor inductive
reasoning from already decided cases over deducing concrete requirements from legal
rules or standards in matters of first impression" and accordingly overlook the
possibility of Tailoring. Rosen, OurNonuniform Constitution,supra note 7, at 1173.
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means of realizing similar objectives and help society recognize the
nonaxiomatic assumptions that are incorporated into ordinary federal
courts' constitutional interpretations."'
2. Potential Costs
There is one core potential cost of ICRA's regime of multiple
authoritative interpreters and two ancillary costs.
a. Protection
The core potential cost is that permitting tribal courts to construe
independently ICRA's provisions may subvert the very protections of
Native Americans' civil rights that ICRA was intended to provide in
the first place. I will label this the value of "Protection."
It is difficult as an a priori matter, however, to identify what
substantive interpretations would undermine Protection. The most
obvious candidate-that any variation from what is constitutionally
required in general society violates Protection-does not survive
scrutiny either doctrinally or normatively. Doctrinally, more than 20
years ago the Supreme Court expressly approved what many federal
appellate courts long had held: that ICRA's provisions need not have
the same substantive meanings as their sister terms in the Bill of
Rights. 2 The logic behind this determination is that ICRA was
intended to accomplish two goals that are in tension with one another:
(1) protecting the rights of persons who enter Indian country by
imposing limits on tribal governments, and (2) preserving "Indian selfgovernment" and protecting the "tribe's ability to maintain itself as a
culturally and politically distinct entity."' Over the past twenty years,
Congress has considered amending ICRA many times to respond to
the Martinez decision,m but at no point has it suggested that this
aspect of the case should be overruled by statute. As a doctrinal
matter, therefore, it is clear that under ICRA the value of Protection
is not undermined simply by deviations from what the Bill of Rights
requires.
As a normative matter, doctrinal variations are not necessarily
violative of Protection, and they may even be necessary to best realize
Protection. Foundational liberal commitments memorialized in the
Constitution may demand the accommodation of select illiberal
81. See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108
Yale L-. 1225, 1238-85 (1999) (identifying these as benefits to be gained through the

study of comparative constitutional law).
82. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,55 (1978). For an example of
a pre-Martinez appellate court decision that held the same, see Tom v. Sutton, 533
F.2d 1101, 1104 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976).

83. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 72.
84. See infra note 526 or 429 and accompanying text.
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communities; not accommodating them may violate the communities'
association interests as well as their members' liberty interests in
being able to actualize themselves in accordance with their
understanding of what self-actualization requires.85 This is not to
suggest that liberal commitments impose no limits on which
communities should be accommodated and to what extent-but they
impose fewer restrictions than is generally thought. In the end,
identifying what variants from ordinary constitutional doctrines
violate Protection requires recourse to a thick political theory.
Elsewhere I have explicated such a thick political theory that
identifies which communities should be accommodated by our liberal
constitutional order and to what extent, 6 and I will provide a brief
overview of it below. In this Article, however, I will draw from this
thick theory only occasionally and instead proceed primarily
inductively. I do so for several reasons. First, as is the case with all
thick theories, the particular theory I have propounded rests on
nonaxiomatic and controversial grounds (for example, it deploys a
Rawlsian framework that not everyone would accept). Because I
believe that the empirical findings concerning ICRA are relevant even
to those who do not accept my thick political theory, I prefer to
present the findings in a manner that does not presume the reader's
agreement with it.
Second, the inductive approach alone can, at the very least, defeat a
potentially devastating threshold objection that can be leveled at
ICRA's regime of multiple authoritative interpreters. Disposing of
this criticism makes the task of finalizing a thick political theory all the
more urgent. The threshold objection is that one does not need a
thick political theory to know that Protection would be imperiled if
the multiple interpreters did not take seriously their responsibilities by
failing to engage in "good faith" interpretation. Indeed, one might be
tempted to suggest that Protection is inherently undermined as a
structural matter by the very institution of tribal courts because tribal
courts are a part of the tribal government that Congress has attempted
to constrain via ICRA to protect Indians and visitors to Indian
country in the first place. Allowing the tribal courts to be the
authoritative interpreters of the very statute that seeks to regulate the
tribes could be viewed as tantamount to asking the fox to guard the
henhouse, an inherent contradiction that is only deepened by the fact
that there was firm tribal opposition to what the Indian community

85. For a full exposition of this, see Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 7, at 10891106. In addition, the normative strength of Native Americans' claims to variations
that facilitate the flourishing of their communities surely are strengthened by virtue of
the history of their displacement by the early Americans.
86. For an effort to create such a theory, see id. at 1093-1106 (identifying limits on
what perfectionist communities can do within their enclaves).
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largely perceived to be ICRA's unjustified interference with tribal
sovereignty. s7
The power of such a structural critique, however, ultimately turns
on empirics because it is possible that tribal judges take their
institutional roles seriously. Determining whether tribal judges take
their role seriously requires a systematic examination of the case law
to determine if the tribal courts have undertaken the task of
interpreting ICRA in good faith. Close examination of the ICRA
case law provided in Part IV refutes the accusation that they have not;
tribal courts, for the most part, have engaged in good faith
interpretation and application of ICRA.
Though good faith interpretation is a necessary condition for
Protection to be preserved, it is not a sufficient condition.
Determining the outer limits of acceptable variations from ordinary
constitutional doctrines ultimately requires a thick political theory.
Elsewhere I have tried to answer the question of what variations from
ordinary liberal practices are acceptable from a Rawlsian
perspective.' What follows is a brief overview of that framework for
determining what communities should be accommodated and to what
extent.
Rawlsians seek to construct a just society by trying to imagine what
political institutions people in an "original position" would choose.
Under the original position, people are under a "veil of ignorance"
and they do not know their religious, philosophical, or moral
convictions. People in the original position accordingly would choose
a basic political structure that would grant liberty to the broadest
possible range of people to self-actualize in the manner that they
deem necessary for their self-actualization. People in the original
position would be exceedingly concerned about maximizing the range
of individuals who could be accommodated because they would be
fearful of creating a polity that might prevent them (whoever they
might be) from self-actualizing. The people in the original position
would seek to accommodate the interests of "political perfectionists"
as well as ordinary liberals. Political perfectionists are those who
believe that their self-actualization requires that they live in a small
polity whose local governments are empowered to advance their
community's understandings of the "good." People in the original
position would want to accommodate such separatists because the
persons they represent might be political perfectionists and they
87. See Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An HistoricalAnalysis of the 1968 'Indian Civil

Rights'Act, 9 Harv. J. on Legis. 557,589-90 (1972).
8& See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 7, at 1064-71, 1089-1125. For an
explanation as to why it might be important to ground a liberal approach in Rawls,
see id. at 1061-63. For a similar deployment of Rawls, see Greene, supra note 8, at 814. For a libertarian approach to similar questions, see Nozick, supra note 8, at 297334.
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would not want to create a polity that would not allow themselves to
self-actualize.8 9
But how could such separatists be accommodated? A federalist
structure is the key: such communities could be allowed to largely
govern themselves in select discrete geographical enclaves, subject to
only two limited, but critical, constraints imposed by the central
government. The first limitation is that the communities would not be
permitted to disrupt the stability of the larger society-what might be
called a requirement of "well-orderedness." The rationale behind
such a limitation is that those in the original position seek to construct
a stable larger polity and accordingly would not agree to a political
structure that was inherently unstable. Well-orderedness requires that
those in the perfectionist enclaves live peacefully with those outside
their enclave, limits the externalities perfectionists can impose on
their neighbors, and may even restrict the activities that can be
undertaken within their enclave if the performance of certain acts that
are too offensive to general society within the enclave may be
destabilizing to the larger polity. 9°
The second requirement is that those within the perfectionist
enclave be able to "exit" it. People in the original position would
agree that an exit right is necessary because without it a polity would
reproduce the problem that led them to accommodate political
perfectionists in the first place; the polity would not maximally secure
the liberty for its citizens to self-actualize because non-political
perfectionists who find themselves within a perfectionist enclave
would not be able to relocate and live in a non-perfectionist society,
where they presumably believe self-actualization is most likely. The
specific contours of the exit right are tricky to identify, however,
because the exit right works against the needs of many political
perfectionists to maintain the type of control over their citizens they
find necessary. There is an inherent tension here, and the specific
contours of the "exit right" can be fleshed out by asking what people
in the original position would agree fair. As I have argued elsewhere,
the exit right would require that children raised within the enclave be
knowledgeable enough about the outside world to make an informed
choice about remaining or exiting. The exit right would also demand
that those raised within the enclave receive training that would permit
them to make a living outside the enclave to ensure that exit is more
89. To be more precise, my analysis distinguishes between "universalist political

perfectionists," who believe that the federal government must pursue the good, and
"localist political perfectionists," who are ideologically committed only to living in a
small polity that is empowered to actively advance their community's view of the
good. Liberal thought requires the accommodation of localist political perfectionists
but cannot accommodate universalist political perfectionists. See Rosen, Outer Limits,
supra note 7, at 1069, 1095-96, 1111-12.
90. See id. at 1093-97.
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than a mere theoretical option. 91 The exit right would not, however,
preclude perfectionist communities from incarcerating people who
have violated their penal laws if the community followed fair and
consistent adjudicatory procedures., Apart from the limitations of well-orderedness and exit, a Rawlsian
liberal's commitments lead to the conclusion that political
perfectionists should be permitted to govern themselves as they see fit
within their enclaves.
Native Americans qualify as political
perfectionists because they believe that they will be unable to sustain
their distinctive cultures and communities unless they have the
autonomy to govern themselves within their discrete enclaves. 93
These enclaves are known as Indian country. As a normative matter,
the value of Protection is best preserved when political perfectionists
like Native Americans are free to govern themselves, subject to the
constraints imposed by well-orderedness and exit. ICRA is a
limitation imposed by the central government that helps ensure that
these limitations are respected. 9 Under this thick political theory,
determining whether the power of tribal courts to interpret and apply
ICRA undermines Protection turns on an analysis of whether wellorderedness and exit are respected or subverted under ICRA's regime
of multiple authoritative interpreters.
b. Ancillary Costs
There are two potential costs of secondary importance caused by
ICRA's regime of multiple authoritative interpreters. The first is that
such a regime creates inefficiencies because it allows the same legal
question to be constantly relitigated and permits the creation of
nonuniform law. While it is undeniable that regimes of multiple
authoritative interpreters incur some costs, it is not axiomatic that
such costs would be inefficient. Variations in public goods across
locales can lead to greater efficiencies in the allocation of public goods
than having only one set because people can move to the locale that

91. See id. at 1097-1106.
92. See id. at 1100. Parallel doctrines in American law illustrate the correctness of
this proposition. Although there is a constitutional right to travel, see Saenz v. Roe,
119 S. Ct. 1518, 1524-26 (1999), States obviously are permitted to incarcerate those
who break their laws. Indeed, under certain circumstances States may even enhance

criminal penalties for those who have committed a crime and then depart the State.
See Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412,422-23 (1981).

93. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 7, at 1134-35.
94. Elsewhere I have criticized ICRA as an unjustified federal intrusion on Indian
political autonomy. See Rosen, Nonformalistic Law, supra note 39, at 629 & n.40;
Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 7, at 1136. It could be argued, however, that ICRA

ensures that Native American constitutional sensibilities are sufficiently akin to
general society's and, therefore, well-orderedness is secured. I am indebted to a
conversation with Professor Ken Simons, which made this point clear to me.
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provides the public goods they value.95
Detailed doctrinal
formulations of quasi-constitutional principles may well qualify as
public goods whose variations from locale to locale might lead to net
efficiency gains. In any event, even if there are efficiency costs to
creating a regime of multiple authoritative interpreters, such costs
would be relevant but not dispositive in assessing the normative
desirability of creating such a regime insofar as financial costs are only
one of many relevant considerations.
The second cost is externalities. Whether and to what extent
externalities materialize, however, hinges on which provisions the
multiple authoritative interpreters are entrusted with construing. It is
conceivable that they could be given the power to construe only
provisions that impose virtually no costs on those outside the enclave
other than the knowledge that people within are behaving in
accordance with different rules.
3. The Analytical Framework
The desirability of ICRA's regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters turns on a balancing of its potential benefits against
potential costs. I have divided the analytical framework for evaluating
ICRA into two categories. The first set of four criteria assesses
whether the ICRA regime of multiple authoritative interpreters has
achieved the potential benefits. The second set of criteria measures
whether ICRA has incurred any of the potential costs that attend
regimes of multiple authoritative interpreters. The framework can be
graphically summarized as follows:
Framework for Analyzing ICRA's Regimes of

Multiple Authoritative Interpreters
Potential Benefits
1.
2.
3.
4.

Institutional Diversity
Community-building
Self-Governance
Legal Imagination

Potential Costs
1. Protection
2. Inefficiencies
3. Externalities

95. For the classic statement of this point, see Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416, 418-20 (1956). Extensive literature has
grown from Tiebout's article. See, e.g., George Zodrow (ed.), Local Provision of
Public Services: The Tiebout Model After Twenty-five Years (1983) (collecting
articles analyzing the Tiebout model).
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III. METHODOLOGICAL NOTES CONCERNING THE STUDY

This part provides background information essential to
understanding the empirical review of the ICRA case law that is
provided in Part IV. Subsection A explains important information
about tribal courts. Subsections B and C discuss the data relied upon
and the study's methodology.
A. Tribal Courts
Because tribal courts construe and apply the bulk of ICRA's
provisions, understanding ICRA's implementation requires an
understanding of the tribal courts themselves.
1. Structure of Tribal Courts
Adjudication in Indian country takes place in either tribal courts or
Courts of Indian Offenses. Courts of Indian Offenses, frequently
called "CFR Courts," are established and run by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. The reported case law demonstrates that virtually all ICRA
adjudication occurs in tribal courts. Tribal courts are the adjudicatory
bodies that are created either by tribal constitutions or the tribal
legislative bodies. Most tribal constitutions do not directly create
judiciaries or require a separation of powers, and therefore, virtually
all tribal courts are the creation of tribal councils.96
Lacking constitutionally mandated structure and form, there is
great diversity among the approximately five hundred and eleven
tribal courts in the United States. 97 The Navajo Nation, for example,
has seven district courts, a children's court, a peacemaker court within
each district, 8 and an appellate court called the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court. Some tribes, such as the Chickasaw Nation, the
96. See Frank Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal
Courts and the Role of the Tribal Bar as an Interpretive Community: An Essay, 18

N.M. L. Rev. 49,55-56 (1988). This is not to suggest that tribal courts are therefore an
organic part of Indian culture. In fact, tribal constitutions were required by the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, and virtually all tribal constitutions were drafted
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and utilized boilerplate language. See Felix S. Cohen,
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 149-50 (1982). These historical facts make it

possible to draw valid generalizations about Indian constitutions.
97. There are 511 courts as defined by the Indian Tribal Justice Act, which
includes various courts of dispute resolution in Arkansas. There are approximately

350 tribal courts, excluding Arkansas natives. See E-mail from David Seldon, Law
Librarian, National Indian Law Library/Native American Rights Fund, to Mark D.

Rosen, Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law (Aug. 31, 2000, 17:10.00
MST) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
98. The peacemaker court "integrate[s] traditional Navajo dispute resolution
methods with traditional Anglo-American judicial methods." Tom Tso, The Process
of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 Ariz. L Rev. 225, 227 n.3 (1989); see also
Zion, The Navajo PeacemakerCourt Deference to the Old and Accommodation to the
New, 11 Am. Indian L. Rev. 89, 99-107 (1983) (discussing the peacemaker courts).
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Choctaw Nation, the Pueblo of Sandia, and the Pueblo of Taos, do not
have appellate courts. In some tribes, the tribal council-the body
that enacts tribal legislation-functions as the appellate forum. In
many of the pueblos in New Mexico, the tribal leader functions as
tribal judge. Finally, many tribes belong to inter-tribal court and
appellate systems. For example, the Intertribal Court of Appeals
consists of the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux

Tribe, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, the Three Affiliated Tribes, and the
Omaha Tribe. 9 The tribal courts also vary on account of the "sizes of
the tribes, their reservations' general populations, their caseloads,
their wealth and resources, their traditions, and the tribunals'
longevity."a1"

2. The Role of the Tribal Judiciary: Doctrinal Considerations
Notwithstanding

the

differences

among

the

tribal

courts

represented in the reported case law," 1 one important commonality is

that they are institutions that independently review the limits on tribal
government imposed by ICRA.11 Indeed, assumption of this function
is mandated by federal law. When the Supreme Court ruled in
Martinez that federal courts were generally unable to hear ICRA
claims, it also stated that tribes must provide forums "to vindicate
rights created by ICRA."1 3 Furthermore, although most tribal
constitutions do not require a separation of powers between the
legislative and judicial bodies, tribal courts have consistently held that
99. United States Commission on Civil Rights, The Indian Civil Rights Act 32-33
(1991) [hereinafter Commission Report].
100. Id. at 32. For example, whereas the Navajo Tribal Courts handled more than
40,000 cases in 1983, the Las Vegas Paiute Tribal Court heard only 14. Id.
101. For more on this, see infra Part III.B.
102. I have found only one reported case in which a tribal court has held that it
lacks the power of judicial review. See Lane-Oreiro v. Lummi Indian Bus. Council, 21
Indian L. Rep. 6143 (Lummi Tribal Ct. 1994). The case grounds its decision in the
tribal tradition of deference to elders who obtain their leadership position as tribal
council members through a lifetime of wisdom and garnering respect.
103. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978). Most tribal courts
accordingly have held that even though there is not a general separation of powers
requirement, there is a specific requirement for there to be an independent tribal
judicial forum to hear ICRA claims. See, e.g., Good Iron v. Hall, 26 Indian L. Rep.
6029, 6030 (D. Ct. of Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation 1998).
Some tribal courts, however, have based their jurisdictional powers in respect of
ICRA on a presumption of power in the absence of specific tribal ordinances to the
contrary. See, e.g., Stone v. Swan, 19 Indian L. Rep. 6093, 6094 (Colville Tribal Ct.
1992); Comm. for Better Tribal Gov't v. S. Ute Election Bd., 17 Indian L. Rep. 6095,
6096 (S.Ute Tribal Ct. 1990). But this reasoning overlooks the fact that the Supreme
Court's holding in Martinez is the basis in federal law for tribal courts' powers of
judicial review, and accordingly understates the legal justification for judicial review.
To date, there have been no reported cases concerning a tribal council's effort to
eliminate a tribal court's power of judicial review through legislation-a circumstance
whose outcome would depend upon which legal theory for judicial review the tribal
court adopted.
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efforts by tribal council members to exert "undue influence" on the
courts violate ICRA's due process guarantees. 104

The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, however, is a potential
doctrinal obstacle to the tribal courts' functioning as fora to vindicate
ICRA rights. Martinez specifically held that ICRA did not waive
tribal sovereign immunity." 5 Although this at first might seem to be

at odds with Martinez's other holding that tribal courts must provide
forums to vindicate ICRA rights, it is important to note that the most
commonly asserted claims against Federal and State governments to
vindicate civil rights claims-Bivens and § 1983 claims-are also not
premised on waivers of sovereign immunity."°6 Prospective injunctive
relief or damages against government officials who have acted beyond
the scope
of their duties is the typical remedy obtained in these
107
cases.

The same is true of Native American tribes. Many tribal courts
have held that ICRA does not waive tribal sovereign immunity," but
have allowed prospective injunctive relief or damages where tribal
officials act beyond the scope of their duties. 1°9 This structure of
104. See, eg., Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Dupree Am. Legion Club, 19 Indian
L. Rep. 6097, 6101 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1992) (noting that overreaching
by tribal council that impedes judicial autonomy would "raise fundamental question
of due process" in violation of ICRA). Though tribal councils for the most part
appear to have respected the role of the tribal courts, I have found one case where the
council sought to depose the chief tribal judge due, apparently, to disagreement with
the judge's rulings. See McKinney v. Bus. Council of the Shoshone-Paiute Tribes, 20
Indian L. Rep. 6020 (Duck Valley Tribal Ct. 1993). The chief judge was subsequently
reinstated by the tribal court. Id.
105. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59 ("[T]he provisions of section 1303 can hardly be read
as a general waiver of the tribe's sovereign immunity. In the absence here of any
unequivocal expression of contrary legislative intent, we conclude that suits against
the tribe under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign immunity from suit.").
106. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989) (holding that
§ 1983 did not override state sovereign immunity); McCollum v. Bolger, 794 F.2d 602,
608 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that a Bivens action cannot be brought against the federal
government because there is no waiver of sovereign immunity). The Supreme Court
recently unanimously ruled that federal agencies are not subject to Bivens suits. See
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994). Section 1983 actions can be brought
against municipalities, but only with regard to municipal policies or customs that are
unconstitutional or illegal. See Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-94
(1978).
107. See, eg., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)
(granting monetary relief against federal agents in their individual capacity).
10& See eg., TBI Contractors, Inc. v. Navajo Tribe, 16 Indian L Rep. 6017, 601819 (Navajo 1988). On the other hand, many tribal courts have held otherwise and
found that ICRA waived tribal immunity. See e.g., LeCompte v. Jewett, 12 Indian L
Rep. 6025, 6026-27 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1985); Oglala Sioux Tribal Pers.
Bd. v. Red Shirt, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6052-53 (Oglala Sioux Ct. App. 1983); Davis v.
Keplin, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6148,6149 (Turtle Mountain Tribal Ct. 1991).
109. See eg., Comm. for Better Tribal Gov't v. S. Ute Election Bd., 17 Indian L.
Rep. 6095, 6097 (S. Ute Tribal Ct. 1990) ("Although sovereign immunity bars Indian
Civil Rights Act suits against tribes, this tribal immunity only 'extends to tribal
officials acting in their representative capacity and within the scope of their
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remedies need not interfere with the deployment of ICRA to protect
rights in keeping with Martinez's charge." 0 Limiting tribes' financial
exposure is particularly important because most tribes have modest
financial resources."'
B. Data
The study's greatest limitation is the incomplete body of reported
case law from which it was able to draw. Most tribes do not publish
their tribal court opinions, and the most comprehensive reporter of
tribal court decisions, the Indian Law Reporter, typically publishes no
more than one hundred decisions per year that come from about
twenty-five tribes. Further, the Indian Law Reporter does not publish
all the cases that are submitted to it by tribes. For these reasons, the
reported case law is highly selective, rendering any effort to generalize
about what is happening in Indian country impossible. The data does,
however, help provide a concrete understanding of what is possible
within the ICRA regime. To the extent that favorable patterns
emerge from the limited data set available, it is advisable to institute
information-gathering changes in the law (like funding and requiring
the publication of tribal court decisions) to help illuminate what is
really occurring in tribal courts, rather than respond to anecdotal
evidence of tribal court abuses by radically restructuring tribal court
jurisdiction.
C. Methodology
Eschewing reliance on indices, the study examined every published
tribal court decision reported in the Indian Law Reporter over the
thirteen year period from 1986 to 1998 (and five reported cases from
1999; the reporter service is backlogged). The study only considered
those cases in which some substantive provision of ICRA, or
analogous provisions in a tribal constitution, was construed. Thus, the
study does not include the many opinions that deal exclusively with
authority."' (quoting Snow v. Quinalt Indian Nation, 709 F.2d 1319, 1321 (9th Cir.
1983))).
110. While the case law analyzed infra in Part IV shows that tribal sovereign

immunity has not precluded meaningful utilization of ICRA to bring about changes in
tribal government, the limited case law available for this study does not permit the

broader conclusion that tribal sovereign immunity has not been problematic to

realizing ICRA's goals. For a study concluding that tribal sovereign immunity
sometimes has proven to be problematic, see Commission Report, supra note 99, at
72.
111. See Johnson v. Navajo Nation, 14 Indian L. Rep. 6037, 6040 (Navajo 1987)
(holding that because sovereign immunity has such great "direct consequences on the
Navajo tribal treasury," the principle that the Navajos "are entitled to a
representative and accountable" tribal government demands that any decision
concerning waiver of immunity be made by the "elected representatives of the Navajo
people" (citations omitted)).
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important legal issues such as sovereign immunity, the nature of the
relief (injunctions as opposed to damages, for example), and the like.
Also, the study does not give consideration to cases where ICRA is
simply mentioned but not substantially analyzed." 2
The study does not distinguish between cases interpreting ICRA
provisions and tribal constitutional provisions. This merits some
explanation. Nearly all tribes have tribal constitutions with provisions
that track verbatim ICRA and the Bill of Rights. These tribal
constitutional provisions are frequently relied on by litigants in tribal
courts in conjunction with ICRA and, sometimes, are the only
provisions invoked by litigants." 3 Although there are important
technical differences between claims based on ICRA's due process
provision and the Ho-Chunk Constitution,'14 these differences are not
relevant for purposes of this Article's study of multiple authoritative
interpreters. After all, what due process means under either ICRA or
the Ho-Chunk Constitution is determined solely by the Ho-Chunk
tribal courts, and neither is reviewable by a federal court. The tribal
court's interpretation of "due process" under the tribal constitution,
therefore, sheds as much light on the operation of a regime of multiple
authoritative interpreters as does interpretation of ICRA's due
process provision. Consequently, this Article will not differentiate
between claims based on ICRA and the tribal constitutions.
In total, there were 194 reported cases, in which 249 claims were
asserted. A list of all cases and claims is provided in Appendix A.
IV. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT CASE LAW

At last, the empirical study. Subsection A examines the ICRA case
law from the vantage point of determining whether ICRA has
achieved the potential benefits associated with a regime of multiple

authoritative interpreters. Subsection B analyzes the case law to
assess what, if any, potential costs relating to such a regime have been
incurred.

112. See, eg., Brehmer v. White Wolf, 23 Indian L. Rep. 6073, 6074 (Cheyenne

River Sioux Ct. App. 1993) ("Such a summary procedure might raise some questions
of due process under [ICRA]. Given its ruling that it lacks jurisdiction over this
appeal under the tribal equivalent of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), however, the court need not
resolve such due process questions.").
113. Although it is true that the federal law of ICRA is always applicable and
accordingly would appear to provide a substantive floor below which Indian
constitutional law cannot fall, in practice it is always possible for a litigant to waive his
or her ICRA rights by failing to raise an ICRA claim.
114. For example, only claims based on ICRA's due process provision constitute a
federal claim and only ICRA provides a basis for federal court jurisdiction under §
1303's habeas provision. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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A. Testing the Framework'sFirstSet of Criteria: PotentialBenefits
The framework's first set of criteria determines whether a regime of
multiple authoritative interpreters achieves any or all of its potential
benefits of extending possibilities for self-governance, expanding the
range of legal and institutional options, enabling idiosyncratic but
valuable communities to flourish, and firing the legal imagination.
There is ample evidence that ICRA has achieved the first three
potential benefits. There is no evidence that the fourth benefit has
been realized, but this is not surprising in light of the widespread
unawareness of ICRA among those not expert in federal Indian law.
Hopefully, this Article may help to change this present reality.
1. The Overlap of Distinctive Doctrines, Community-Building and
Self-Governance
The potential benefits of community-building, distinctive
institutions, and self-government overlap in the context of ICRA.
Indeed, in Martinez, the case that played a key role in creating the
ICRA regime of multiple authoritative interpreters," 5 the Supreme
Court explicitly linked all three potential benefits. The Martinez
Court justified its holding on the ground that "the retained
sovereignty of the tribes is that needed to... preserve their own
unique customs and social order.'1 6 The Court concluded that ICRA
was intended to enhance both "Indian self-government" and the
"tribe's1' ability
to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct
17
entity.'

Upon examination of the interpretive canons used by the tribal
courts as well as the courts' substantive holdings, it is evident that the
ICRA regime of multiple authoritative interpreters has realized these
benefits, as shown below in subsections two to five.
2. Tribal Interpretive Canons
Consistent with the license provided by the Supreme Court in the
Martinez case, 118 the principal interpretive approach taken by virtually
all 9 tribal courts in construing ICRA is that its provisions need not be
interpreted in the same way as their sister terms in the Bill of Rights.
115. This is true insofar as Martinez deprived federal courts of virtually all subject
matter jurisdiction, leaving jurisdiction to tribal courts, and made clear that each
tribe's tribal court could construe the ICRA provisions in light of its own values and
needs. See supra notes 22-25, 31 and accompanying text.
116. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685-86 (1990).
117. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62,72 (1977).
118. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
119. One tribal court has concluded that ICRA's provisions should be given the
same meanings as Bill of Rights provisions. See Walker River Paiute Tribe v. Jake, 23
Indian L. Rep. 6204, 6205-07 (Walker River Tribal Ct. 1996).
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Instead, the provisions are to be construed in light of tribal traditions,
values and needs. For example, in Ponca Tribal Election Board v.
Snake,"0 the tribal court stated that:
[w]hen analyzing due process claims, it is important to note that the
Indian nations have formulated their own notions of due process and
equal protection in compliance with both aboriginal and modem
tribal law. Indian Tribes, whose legal traditions are rooted in more
informal traditions and customs, are markedly different from
English common law countries, upon which the United States'
notions of due process are founded."'
Similarly, in Plummer v. Plummer," the tribal court held that "due
process protections are a product of moral principles, and our own
morality and tribal customs frame such principles in the Navajo way."
For these sorts of reasons, cautioned the Snakee -3 court, "[w]hen
entering the arena of due process in the context of an Indian tribe,
courts should not simply rely on ideas of due process rooted in the
Anglo-American system and then attempt to apply these concepts to
tribal governments as if they were states or the Federal
government." 124
This does not mean, however, that the tribal courts are unwilling to
consult federal case law. For example, the very next sentence in the
Snake opinion states: "[t]hat is not to say that the general concepts of
due process analysis with regard to state and federal governments are
wholly inapplicable to Indian governments.""
Tribal willingness to
look seriously at federal case law is consistent with the methods of
interpretation identified in the model of ICRA interpretation- 6 as
well as the significant degree of tribal assimilation of basic Anglo
political values that is evident in the tribal case law, a finding
examined below in depth.- 7 Nonetheless, tribal courts recognize that
federal "precedents are certainly not dispositive nor controlling in the
tribal context. One should tread lightly when analyzing the scope and
nature of tribal sovereignty and not make assumptions based upon a
history and legal tradition that might be entirely foreign to an Indian
nation."'- 8

120. 17 Indian L. Rep. 6085 (Ponca Ct. App. 1988).
121. Id.; see also Kinslow v. Bus. Comm. of the Citizen Band of Potawatomi, 15
Indian L. Rep. 6007 (Citizen Band Potawatomi Sup. Ct. 1988) (similar).
122. 17 Indian L. Rep. 6151, 6152 (Navajo 1990).
123. 17 Indian L. Rep. at 6088.
124. Id. Another court has put the matter succinctly: "[uInder the Indian Civil
Rights Act, parties... should be cautious in evaluating due process in Anglo terms."
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Wiley, 23 Indian L. Rep. 6037, 6037 n.4 (Colville
Tribal Ct. 1996).
125. Snake, 17 Indian L. Rep. at 6088.
126. See supra Part II.A.2.
127. See infra Part IV.B.3.
128. Snake, 17 Indian L. Rep. at 6088.
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3. Identical Outcomes
It is worth noting from the start that the benefits of communitybuilding and self-governance do not necessarily require that there be
substantive outcomes in the tribal courts that differ from the likely
outcomes in federal courts (though diversity of legal doctrines and
institutions by definition does). This is most readily seen in respect to
the value of self-governance, which simply requires that the tribe have
the power to self-govern, but on its own says nothing about the
substance of the governing policies. It is equally true, however, that
community-building can be advanced by tribal court decisions that
rely on tribe-specific values and approaches to achieve the same
outcomes that federal courts would likely reach.
The case of Atcitty v. District Court for the Judicial District of

Window Rock1 29 is instructive in this regard. The issue in Atcitty was
whether mere applicants for housing services on the Navajo
Reservation had a sufficient property interest to assert due process
claims that the housing services department's procedures were
inadequate. The tribal court engaged in Tailoring.130 The court
adopted the federal Standard that a claimant must have a "legitimate
claim, rather than a mere unilateral expectation, to the benefit," but
instead of using the Legal Test developed by federal courts-which
required an examination of the "statutes and policy guidelines to
determine whether a claimant has the requisite legitimate claim to the
benefit"-the tribal court defined "legitimate claim" by reference to
the Navajo concept of k'e, which concerns "one's unique, reciprocal
relationships to the community and the universe. ' '131 According to the
court, k'e "frames the Navajo perception of moral
right, and therefore
1' 32
this court's interpretation of due process rights.'
[K'e] promotes respect, solidarity, compassion and cooperation so
that people may live in hozho, or harmony. K'e stresses the duties
and obligations of individuals relative to their community. The
importance of k'e to maintaining social order cannot be overstated.
In light of k'e, due process can be understood as a means to ensure
that individuals who are living in a state of disorder or disharmony
are brought back into the community
so that order for the entire
33
community can be reestablished.

K'e required the court to examine the Navajo doctrine of
"distributive justice":
"[d]istributive justice is concerned with the well-being of everyone in
a community. For instance, if I see a hungry person, it does not
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

24 Indian L. Rep. 6013 (Navajo 1996).
See id.; Part II.A.2.
24 Indian L. Rep. at 6014.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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matter whether I am responsible for the hunger. If someone is
injured, it is irrelevant that I did not hurt that person. I have a
responsibility, as a Navajo, to treat everyone as if he or she were my
relative and therefore to help that hungry person. I am responsible
for all my relatives. This value which translates itself into law under
the Navajo system of justice is that everyone is part of a community,
and the resources of the community must be shared with all."

Distributive justice requires sharing of Navajo Nation resources
among eligible applicants." '
Applying these principles to due process, the court then ruled that
"[i]f the respondents are eligible for receiving governmental benefits,
and although they are mere applicants, they have a sufficient property
interest under Navajo common law to assert due process claims."'
Even though the same outcome probably would have been obtained
in a federal court utilizing ordinary federal doctrine,1' it is important
vis-a-vis not only self-governance but also community-building that
the tribal court had the opportunity to arrive at its legal conclusion by
reference to its tribe's particular cultural values. Although not all
communities require the type of political autonomy afforded by
regimes of multiple authoritative interpreters in order to flourish,L
the power to create law that multiple authoritative interpreters
provides-that is, the power to articulate both the holding and the
narrative within which the legal outcome is situated-is important for
some communities. 1m Where the multiple authoritative interpreter
arrives at an outcome indistinguishable from the outcome that would
have been obtained in ordinary courts, the community-building
function multiple authoritative interpreters serves is to afford the
community the opportunity to treat the community narratives that
reflect their self-understandings (such as k'e and Navajo distributive
justice) as law rather than mere literature. This allows the
communities to gain the socializing and other benefits the law
affords. 139

134. Id. (quoting The Honorable Robert Yazzie, Life Comes From It: Navajo
Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. Rev. 175, 185 (1994)).
135. Id.
136. See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (noting
that "welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly had a claim of entitlement to welfare

payments that was grounded in the statute defining eligibility for them.

The

recipients had not yet shown that they were, in fact, within the statutory terms of

eligibility. But we held that they had a right to a hearing at which they might attempt
to do so").
137. For a discussion of what types of communities might need such powers, see
Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 7, at 1064-86.

138 See Cover, supra note 8, at 40-44 (discussing "jurispathic" power of general
society's law to destroy some communities).

139. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 7, at 1064-86 (discussing significant

socializing effect of law).
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4. Variant Outcomes
Frequently, however, community-building is viewed as requiring
outcomes that vary from the outcomes that would have been obtained
in ordinary federal courts under ordinary federal doctrines. Here are
some examples.
a. Due Process and Respect for TribalLeadership
In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Bray,140 the issue was whether
due process requires that a judge, rather than the prosecutor, make
the probable cause determination following a nonwarrant arrest.
Supreme Court case law requires that such determinations be made
by a judge.141 Deploying the interpretive approach of Tailoring, the
tribal court ruled that the prosecutor could also make that
determination in the tribal context. 142 The Bray court came to its
conclusion based on the traditional Indian value of trust in leadership.
The court noted that "[L]eaders... were chosen because of the
respect others had for their decision-making ability in a particular
area .... Traditionally, when a tribal leader made a decision, it was
followed because of the respect and trust the tribal community had for
him. ' '143 The Bray court concluded that the trust deemed integral to
tribal government would be undermined by the type of checks and
balances that Anglo due process required.'" This is not to say that the
tribe ceded its autonomy to despots and gave up its powers of selfgovernment; trust was consistent with self-rule because "when the
community no longer trusted the decision-making ability of the
leader, they just stopped following him."' 45 The Bray court held that
these traditional principles carried over to the instant context:
[i]t is incumbent upon the tribal judges and justices to sustain the
attitude of trust and respect in their leadership role in the Indian
community in order to maintain the community's confidence in the
court system .... [The tribe must trust] that46 the prosecutor will, in
fact, truly and faithfully carry out his duties.1

140. 26 Indian L. Rep. 6061 (Colville Tribal Ct. 1999).
141. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1975).
142. For a court that has held otherwise, see Walker River Pahjute Tribe v. Jake, 23
Indian L. Rep. 6204, 6206 (Walker River Tribal Ct. 1996) (noting that the probable
cause determination following a warrantless arrest must be "made by a neutral tribal
court judge").
143. Bray, 26 Indian L. Rep. at 6062 (citations omitted).
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 6062-63 (citations omitted). The Bray court recognized that today
leaders are chosen differently and that the existence of written laws both removes
discretion and impedes the community from deciding when it will stop following a
given leader. Id. The court nevertheless held that there remained avenues for tribal
members to express distrust of prosecutors and that the better approach was to allow
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b. Search and Seizure and Checking After Members' Welfare
A man named Kahe had not been seen by his Hopi neighbors for
more than a day. Concerned about Kahe's well-being, a neighbor
asked the police to look for him. Pursuant to this request, tribal police
stopped Kahe's vehicle for what was known on the Hopi reservation
as a "welfare check." Though the stop had not been prompted by
concerns of criminal conduct, the police requested to see Kahe's
license and search his car. The tribal police found alcohol, which was
illegal, upon searching the vehicle.
In Hopi Tribe v. Kahe,147 the issue was whether the search and
seizure violated ICRA's prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The court employed Fitted Incorporation, adopting the
federal doctrinal rubric of "probable cause" to determine if the stop
and search was lawful but determining the content of "probable
cause" by reference to considerations unique to the Hopi tribe."4 The
court determined that the welfare check was lawful, but that the
requests to see the driver's license and search the car were not.'49
Whether there was probable cause had to be determined by taking
"into consideration customary and traditional ways of the Hopi
people. Because of the extended family system, Hopi people look out
for and take care of each other. It is Hopi to be concerned about the
welfare of your family and neighbors and to make sure that they are
)
okay. 150
The Kahe court concluded that the tribal police had probable cause
to stop the vehicle, because "when someone makes a request of the
police to check on the well-being of a person it is expected that police
officers have the responsibility and obligation to make the welfare
check. ' ' 51 But concern for not construing the law of search and
seizure in a manner that would undermine Hopi values led to the
court's second holding: that the tribal police's request to see the
defendant's license and search his car was unreasonable.5' - The Kahe
court stated that "this court wants to encourage the principle behind
welfare stops, it does not want to discourage calls from concerned
family members with the threat that those individuals will
immediately be subject to arrest."" 3

in the first instance for a government structure that called upon and cultivated the

tribe's trust in its leaders. Id.
147. 21 Indian L. Rep. 6079 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1994).

14& See id at 6079.
149. See idat 6080.
150. Id. at 6079.
151. Id.

152. See idat 6080.
153. Id at 6079.
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c. Void for Vagueness, Honesty, and the Integrationof Wrongdoers
Back Into the Community
A man named Stepetin had driven his truck at high speed on a
gravel road in close proximity to people, injuring no one but killing a
dog.154 A tribal ordinance provided that "[w]here state law.., does
not conflict with the Tribal Code, the Tribal Court may resort to and
enforce any state statute within tribal jurisdiction." 155 No provisions
of the tribal code directly governed Stepetin's actions, but a provision
of State law criminalized them. 156 Stepetin was prosecuted
under the
57
tribal ordinance insofar as it incorporated State law.
The question before the tribal court in Stepetin v. Nisqually Indian
Community158 was whether the tribal ordinance violated ICRA's due
process guarantees because it was void for vagueness. A majority of
the tribal court answered in the affirmative. Deploying Stock
Incorporation, the tribal court held that "[t]he principle underlying
the vagueness doctrine is that no one is to be held criminally
responsible for conduct which he or she could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed."'59 Even though "[a]ny reasonable
person should know this type of conduct is prohibited in any
community.., the issue [is] not whether [defendant] knew this
conduct was wrong, but whether he knew it was a crime."' a The
incorporation provision did not meet this test.'61
The partial dissent in Stepetin highlights the connection between
variations from ordinary doctrines and community well-being. The
partial dissent criticized the majority for "ignoring the internal
dynamics of the tribal community."' 162 In response to the majority's
importation of the ordinary federal Legal Test that the analysis turned
not on the defendant's knowledge of wrongdoing but on whether he
knew it was a crime, the dissent Re-Standardized. The partial dissent
criticized the majority's conclusion that criminal prohibitions had to
appear in written statutes, noting that "traditionally, for a member of
what is now the Nisqually Indian Community, there was no difference
between wrongful conduct and that which was societally sanctioned"
and that it did not matter whether the source of the tribal member's
knowledge was a written prohibition or an oral tradition. 63 The
154. See Stepetin v. Nisqually Indian Cmty., 20 Indian L. Rep. 6049 (Nisqually Ct.

App. 1993).
155. Id. at 6050 (citation omitted).
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See id. at 6050-51.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 6051.
Id.
See id. at 6051.

162. Id. at 6052 (Irvin, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163. Id. at 6053.
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partial dissent concluded that the rule for ICRA due process purposes
should follow the traditional Nisqually approach because ICRA is to
be construed "in the context of tribal traditions" and in view of the
"cultural expectations and the dynamics of the tribal community.')26
Applying the Re-standardized rule in the context at hand, the partial
dissent concluded that the defendant had the requisite actual
knowledge that his behavior was wrong.'6
Of particular significance for present purposes is the partial
dissent's argument that the majority's approach harmed the
community's well-being. The majority's rule rewarded a defendant's
factually false claim that he lacked notice, thereby interfering with the
"high value on telling the truth, and on the admission of fault by a
wrongdoer" valued by the tribal community.'6
Moreover, the
majority's rule hindered the "correction of the wrongful conduct
and/or recompense for its consequences" that is "necessary in order
for the wrongdoer to be taken back into the fold of the tribal
community. To allow an offender to go unpunished for obvious
wrongdoing is destructive to the social health of the tribal
community." 167

d. Novel Doctrinesand the Value of Self-Governance
Several tribal courts have created novel legal doctrines designed to
advance the tribal value of self-governance. Utilizing the jury right,
the case of Downey v. Bigman16 developed limitations on the powers
164. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
165. The partial dissent stated that Stepetin "knew that the type of behavior he
engaged in could result in tribally imposed sanctions" by virtue of his having lived in
the "close-knit society" of the Nisqually Indian Community all his life. Id. His
"knowledge of those common social duties imposed by traditional tribal mores
constituted adequate notice that his conduct could [trigger] tribal sanctions." Id.
Furthermore, continued the partial dissent, the defendant "also had actual notice that
the reckless driving statute and other state motor vehicle offenses were being
enforced on the Nisqually Reservation, and that his conduct could or would be
criminally punished ....[W]ord travels very fast [on the reservation] ...To discount

its existence and effectiveness in providing notice... would be to deny reality." Id. at
6053-54.
166. Id. at 6055.
167. Id. For the purpose of illustrating the connection between nonuniformity and
community-building, it does not matter that the dissent's view did not sway the
majority. It is interesting, however, to contemplate why the majority ruled as it did.
The majority appears to agree with the dissent's description of the "realities" of tribal
life. See id. at 6051 ("We are aware that on the Nisqually Reservation word may travel
quickly throughout the reservation."). The majority, however, does not explain why
it believes the dissent's reliance on the Nisqually cultural context is mistaken. See id.
The majority simply asserts that the enactment of written ordinances constitutes the
quasi-constitutionally "proper" modality for disseminating information about
criminally proscribed activity. Id. The majority's adoption of written requirements
perhaps can best be explained as an instance of the assimilation of Anglo values. For
more on this point, see infra Part IV.B.3.
168. 22 Indian L. Rep. 6145 (Navajo 1995).
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of tribal judges to disregard jury findings. The court grounded its
doctrinal holdings in tribal customs that reflected concerns not only
for the rights of the defendant but also the community's interest in
participating in government. Consulting tribal tradition, the court first
noted that juries are a "modem expression of our longstanding legacy
of participatory democracy," that is "the ability of the people as a
whole to make law":
Navajo participatory democracy guarantees participants their
fundamental right to speak on an issue, and discussion continues
until the participants reach consensus. In this sense, decisions are a
product of agreement among the community rather than a select
few. Status, wealth and age are not determinants of whether a
person may participate in the decision-making process.
Furthermore, no one is pressured to agree to a certain solution,169and
persuasion, not coercion, is the vehicle for prompting decisions.
The court also stated that juries are a continuation of the tradition
of "community participation in the resolution of disputes through
deliberation and consensus. ' 170 A juror participates in community
self-governance by interpreting and executing community laws.
These tradition-based principles led the Bigman court to adopt
strict limits on a trial court's ability to overturn a jury verdict. 171 They
also resulted in the court's creation of a novel jury procedure under
which jurors may "ask questions of the witnesses during trial" so that
the jury would be "more reflective of Navajo participatory
democracy."172 In basing its holding on the proposition that the jury
right encompassed both individual rights and community values of
political participation, the tribal court engaged in Re-Targeting
insofar as the Goal behind the jury right in American constitutional
law is to protect the defendant and the173integrity of the judiciary, not to
provide a forum for self-government.
Similarly, in Rough Rock Community School v. Navajo Nation,74
the tribal court relied on both Tailoring and Re-Standardizing to
advance values of self-governance. In Rough Rock, an ordinance that
169. Id. at 6146.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 6146-47 (stating that the judge cannot become a thirteenth juror;
overturning a "decision made by consensus" is "an authoritarian practice" that is
permissible only when "the evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the
finding.., or when the jury is confused").
172 Id. at 6146. The court also decided that "[t]o maintain impartiality, all the
questions will be channeled through the judge, whose authority to permit or forbid
the question is discretionary." Id.
173. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. Interestingly, Professor Akhil
Amar has argued that the federal jury right was originally intended to play a similar
role. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131,
1187-89 (1991) (speaking of jurors' roles as "political participants" in the minds of the
founders).
174. 22 Indian L. Rep. 6162 (Navajo 1995).
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limited the field of candidates for the position of school board

representative to persons who had a "demonstrated interest,
experience and ability in Educational Management" was invalidated

on due process grounds. 17 5 The tribal court first held that there exists
a Navajo "higher law," akin to "'the Anglo concept of natural law,"'
that can be found in "Navajo customs and traditions that are
fundamental and basic to Navajo life and society.' 7 6 Navajo higher
law guarantees Navajos the "political liberty" to participate in
government, and in the Tailoring section of its opinion the court held
that this political liberty is protected under the ICRA due process
clause. 17 To decide whether the candidacy prerequisites violated due
process, the court Re-Standardized. Looking once again to tribal
traditions, the court determined that laws that affect liberties derived
from "higher law" must have "ascertainable standards" or they violate
due process.7
This new Standard reflected fundamental Navajo
values: the absence of "objective" standards "delegate[s] unregulated
discretion which could lead to manipulation and abuses of authority.
Navajo thought deplores abuses of authority because of the
consensual and egalitarian principles of governance.""179
The
ordinance did not satisfy these requirements and, therefore, was
struck down by the court.
e. VariationsAcross Tribes
Finally, it is worthwhile to reiterate that tribal courts create
nonuniformities vis-a-vis not only United States constitutional law but
also other tribes. Thus, although tribes sometimes cite to the opinions
of other tribal courts, m most often they cite only to case law from
their own tribe's courts. When citing to other tribes' courts,
moreover, they have noted that the decisions of other tribes' courts
8
are not binding on them.'1
Tribal courts have recognized that they
175. Id. at 6163 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
176. Id. at 6164 (quoting Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Election Supervisors, 18 Indian
L. Rep. 6009 (Navajo 1990)).
177. See id.
17& Id. at 6165. This is a wholly new substantive rule. Under federal law, the
doctrine most similar to it, void-for-vagueness, voids civil statutes only if a statute is
"so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all." Boutilier v. INS,
387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) (quoting Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239
(1925)). Legislation affecting "fundamental rights" under substantive due processthe other analogous doctrine-are reviewed under strict scrutiny, see, eg., Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1992), a Legal Test that also is different
from the requirement of "objective" and "ascertainable standards."
179. Rough Rock, 22 Indian L. Rep. at 6165.
180. See, eg., Office of Navajo Labor Relations v. W. World, 21 Indian L Rep.
6070 (Navajo 1994) (citing to many other tribes' opinions); Kinslow v. Bus. Comm. of
the Citizen Bank Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 15 Indian L Rep. 6007, 6009 (Citizen
Band Potawatomi Sup. Ct. 1988) (citing to Navajo opinions).
18L See, eg., Rave v. Reynolds, 22 Indian L. Rep. 6137, 6139 (Winnebago Tribal
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must take into account the "custom, tradition and history" of their
own tribes in construing the ICRA provisions.1" Another factor
justifying different constructions is the unique "composition and
territory" of the tribe. 183 As one court has noted,
[i]n many cases, large tribes with large reservations have adopted
the Federal Rules of Procedure and/or have incorporated state
substantive laws into their codes. Case law from these tribal courts
does not necessarily fit smaller reservations with strongly integrated
communities, tribes with a different economic base and practices, or
tribes 18with
more relaxed procedures or simplified law and order
4
codes.

In short, Native American communities have utilized their
respective regimes of multiple authoritative interpreters to develop
legal applications that reflect and advance their communities'
distinctive values. A more extensive overview of tribal case law under
ICRA, which documents many more examples of this, is discussed
below. 185
B. Testing the Framework'sSecond Set of Criteria:Potential Costs
The framework's second set of criteria seeks to evaluate whether
ICRA has incurred any or all potential costs such as undermining
essential protections, or creating externalities or inefficiencies. The
empirical study of the ICRA case law provides strong preliminary
evidence that the costs of the ICRA regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters have been minimal. With respect to the potential cost of
Protection, the study strongly suggests that the two possible threshold
critiques of a regime of multiple authoritative interpreters in ICRAthe absence of good faith interpretation and an inherent structural
incapacity of the fox to guard the henhouse-are without merit.
Tribal courts have developed substantive ICRA doctrines with real
bite and in the process have effectuated significant changes in tribal
government practices. Additional evidence demonstrates that tribal
courts take their task of construing ICRA seriously. This evidence is
the attentiveness tribal courts give to federal court precedents when
construing ICRA's sister terms in the Bill of Rights, as well as the
tendency of tribal courts to depart from federal interpretations only
after articulating good reasons to do so. Indeed, analysis of the case
law reveals that tribal courts have assimilated many Anglo
constitutional values even though they have given the provisions
varying applications. Additional evidence is that tribal courts appear
Ct. 1995) (noting that other tribes' holdings are "not binding on this court").
182. Id.
183. Stepetin v. Nisqually Indian Cmty., 20 Indian L. Rep. 6049,6053 (Nisqually Ct.
App. 1993) (Irvin, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184. Id.
185. See infra Part IV.B.4.
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to have dealt fairly with non-Indians and non-members who have
raised ICRA claims. 86 As discussed above, however, a full evaluation
of Protection requires not only an empirical study but also a
normative theory to identify the range of doctrinal variations that is
consistent with the value of Protection. None of the cases' holdings
runs afoul of the protections that a Rawlsian framework would deem
to be essential, though the reasoning of one case is problematic.
Taken as a whole, the case law suggests that the costs to Protection, if
indeed there have been any, have been minimal.
With respect to ancillary potential costs, the tribal court case law
shows that it is possible to design a regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters that produces few externalities. Limits on tribal court
jurisdiction over outsiders has meant that virtually all ICRA
jurisprudence concerns internal tribal matters whose effects outside
Indian country are only slight. Because the study considers reported
case law and not the costs of administering tribal courts, however, the
study does not shed any light on the efficiency costs incurred by tribal
courts.

1. The Deployment of ICRA to Protect Rights and Shape Tribal
Government Practices
The costs of Protection would be prohibitively high if tribal courts
did not take their charge of interpreting ICRA seriously and instead
rendered the law's protections toothless. This has not happened. As
subsections two to four will demonstrate, tribal courts have created
doctrines that impose significant limitations on tribal governments.
For example, over the past thirteen years tribal courts have relied on
ICRA to close a tribal jail;"m enjoin tribal elections pending the
implementation of changes in voter qualifications; 1t strike down
ordinances that prescribed qualifications for public office;1' 9 reverse
the removal of tribal council members; 110 reverse tribal banishment
decrees;' 9' impose obligations on tribal governments to provide
186. There is, however, an insufficient quantity of case law to be certain about this
point. See infra Part IV.B.4.h.

187. See McDonald v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 17 Indian L Rep. 6030, 6030
(Colville Tribal Ct. 1990) (ordering closure of tribal jail facility "on the grounds that

the jail has an inadequate ventilation system, a faulty and outdated electrical
system[,] ... and... that the conditions of the jail present a danger to the health and

safety of the inmates").
18& See Kavena v. Hamilton, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6061 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1988), aff'd,
16 Indian L. Rep. 6063 (Hopi App. Ct. 1989).
189. See Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Election Supervisors, 18 Indian L Rep. 6009
(Navajo 1990).

190. See Coalition for Fair Gov't II v. Lowe, 23 Indian L Rep. 6181 (Ho-Chunk
Tribal Ct. 1996).
191. See Burns Paiute Indian Tribe v. Dick, 22 Indian L Rep. 6016, 6017 (Bums
Paiute Ct. App. 1994).
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information to tribal members; 192 require that terminated employees
be provided representation at termination hearings; 19 3 dismiss criminal
cases for the failure to prosecute in a timely fashion;194 exclude from
introduction into evidence information obtained pursuant to unlawful
searches and seizures; 195 strike down or enjoin enforcement of
ordinances for violating equal protection,'96 due process,' 97 and the
right to free exercise of religion; 198 and reverse countless
determinations
by tribal administrative bodies for due process
violations."9
2. The Respect Accorded to Federal Precedent by Tribal Courts
A prerequisite to acceptable costs vis-a-vis Protection is that the
multiple authoritative interpreters engage in good faith efforts of

interpretation.

A strong indicator that tribal courts take their

responsibilities of construing ICRA seriously is the deference tribal
courts give to federal case law construing the Bill of Rights. Although
federal case law is not binding,2'° it is cited in nearly every tribal court
opinion and plays an important role in tribal court construction of
ICRA. In the sample of tribal court opinions examined by the study,
tribal courts only occasionally engage in Tabula Rasa or Re-Targeting
and almost always deploy some form of Adapted Adoption; tribal
courts most frequently employ Tailoring and Fitted Incorporation,
commonly Re-standardize, and occasionally engage in Stock
192. See Hopi Tribe v. Consol. Cases of Emerson AMI, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6163
(Hopi App. Ct. 1996) (holding that before defendants waive right to counsel court
must tell them that lawyers understand law and procedure better than lay people, that
they will be at a disadvantage without counsel, disclose the maximum consequences
of the plea, and inform defendants of the availability of public defender); Hopi Tribe
v. Consol. Cases of Donald Mahkewa, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6144 (Hopi App. Ct. 1995)
(holding that due process requires that defendants arrested for driving under the
influence be informed of right to arrange to have an independent blood alcohol test);
In re Matter of Consol. Small Claims Cases, 24 Indian L. Rep. 6109 (Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribal Ct. 1996) (holding that due process requires court to give notice to
persons that they are entitled to a hearing of indigence after which, if they
demonstrate poverty, they will be freed after being jailed for contempt of court).
193. See Johnson v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 25 Indian L. Rep. 6011
(Mashantucket Pequot Ct. App. 1996).
194. See Suquamish Indian Tribe v. Purser, 21 Indian L. Rep. 6090 (Suquamish Ct.
App. 1992).
195. In re D.N., 22 Indian L. Rep. 6071 (Hopi Child. Ct. 1995).

196. See Conroy v. Bear Runner, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6037, 6039 (Oglala Ct. App.
1984).
197. See Rough Rock Cmty. Sch. v. Navajo Nation, 22 Indian L. Rep. 6162 (Navajo
1995).
198. See Kavena v. Hamilton, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6061, 6062 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1988).
199. See e.g., One Feather v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Pub. Safety Comm'n, 16 Indian L.
Rep. 6042 (Oglala Ct. App. 1986).
200. See id.; see also Hoopa Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v. Gerstner, 22 Indian L.
Rep. 6002, 6005 (Hoopa Ct. App. 1993) ("Even though the decisions of federal ...
courts are not controlling in this court, such decisions can be used as guidance .... ).
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Incorporation. This is not to suggest that Tabula Rasa is illicit; tribal
courts have full authority to interpret in this manner, and even
exclusive reliance on Tabula Rasa would not be per se problematic.
Nonetheless, the distribution of interpretive approaches found in
ICRA case law is illuminating in respect to "good faith" because it
demonstrates that tribal courts are not averse to consciously adopting
Anglo law that they believe to be consistent with their tribe's values.2 01
This is a strong indicator that the tribal courts do not interpret ICRA
irresponsibly. One might conclude that tribal court reliance on
federal case law reflects either a lack of legal imagination by the tribal
court or the fact that the tribal court regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters is a waste of resources. The significant tribal court
deviations from ordinary federal doctrines documented in this Article,
however, belies such inferences. Though tribal courts look to federal
case law for guidance, m they do not merely parrot federal
approaches.
3. Assimilation and Syncretism
The reported ICRA decisions indicate that tribal courts have deeply
assimilated the Anglo jurisprudential concepts that appear in ICRA's
substantive provisions even though they have given them applications
that reflect tribal values. In the words of one tribal court, "[a]lthough
tribal due process may differ when it comes to its application to
customary and traditional laws, many of the principles embodied in
the Bill of Rights have become key ingredients in the Indian legal
processes."'
The result is a syncretism of Anglo and tribal values
and, in the process, a deep assimilation of many Anglo constitutional
values by the tribal courts.4 This constitutes further evidence that
tribal courts have engaged in good faith efforts to interpret ICRA
seriously, for such assimilation otherwise would not be expected to
have occurred.
It is important to note that assimilation of Anglo concepts occurs
not only when a holding wholly adopts federal law, but also when

201. Relatedly, when tribal courts decide that tribal customs, values or needs
require either modification of the federal rule or adoption of an entirely different

rulification, they frequently explain why deviation from the federal approach is
necessary. See, eg., Suquamish Indian Tribe v. Purser, 21 Indian L.Rep. 6090, 6091
(Suquamish Ct. App. 1992); supra Part IV.
202- Cf. Tushnet, supra note 81, at 1238-69 (discussing "functionalist" benefits of
comparative constitutional law).
203. Teeman v. Burns Paiute Indian Tribe, 25 Indian L Rep. 6197, 6199 (Burns
Paiute Ct. App. 1997).

204. The case law alone does not reveal to what extent Indians who play no role in

the legal system have assimilated the Anglo values insofar as the role law plays in
"constituting" a culture varies depending upon culturally specific factors. See Tushnet,

supra note 81, at 1269-85.
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tribal courts advance unique constructions of the ICRA provisions. 205
Consider the important role that Anglo jurisprudential concepts play
when tribal courts make good faith efforts to define ICRA provisions
by reference to tribal customs. The tribal custom must be fitted within
an Anglo term, and this leads tribal courts to assimilate Anglo judicial
concepts into their lexicons and ways of thinking.2°6 This may well
lead tribal courts to adopt the larger gestalt of the system of which the
Anglo term is a part. For example, due process is part of a
jurisprudential system that emphasizes the rights of individuals rather
than the duties of individuals or the rights of the government. 2°7 The
effort to interpret the Anglo term by reference to tribal customs,
therefore, may affect tribal courts' understandings of their own tribal
customs, a particularly deep form of assimilation and cultural
syncretism.
These phenomena are well illustrated in Begay v. Navajo Nation.2"s

In Begay, the tribal court tried to derive due process' requirements by
reference to tribal customs.2°9 The tribal court held that "[tihe
concept of due process was not brought to the Navajo Nation by the
Indian Civil Rights Act .... The Navajo people have an established

custom of notifying all involved parties in a controversy and allowing
them... an opportunity to present and defend their positions."2 10 To
support this, the Court pointed to the tribe's customary approach to
dispute resolution:
[w]hen conflicts arise, involved parties will go to an elder statesman,
a medicine man, or a well-respected member of the community for
advice on the problem and to ask that person to speak with the one
they see as the cause of the conflict. The advisor will warn the
accused of the action being contemplated and give notice of the
upcoming group gathering. At the gathering, all parties directly or
indirectly involved will211be allowed to speak, after which a collective
decision will be made.
From this narrative of customary practices, the tribal court derived
205. This is true only if there is a good faith effort to construe the ICRA provision.
206. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Platero, 19 Indian L. Rep. 6049, 6050 (Navajo 1991)
(tribal court uses Anglo terms of "due process," "fundamental fairness," and

"common law" to describe traditional and distinctive Navajo law: "Navajo due
process, which is fundamental fairness in a Navajo cultural context" can be found in
"Navajo common law").
207. Cf. Helgeson v. Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians,
25 Indian L. Rep. 6045, 6053 (Lac Du Flambeau App. Ct. 1998) ("Prior to European

influence, it was a well accepted belief throughout Indian Country that individual
rights lie subordinate to the rights of the tribe ....The notion of individual rights was

foreign to Indian people and the imposition of the Indian Civil Rights Act is looked
upon as an infringement on the rights of Indians to govern themselves.").
208. 15 Indian L. Rep. 6032 (Navajo 1988).

209. Id. at 6034-35.
210. Id. at 6034.
211. Id.
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the content of what the court dubbed "Navajo customary due
process": "[t]he heart of Navajo due process, thus, is notice and an
opportunity to present and defend a position."21 The degree of deep
assimilation evidenced in Begay extends far beyond attaching an
Anglo label to customary tribal practices to the court's understanding
of the practices themselves. The narrative was intended to identify
the content of due process. But rather than yielding what the court
found-that due process requires notice and a hearing-the narrative
revealed that there were several components of customary dispute
resolution: parties (1) voluntarily went to a (2) respected elder who
gave (3) notice to the party believed to have done wrong of an (4)
upcoming group gatheringat which (5) allparties directly or indirectly
involved were allowed to (6) speak, after which a (7) collective
decision was made. The Begay court concluded that only two of these
components- "notice and an opportunity to present and defend a
position"-constituted the "heart of Navajo due process. 2 1 3 But
why? The court could have concluded that due process requires that
the aggrieved party choose an elder statesman to act as arbiter, be
part of a group gathering, and then obtain a collective decision. A
plausible explanation is that the Navajo Supreme Court's
understanding of its tribe's customary practices was influenced by the
court's understanding of what Anglo due process requires 1 4
Another gauge of deep tribal court assimilation of Anglo
jurisprudence is the evidence of tribal courts' progressive fluency wvith
the ICRA provisions. A large number of tribal cases employ terms
such as "due process," "fundamental rights," "equal protection,"
"warrant," "probable cause," and so forth, without citing to any
statutory or tribal constitutional sources.2'5 Similarly, many recent
tribal court decisions that cite to an ICRA provision will then
articulate the provision's Legal Test without citing to case law216 even
212- Id
213. Id

214. An alternative explanation is that the Begay court felt obligated to announce
that ICRA due process requires notice and a hearing and that rather than being an
occasion for unwitting assimilation, the court merely justified the preordained rule by
reference to customary practices. This is not a compelling account, however, because
there are many other cases where the Navajo Supreme Court indeed has adopted
unique standards on the basis of customary tribal practices. See, e.g., Downey v.
Bigman, 22 Indian L. Rep. 6145 (Navajo 1995) (Re-Targeting the jury right).
215. See, e.g., Palmer v. Millard, 23 Indian L. Rep. 6094 (Colville Ct. App. 1996)
(discussing "due process" but not citing to ICRA's fourth amendment analogue);
Hopi Tribe v. Kahe, 21 Indian L. Rep. 6079 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1994) ("warrant" and

"probable cause"); Carmenoros v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 18 Indian L.Rep. 6147 (S.W.
Intertribal Ct. App. 1991) ("due process"); Williams v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe,
18 Indian L. Rep. 6091 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1991) (same); George v.
Shoshone Bannock Tribes, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6084 (Shoshone Bannock Tribal Ct.
1989) ("due process" and "equal protection").

216. See, e.g., Murphy v. Standing Rock Sioux Election Comm., 17 Indian L Rep.
6069, 6071-72 (Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Ct. 1990) (holding that due process
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when other parts of the decision cite to legal authority to establish
legal propositions. 17 Ready invocation of ICRA's terminology and
doctrine without statutory and case citation suggests that the Anglo
concepts have worked their ways into tribal judges' basic professional
vocabularies and way of thinking.2 18
Furthermore, and quite
remarkably, tribal courts sometimes attribute the legislative purposes
of advancing due process and other Anglo values to tribal ordinances,
and accordingly
construe the ordinances in ways that reflect those
219
doctrines.
Another sign of deep assimilation is that tribal courts sometimes
adopt federal doctrines without apparently recognizing that there are
plausible alternatives.' 2 For example, in In re D.N.,2z the Hopi
Children's Court decided that a teacher's search inside a student's
waistband violated ICRA's guarantee against unreasonable searches.
The court recognized that federal case law was "not binding upon this
court" but consulted federal law for guidance in determining the
merits of whether the teacher's search had been unlawful. 2 Once the
court determined a violation had occurred, however, it immediately
concluded that the evidence was to be excluded. The court did not
cite to a single federal case to substantiate its decision to apply the
exclusionary remedy, nor did it consider whether the exclusionary
remedy fit the tribal context.3 The court's reflexive adoption of the

requires notice and hearing without citing to case law); In re B.F.C., 21 Indian L. Rep.
6035 (Nook. Ct. App. 1990) (same); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v.
Peone, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6136, 6137 (Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribal Ct.
1989) (waiver of trial right is valid when it is "made knowingly and intentionally").
217. See, e.g., Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Am. Tobacco Co., 25 Indian L. Rep.
6054 (Muscogee Nation D. Ct. 1998) (enumerating requirements of due process
without case law citation while citing to statutory language from other piece of
legislation in course of court's opinion).
218. Although not the primary concern of this Article, the reality of deep
assimilation gives credence to the view that ICRA imposed Anglo values
notwithstanding the fact that it granted the tribes the power to construe its terms. See
Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized FederalIndian Law, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 77, 124-25 (1993).
219. See, e.g., Johnson v. Belgarde, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6183, 6184 (Hopi App. Ct.
1996) (defining tribal ordinance term of "good cause" as requiring "reasonable notice
of a hearing and an opportunity to be heard"); Martin v. Hopi Tribe, 25 Indian L.
Rep. 6185, 6186 (Hopi App. Ct. 1996) (explaining policy behind a tribal ordinance as
being the protection of due process rights; "'the duty of the Tribal Courts to hear and
determine all cases before it in a fair and impartial manner'.., is rooted in sound
public policy and in statutes designed to protect a litigant's right to constitutional due
process" (citation omitted)).
220. This is consistent with the point made above that precedent can blunt
imagination. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
221. 22 Indian L. Rep. 6071 (Hopi Child. Ct. 1995).
222. Id.
223. See also Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Pretends Eagle, 24 Indian L. Rep. 6240,
6244 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997) (adopting exclusionary rule "without deciding the
policy reasons for this action" or pointing to tribal custom).
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Anglo approach suggests deep assimilation because the court did not
even appear to appreciate that it had made a nonaxiomatic election.
Additional evidence of deep assimilation of constitutional values
comes from the analysis in subsection four of substantive ICRA
doctrines that have been developed in tribal courts. The study
indicates that tribal courts have assimilated many Anglo values
because much of the ICRA case law bears a significant resemblance to
federal constitutional law.
4. Review of ICRA Case Law
This subsection examines tribal court interpretation of ICRA. It
describes in rich detail the nature of the questions that have been
presented to tribal courts, the substantive holdings of the tribal court
cases, and the methodologies of interpretation that the tribal courts
utilized. Rather than provide a case-by-case analysis of roughly 250
claims reported in 193 cases, 4 this subsection proceeds serially
through the major ICRA guarantees and provides an overview of the
most frequently litigated issues and outcomes. In the process, this
section points out the courts' methodologies of interpretation and
identifies the "Hard Cases," i.e., cases with results or reasoning that
likely would be troubling to enthusiasts of American constitutional
law. Whether a case qualifies as a "Hard Case" is analyzed without
recourse to a thick political theory for the purpose of providing
analysis that is relevant to the widest possible audience. Finally, this
section analyzes the Hard Cases under the thick Rawlsian political
theory outlined above.'
The overview provides several useful vantage points for assessing
whether the potential risks of having multiple authoritative
interpreters have materialized in ICRA. The methodologies and
substantive holdings of the tribal courts shed light on the strength of
the two possible threshold objections (i.e., bad faith interpretation and
structural incapacity) because case law demonstrates that the tribal
courts have taken their responsibility to construe ICRA seriously.
The case law also reflects deep assimilation of Anglo constitutional
principles and an intriguing jurisprudential syncretism that further
indicates the good faith interpretation of ICRA by tribal courts. Even
without invoking deep political theory, the cases' substantive holdings
support
inductive conclusion that the ICRA regime has not
imposed the
significant costs vis-a-vis Protection; the cases are strongly
rights-protective, even if the actual doctrines vary somewhat from
ordinary federal case law. The Hard Cases provide an opportunity to
concretely examine the possible costs incurred by the ICRA regime.
224. See infra Appendix A (listing all cases and providing other raw data).
225. See supra Part II.B.2.(a).

226. See id.
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None of the holdings in the Hard Cases appears problematic under a
Rawlsian framework. Finally, the litigated issues reveal that nonICRA jurisdictional limitations on tribal courts ensure that ICRA
litigation decides issues localized to Indian country and, therefore,
ICRA's regime of multiple authoritative interpreters produces
practically no externalities.
a. Due Process
The most heavily litigated provision in the reported cases was due
process. One hundred thirty-four of the two hundred forty-seven
litigated claims were due process. Sixty-five of these claims were
resolved in favor of the complainants and sixty-nine in favor of the
government. Analysis of the case law reveals significant degrees of
Adapted Adoption of federal doctrine; tribal courts have engaged in a
significant amount of Tailoring and Fitted Incorporation and some
Re-Standardizing to accommodate unique tribal values and needs.
Almost all of the decisions strongly protect individual rights. Only a
few qualify as Hard Cases. After further analysis of the Hard Cases, it
is evident that none of them runs afoul of a Rawlsian thick political
theory. Finally, none of the due process decisions creates significant
externalities.
Most due process claims concerned notice and hearing
requirements across different contexts. In these decisions, tribal
courts tend to be protective of tribal members' rights and to engage in
either Tailoring or Incorporation (both Fitted and Stock
Incorporation). In many cases, the issue was whether particular arms
of tribal government were required to provide notice and hearing to
potentially affected persons in particular instances.'
For example,
one court utilized Fitted Incorporation in holding that due process is
violated when the challenger of a tribal election is not given notice as
to the date and time of a post-election hearing conducted by the
election commission.m Another court employed Stock Incorporation
in the course of holding that notices of suspension from a public
employer must give employees "a sufficient understanding of the facts
behind the suspension so that they can consider whether to grieve the
suspension." 9 Many cases-both criminal and civil-have held
227. See, e.g., Lezard v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 22 Indian L. Rep. 6135, 6135
(Colville Ct. App. 1995) (tribal court must provide notice and right to hearing before
holding party in criminal contempt); Tulalip Hous. Auth. v. Alcombrack, 22 Indian L.
Rep. 6119, 6121 (Tulalip Ct. App. 1994) (applying due process notice and hearing
requirements against tribal housing authority).
228. See Murphy v. Standing Rock Sioux Election Comm'n, 17 Indian L. Rep. 6069,
6072 (Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Ct. 1990).
229. White v. Ho-Chunk Nation Dep't of Pers., 24 Indian L. Rep. 6182, 6185-86
(Ho-Chunk Nation Tribal Ct. 1996) (pointing to federal case law for the proposition
that the employee had a protectible due process interest in her employment that
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ordinances void for vagueness because they provided inadequate
notice of the required or proscribed behavior."- One tribal court ReStandardized so as to provide tribal members greater protections than
those afforded by federal law.3 1 In many cases, the courts applied
Fitted or Stock Incorporation to reverse government officials' run-ofthe-mill neglect to afford affected parties a hearing m or the
government's failure to abide by its own procedures and
regulations.23
While the study uncovered no tribal cases rejecting the federal rule
that due process requires hearing and notice, the tribal courts
frequently engaged in Tailoring and Fitted Incorporation to
accommodate tribal customs, values, and needs. For example, for
purposes of determining whether an "ordinary" person can
understand a statute for purposes of void-for-vagueness analysis, one
court looked to the "ordinary Navajo person, who very often will be
bilingual, with English as a second language."'
Similarly, several
tribal courts have held that due process' notice requirement is
satisfied by posting and other methods of public announcement that,
given the realities of tribal life, are reasonably calculated to inform
interested parties.3 5 Another set of cases utilizing Subjective
Tailoring has ruled on the basis of tribal custom that due process
requires that virtually any nonparty be provided an opportunity to
have her views heard in court based on tribal custom.2
Yaccordingly triggered notice and hearing requirements).
230. See, eg., Burns Paiute Indian Tribe v. Dick, 22 Indian L Rep. 6016, 6017-18
(Burns Paiute Ct. App. 1994) (civil); Stepetin v. Nisqually Indian Cmty., 20 Indian L
Rep. 6049,6050-51 (Nisqually Ct. App. 1993) (criminal).
231. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
232 See, eg., McKinney v. Bus. Council of the Shoshone-Paiute Tribes, 20 Indian
L. Rep. 6020 (Duck Valley Tribal Ct. 1993) (reinstating judge of tribal court dismissed
by council without a hearing: Subjective Incorporation); In re B.F.C., 21 Indian L
Rep. 6035 (Nook. Ct. App. 1990) (reversing trial court's summary dismissal of a case
after the trial court had refused to allow the party to be heard on a motion to
continue: Objective Incorporation).
233. See Pioche v. Navajo Bd. of Election Supervisors, 18 Indian L Rep. 6071, 6073
(Navajo 1991); Carmenoros v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 18 Indian L Rep. 6147 (S.W.
Intertribal Ct. App. 1991); One Feather v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Pub. Safety Comm'n,
16 Indian L. Rep. 6042, 6043 (Oglala Ct. App. 1986).
234. Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Election Supervisors, 18 Indian L Rep. 6009, 6012
(Navajo 1990) (deploying Subjective Tailoring).
235. See, e-g., Rave v. Reynolds, 23 Indian L. Rep. 6150, 6169 (Winnebago Sup. Ct.
1996) (Subjective Tailoring); Baldy v. Hoopa Valley Tribal Council, 22 Indian L Rep.
6015, 6016 (Hoopa Valley Ct. App. 1994) (same).
236. See Johns v. Leupp Sch., Inc. 22 Indian L Rep. 6039, 6039 (Navajo 1995)
(discussing how a "'broad scope of inquiry is in keeping with the general Navajo
common law rule of due process .... The Navajo people have an established custom
of notifying all involved parties in a controversy and allowing them, and even other
interested parties, an opportunity to present and defend their positions.' All
perspectives are important for a court to hear when making discretionary rulings"
(quoting Begay v. Navajo Nation, 15 Indian L. Rep. 6032, 6034 (Navajo 1988))); In re
Estate of Tasunke Witko v. Heileman Brewing Co., 23 Indian L Rep. 6104, 6108
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Under the rubric of due process, tribal courts have imposed
obligations on various arms of tribal government to proactively
provide information to tribal members. For example, in Simplot v.
Ho-Chunk Nation Departmentof Health, 7 the tribal court held that a
tribal agency violated due process by failing to inform an employee
that he had a right under personnel procedures to displace less senior
workers. Similarly, in Knudson v. Ho-Chunk Nation Treasury
DepartmentP3s the tribal court ruled that due process requires that
terminated public employees be given the identical data relied upon
by their supervisors so employees can adequately represent
themselves during the administrative review process. The Knudson
decision illustrates the deep assimilation of Anglo values because the
court did not cite case law or statutory provisions. Another tribal
court held that due process requires that judges inform persons jailed
for contempt that they are entitled to a hearing of indigence at which
they will be freed from jail if they demonstrate poverty.239 Similarly,
in Hopi Tribe v. Mahkewa,2 40 the court determined that tribal police
must inform persons stopped for drunk driving that they have a right
to obtain an independent blood-alcohol test. The Mahkewa court
engaged in Re-Standardizing, ruling that due process "include[s] and
require[s] that defendants have a fair chance to obtain potentially
exculpatory evidence to prepare their defense. ' 41 The Mahkewa
court went on to note that failing to inform people of their right to an
independent test "would in effect suppress evidence favorable to the
defendant and would be violative of due process of law."242
Relying on due process, tribal courts have fashioned many other
protections and relief. One court concluded that due process imposes
a litany of requirements on the tribal police with respect to
arrestees.2 43 Another court held that due process grants public
(Rbd. Sioux Sup. Ct. 1996) (en banc) (referring to "traditional Lakota notions of due
process that provide everyone the opportunity to be heard before making a
decision").
237. 23 Indian L. Rep. 6235, 6241 (Ho-Chunk Tribal Ct. 1996).
238. 26 Indian L. Rep. 6011, 6011 (Ho-Chunk Sup. Ct. 1998).
239. In re Consol. Small Claims Cases, 24 Indian L. Rep. 6109, 6109 (Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribal Ct. 1996).
240. 21 Indian L. Rep. 6139, 6140 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1992), affd, 25 Indian L. Rep.
6144 (Hopi App. Ct.).
241. Id. at 6140.
242. Id.
243. See Drags Wolf v. Tribal Bus. Council of the Three Affiliated Tribes, 17
Indian L. Rep. 6051, 6052 (Fort Berthold Tribal Ct. 1990). The requirements are:
1. Each defendant will be given a written, verified complaint following his
arrest. 2. Each defendant will be provided with a copy of such complaint at
his arraignment, if not in possession of a copy at that time. 3. Each
defendant shall be read and contemporaneously given a detailed explanation
of his rights and written acknowledgment of such by each defendant shall be
filed with the clerk of court. 4. That in addition to advising each defendant
as to the alleged violations of tribal law, a meaningful explanation by the
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employees a right to representation at termination hearings.2' In
Burns Paiute Indian Tribe v. Dick,24 the tribal court Re-standardized
and reversed a trial court's order excluding several members from the
reservation.2' The Burns court adopted a novel rule: due process is
violated when a court fails to give consideration to a liberty interest in
the course of its opinion.247 The Burns court also determined that
family relationships implicate the liberty interest of "intimate
association[s]. ' 24 The court further noted that the lower court
violated due process because the excluded members had wives and
children on the reservation and the trial court failed to "consider
these relationships and the serious, resulting breakup
of the
2 49
appellants' families and the effect on the tribal community.
One set of potential Hard Cases spotlights the tribal courts'
tendency to avoid highly formalistic interpretations of the law and,
instead, focus on the practical consequences of the legal edict at issue.
For example, in Hopi Tribe v. Lonewolf Scott, 5 the tribal court ReStandardized when it rejected a void-for-vagueness challenge to a
tribal ordinance. Eschewing the federal standard under which statutes
may be void for vagueness if there is the mere "possibility of
discriminatory enforcement" and lack of notice,21 the tribal court
conducted a realistic, highly contextualized analysis of how the
affected community understood the challenged ordinance and stated
that:
[i]t seems theoretic conjecture that the defendants claim that they
did not understand the plain language of the statute ....
The Hopi
courts have properly limited the application of this statute so as to
not overstate the criminal sanctions imposed on a defendant. Its
meaning and application is clear to the police, prosecutors, and the
reservation communities. There have been no episodes of capricious
or arbitrary arrests based on [the ordinance] and the Hopi courts

judge-magistrate with a layman's explanation as to the specific elements of
the alleged crime in order that a defendant having never previously
appeared in court and unschooled in legal jargon could reasonably be
expected to ascertain if his conduct did in fact violate tribal law.
IL
244. See Johnson v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 25 Indian L. Rep. 6011
(Mashantucket Pequot Ct. App. 1996) (holding that due process was violated where
administrative law judge disallowed attorney from representing employee).
245. 22 Indian L. Rep. 6016 (Burns Paiute Ct. App. 1994).
246. See id.
247. See id at 6017.
24& Id
249. Id. The appellate court concluded that these relationships implicated the
liberty to "associate with persons of one's choice," which is the "the right of 'intimate
association."' Id.
250. 14 Indian L. Rep. 6001, 6005 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1986).
251. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1082 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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have applied this criminal statute in a uniform, consistent, and
limited manner ... 252

It can be argued that the Lonewolf court's upholding of a criminal
ordinance that was in fact ambiguous simply because there had not yet
been discriminatory enforcement threatens the value of Protection.
Similarly, in Moore v. Hoopa Valley Tribe,25 3 the tribal court found no
due process violation even though the language in the trial court's
order was considered objectively ambiguous by the appellate court
because the defendant had actual notice of the trial court's contempt
hearing.'
How problematic are these cases of subjective, realistic
interpretation from the vantage point of the value of Protection? A
critic might be partially comforted upon learning that some tribal
courts have adopted the federal "objective" standard. 25 5 But it is far
from clear that the subjective approach undermines Protection.
Adoption of an objective approach in the federal case law may be less
a categorical rejection of the subjective approach and, instead, more a
reflection of the implausibility of a single subjective understanding
across the large and diverse national citizenry. By contrast, in the
context of small, homogeneous communities, there may exist a
common subjective understanding notwithstanding "objective"
ambiguity.25 6 Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly utilized
subjective analysis to uphold criminal provisions "[n]otwithstanding
the[ir] apparent indeterminateness" in the military context because
the provisions are applicable to only a discrete community where
"what those crimes are, and how they are to be punished" was "well
known."25 7 More fundamentally, insofar as the meaning of English
252. Lonewolf, 14 Indian L. Rep. at 6005 (citation omitted).
253. 26 Indian L. Rep. 6013 (Nw. Reg'l App. Ct. 1998).
254. This tendency toward subjective rather than objective interpretation is found
outside the due process context. See, e.g., Pueblo of Pojoaque v. Jagles, 24 Indian L.
Rep. 6137 (Pojoaque Pueblo Tribal Ct. 1997) (trial by jury); see also infra notes 405-06
and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Burns Paiute Indian Tribe v. Dick, 22 Indian L. Rep. 6016, 6018
(Bums Paiute Ct. App. 1994) (dismissing argument that "the ordinance could be
interpreted in that manner but it was not the tribe's policy to do so").
256. This observation may not hold in respect of the Lonewolf case insofar as the
defendants were not members of the Hopi Tribe. See Lonewolf, 14 Indian L. Rep. at
6001. On the other hand, defendants belonged to a tribe that shared the Hopi border
and may have had shared cultural understandings, as the tribal court suggested when
it spoke of the ordinance's clear understanding to the "reservation communities." Id.
at 6005.
257. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65, 82 (1857) (military law), quoted approvingly in
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 747 (1974). The Court in Parkeralso upheld a void-forvagueness challenge to two articles in the Uniform Code of Military Justice that the
Court acknowledged would not have passed constitutional muster "as measured by
contemporary standards of vagueness applicable to statutes and ordinances governing
civilians." Parker, 417 U.S. at 741 (citation omitted). The military code provisions
were upheld because, inter alia, the "content" of the provisions "may be supplied...
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words is a product of cultural understanding rather than a reflection of
some "natural" and inherent quality of the word, it well could be
argued that the division between "subjective" and "objective"
understandings is false and that all understandings are subjective - s If
this is true, it is thoroughly sound to construe legal terms' meanings by
reference to the likely understandings of the parties that are to be
affected by the law. s9 Where the affected persons are part of a small
community, it is sensible to directly consult the community's
"subjective" understandings of the terms in issue." Only when those
affected are a State or national constituency does it become necessary
to perform an "objective" analysis that, in reality, is a measure of the
range of the likely subjective understandings held by the wide range of
m
persons affected by the state or federal regulation.2
Returning to the overview of the ICRA due process case law, the
challenges of securing justice for indigent parties have spurred many
tribal court procedural innovations. For example, although the ICRA
guarantee to the right of counsel does not include a requirement that
tribes provide counsel to indigents,l one tribal court has held that
due process requires counsel where charges are serious and
defendants have limited education and understanding.' Other courts
have imposed duties on judges who hear criminal cases in which the
defendant is unrepresented. One tribal appellate court ruled that trial
judges must inform pro se defendants of the lesser included offense
doctrine and must rule sua sponte on the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence at the end of the prosecution's case.64 The
tribal appellate court in Teeman v. Burns Paiute Indian Tribe265 went
so far as to impose a duty on trial judges to research certain questions
of law for pro se defendants. The trial court had refused to recognize
the defense of self-defense unless the defendant could find a legal
source for it. The Teeman court stated that "[w]hen all the resources,
training and background knowledge in law repose within the
government, it is basically unfair to shift to the presumptively

by less formalized custom and usage" within the military community. Id. at 754. For a
discussion of the role played in Parkerby the presence of a discrete community, see
Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution,supra note 7, at 1175-76, 1178-79.
25& See Susan A. Handelman, The Slayers of Moses 3-4 (1982); David Couzens
Hoy, Interpretingthe Law: Hermeneuticaland Post-structuralistPerspectives,58 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 135,138-39 (1985).
259. See Hoy, supra note 258, at 151-52.
260. See supra note 258.
261. See Hoy, supra note 258, at 157-64.
262. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (1994).
263. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Thomas, 18 Indian L Rep. 6126 (Colville
Ct. App. 1990).
264. See S. Ute Tribe v. Baca, 17 Indian L. Rep. 6010, 6011-12 (S. Ute Ct. App.
1989).
265. 25 Indian L. Rep. 6197,6199 (Burns Paiute Ct. App. 1997).
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innocent defendant the burden of proving the law." 216 The Teeman
court went on to note that the law instead "plac[es] responsibility on
the trial court judge to rule upon the questions of law presented at the
trial... [a]n unbelievably unfair result obtains when the guilt or
innocence of a pro se defendant is decided upon his or her ability to
research law."2 67 The court concluded that due process is violated
when the law "places upon an accused the burden of proving that the
law will permit the introduction of evidence of an exculpatory
nature."2'
Other tribal courts have placed duties on trial judges that are
designed to ensure that substantive justice is attained. For example,
one court concluded that when parties are indigent, not represented
by council, and untutored in the law, tribal court judges should take
an active role akin to judges in Germany's inquisitorial system. The
judge's role may include propounding legal theories and developing
the facts. 2 69 Another tribal court has indicated that judges may lead
the questioning at legal hearings, 270 and yet another stated that judges
may have ex parte communications with potential witnesses if the
court subsequently informs the parties of the substance of the
communications and permits the parties to respond.27 1
Although these cases exhibit a noble intent to assist the
impecunious, some may consider them Hard Cases on account of the
significant powers they grant to judges. Further reflection, however,
reveals strong reasons why these may not qualify as Hard Cases.
First, similar proactive and discretionary powers are exercised by
administrative law and bankruptcy judges, who "share other
characteristics with the inquisitorial model of dispute resolution. "272
In any event, to the extent that tribal judges exercise greater
discretion than do federal judges, such differences are not necessarily
problematic. Structural considerations can provide a compelling
justification for differential institutional arrangements, 273 and tribal

266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See Butler v. Siletz Tribal Council, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6044, 6044-45 (Siletz
Tribal Ct. 1989).
270. See Clown v. Coast to Coast, 23 Indian L. Rep. 6055, 6057-59 (Cheyenne River
Sioux Ct. App. 1993). To prevent judges from acting in an "authoritarian manner,"
however, the Clown court also provided extensive guidelines with regard to pro se
trials that included, for example, instructions to the court to expressly give parties the
choice to either question the opposing party themselves or have the court do it. Id. at
6058-59.
271. See Miner v. Banley, 22 Indian L. Rep. 6044, 6046 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct.
App. 1995).
272. Rosen, Recent American Codifications,supra note 38, at 1210-11. Moreover,
even ordinary federal trial court judges "may appoint an expert witness [and] examine
such a witness himself." Id. at 1211.
273. See Rossi, supra note 13, at 1222-38.
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judges are more likely to be politically accountable to tribal
communities than federal judges are to the people whose disputes
they hear; tribal judges typically do not enjoy life tenure and tend to
interact more directly with the people over whom they exercise power
than do federal judges due to the smaller size and greater social
cohesiveness of most tribal communities. Such accountability makes
discretion more palatable, for the possibility of a meaningful
communication of community dissatisfaction likely serves as a check
on the tribal judges.
Perhaps the most difficult set of Hard Cases are those instances
where tribal courts give what might be deemed excessive weight to the
community's interests in the due process calculus. For example, in
274 the tribal court upheld against a due process
Ben v. Burbank,
challenge a tribal ordinance that gave appellate courts the power to
refuse to hear appeals where "substantial justice" had been done
between the parties.275 The appellant in Ben refused to pay for
construction that had been performed by a relative.- 6 After years of
informal efforts to collect the debt, the relative sued successfully in
court. 7 On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial court had
applied the incorrect statute of limitations and, therefore, the case
should have been dismissed.2 78 The Ben court dismissed the appeal,
refusing to even hear appellant's argument on the statutory grounds
that there was no279appellate review because there had been
"substantive justice."
In upholding the ordinance limiting appellate
jurisdiction, the Ben court ruled that due process rights are
"'fundamental, but they are not absolute, limitless, or unrestricted"'
and held that the tribe's interests outweighed the appellant's interest
in seeking to "hid[e] behind her statute of limitations claim in order to
avoid paying for the work."'
The tribe's interests were to achieve
substantive justice, which furthers the "concept of community good
and moral right," and to advance k'e, which refers to a person's "deep
feeling for responsibilities to others and the duty to live in harmony
with them." 1
Helgeson v. Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians is an even more troubling case. In Helgeson, the tribal
appellate court upheld a trial court's finding that the defendants had
violated a noncriminal ordinance that prohibited the possession of
274. 24 Indian L. Rep. 6001 (Navajo 1996).
275. Id.
276. Id
277. Id
27& Id.
279. Id
280. Id. at 6001-02 (quoting In re Estate of Plummer, 17 Indian L Rep. 6151
(1990)).
281. Id. at 6001.
282. 25 Indian L. Rep. 6045 (Lac Du Flambeau App. Ct. 1998).
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certain types of gambling devices despite a fundamental error by the
trial court.

In a trial whose "whole purpose ... was to determine if

the devices were contraband," the lower court prematurely ruled that
the devices at issue constituted gambling devices. 84 The appellate
court analyzed the due process issue by means of a balancing test
drawn from federal law but employed Tailoring to ascertain the
appropriate weight to accord the community's interest. The appellate
court stated that "[p]rior to European influence, it was a well accepted
belief throughout Indian [c]ountry that individual rights lie
subordinate to the rights of the tribe" and described ICRA as a
Western "imposition" that "infringe[d] on the rights of Indians to
govern themselves."'
Nevertheless, ICRA "still provides for the
balancing test in which a tribal court can weigh the rights of an
individual versus the rights of the tribe. 2 86 Weighing the costs
imposed on the individuals by a monetary fine and forfeiture of the
seized devices against the potential costs on the tribe resulting from
the loss of the right to regulate gaming activity-a risk because the
illegal devices violated the tribal-state gaming compact pursuant to
which the tribe was permitted to run its casino-the appellate court
concluded that the tribe's gaming operations was "one of the most
precious economic resources [the tribe has] ever had" and upheld the
conviction.3
The Ben and Helgeson cases are the most threatening due process
cases to Protection. It is not clear, however, that these cases in fact
constitute Hard Cases. The balancing that occurs in tribal court
opinions is different in degree, rather than kind, from what occurs in
federal decisions because constitutional due process rights also
typically involve de facto, if not de jure, balancing.'
Monetary
considerations are deemed a relevant factor in quantifying the
government's interest in federal due process case law,289 and the tribal
interest in securing gaming is particularly strong because most tribal
communities were deeply impoverished and incapable of providing
basic essentials to their members before the income streams from
gambling began to flow. Federal habeas case law disallowing review
for procedural defaults unless defendants can "demonstrate that the
failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage

283. Id. at 6053.
284. Id.
285. Id. I have made a similar argument. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 7, at
1134-40.
286. Helgeson, 25 Indian L. Rep. at 6053.
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (balancing welfare
recipient's interest versus the government's interest to determine the nature of the
hearing required by due process: de jure balancing).
289. See, e.g., id. at 265.
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of justice"2' is useful in appropriately contextualizing Ben and
Helgeson. Substantive review in both the federal habeas case law and
the tribal court cases is tied to substantive fairness.29 In any event,
even if the Ben and Helgeson courts accorded the community's
interests greater weight than would federal doctrine, this would not
necessarily mean that they violated the value of Protection. It would
first be necessary to develop a normative theory to identify the
quantum of weight allocated to governmental interests that are
problematic. The cases are not troubling when analyzed under the
thick Rawlsian political theory discussed earlier because in neither
case did the community court's decision interfere with a person's
ability to exit Indian country or threaten the well-orderedness of
general society.292
b. Equal Protection
There were thirty-five published opinions concerning ICRA's equal
protection guarantee. Courts ruled against the tribe in twelve cases,
though two of these were later reversed by the case most challenging
to the value of Protection. The equal protection case law continues
the twin trends of Adapted Adoption and assimilation that appear in
the tribal due process jurisprudence. 293
The case of Bennett v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors2' is a
strong rights-protecting equal protection decision that showcases both
Tailoring and assimilation. In Bennett, the court struck down an
ordinance placing requirements on who could run for public office.
By invoking the federal equal protection doctrine of "fundamental
rights" without citing to federal case law, the Bennett court most likely
is exhibiting assimilation. 295 The court then Tailored, looking to tribal
290. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,750 (1991).
291. To be sure, the federal habeas doctrine in Coleman and the Ben court's
holdings are different in that the appellant in Coleman had an opportunity to appeal.
Nevertheless, Coleman is instructive because the scope of de facto review in both
cases turned on an assessment of whether the status quo violated substantive justice.
292. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 7, at 1093-1106, 1126-27. Wellorderedness would be implicated by the imposition of significant externalities on nonIndian society or the presence of activities within Indian country that were so
troublesome to general society as to undermine general society's cohesiveness or
sense of self. Id. The two cases do not impose significant externalities; Helgeson
creates none, and Ben deploys activist judicial arguments to achieve an outcome that
most people likely would consider fair. Furthermore, the parallels between the two
cases and federal case law suggest that they are not sufficiently troublesome to
potentially unravel general society.
293. A series of equal protection cases were brought by non-Indians and nonmember Indians, claiming that the differential treatment they received as "outsiders"
of the tribe violated equal protection. I examine these cases below in "The Treatment
of Outsiders." See infra Part IV.B.4.(h).
294. 18 Indian L. Rep. 6009 (Navajo 1990).
295. Id. at 6012. An alternative explanation for the reference to "fundamental
rights" without case law citation is that the court consulted the federal case law but

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

traditions and deciding that the "political liberty" to run for office, "a
part of the concept of republican participatory democracy [that is]
grounded in Navajo tradition," constituted a "fundamental right" that
was infringed upon by the ordinance in question. 9
In Griffith v. Wilkie,2 9 another tribal court relied upon equal
protection to construe a tribal ordinance. The issue in Griffith was
whether an ordinance providing that "[t]he mother of an illegitimate
unmarried child is entitled to its custody, services, and earnings"
absolutely precluded fathers from being awarded custody.2 8 The
tribal court engaged in Tabula Rasa, concluding that if the ordinance
were "interpreted as eliminating a father of an illegitimate child as a
potential custodial parent, he is denied equal protection of the law."2 99
The court construed the ordinance as providing a presumption of
maternal custody if paternity were undeterminable, but imposing the
best interest of the child test if the father were known.3 °
Several of the reported cases concerned allegations of selective
enforcement of tribal law. The most aggressive interpretations of
equal protection can be seen in two cases, each of which was a
consolidation of numerous criminal cases. In Matter of Consolidated
Criminal Cases, 3 1 Mark Fox, a member of the Tribal Council who sat
on the Judicial Committee and was not a party in either of the
consolidated cases, had been charged with assault in December of
1996 but had delayed his prosecution for over a year by transferring
the prosecutor originally assigned to him and failing to appoint a
replacement. Fifteen tribal members who had been charged with
various crimes around the same time as Fox, but whose prosecutions
for some reason simply did not cite to it. This seems unlikely, however, because the
court cited to numerous federal cases elsewhere in its opinion. See id. at 6011-12.
296. Id. ("In Navajo tradition, government and governing was a matter of
consensus of the people, and Navajos had a participatory democracy. It was, in fact,
one of the purest democracies in human history. Long before the United States of
America extended the privilege and right to vote to those who did not own property
and to women, all Navajos participated in public decisions. Therefore, there is a
strong and fundamental tradition that any Navajo can participate in the processes of
government, and no person who is not otherwise disqualified by a reasonable law can
be prohibited from holding public office.").
297. 18 Indian L. Rep. 6058 (N. Plains Intertribal Ct. App. 1991).
298. Id. at 6059.
299. Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court struck down on due process grounds a
statutory presumption that unwed fathers are unfit for custody. See Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (holding that due process requires that unwed fathers have a
right to a hearing on their parental fitness). The Wilkie court's equal protection
decision thus protects unwed fathers' rights in the same way as the Supreme Court's
due process case law does. The tribal court's holding, which was premised on a
different provision and did not invoke the Supreme Court precedent, thus illustrates
both the reasonableness of the trial court's approach and the tribe's jurisprudential
independence.
300. See Wilkie, 18 Indian L. Rep. at 6059-60.
301. 15 Indian L. Rep. 6062 (Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation D. Ct. 1997).
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had gone forward, brought equal protection challenges. - Without
identifying a Legal Test, 0 3 the tribal court accepted the fifteen
defendants' arguments and dismissed the criminal cases against
them.' 4 Similarly, in Conroy v. Bear Runner0 the tribal court found
that an ordinance imposing an occupation tax had been selectively
applied, and therefore, violated equal protection. Citing to federal
case law, the Conroy decision engaged in Stock Incorporation- and
adopted the Legal Test that equal protection is violated "where the
statute or ordinance, although valid on its face, is enforced so as to
discriminate against certain persons, occupations or privileges of the
same class."3 "7
Other tribal courts, however, have erected a higher burden to
finding an equal protection violation for selective enforcement of law.
The Legal Tests employed by these courts are almost identical to the
approach taken by the federal courts.-" For example, in Southern Ute
Tribe v. Baca,30 the tribal court ruled against the claim that
inconsistent prosecutorial practice with respect to the lesser included
offense doctrine is a per se violation of equal protection. The court
engaged in Fitted Incorporation, citing to federal case law to hold that
"'aberrational implementation of proper criminal procedures does not
give rise to an equal protection claim absent a showing of intentional
or purposeful discrimination.' ' 310 The court explained the rule by
reference to tribal circumstances:
"courts publish few written
opinions identifying particular court practices... [and a] strict equal
protection rule on procedural matters which would continually elevate
particular variations in court practices to the level of equal protection
claims would be unwise. ' 311 Similarly, in Burns Pahwte Indian Tribe v.
Dick,31 2 the tribal court ruled that inconsistent enforcement of a tribal
302. See id at 6059.
303. See supra note 60.
304. See In re Consol. Criminal Cases, 15 Indian L. Rep. 6062 (Three Affiliated
Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation Dist. Ct., Nov. 19, 1997); In re Consol.
Criminal Cases, 15 Indian L. Rep. 6062 (Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation Dist. Ct., Oct. 10, 1997).
305. 16 Indian L. Rep. 6037, 6039 (Oglala Tribal Ct. App. 1984).

306. Id The tribal court erred in its analysis of federal law, however, because the
case upon which it relied did not establish this rule. See id. (citing Brodhead v.
Borthwick, 174 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1949)).
307. Id
308. For an example of the federal rule, see United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.

456,464-65 (1996).
309. 17 Indian L. Rep. 6010, 6011 (S. Ute Ct. App. 1989).
310. Id at 6011 (quoting United States v. Doe, 401 F. Supp. 63, 65 (E.D. Wis.
1975)).
311. Baca, 17 Indian L. Rep. at 6011; see also Frost v. S. Ute Tribal Council, 23
Indian L. Rep. 6135, 6136 (S. Ute Tribal Ct. 1996) (stating that failure of a tribe to
prosecute similar allegations in the past does not, in and of itself, violate equal

protection).
312. 22 Indian L. Rep. 6016 (Bums Paiute Ct. App. 1994).

This is virtually

identical to the federal rule. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (observing that "the
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exclusion ordinance violates equal protection only when the tribe "has
not excluded others similarly situated for similar conduct and the
decision to exclude was based upon bad faith, or on impermissible
grounds, as, for example, race, religion or the exercise of other
'
constitutional rights."313
Other tribal courts have adopted similar
Legal Tests in response to equal protection challenges to the
distribution of tribal resources.314
Another set of cases in the selective enforcement context displays
tribal equal protection at its most and least rights-protecting. Two
cases decided the same day by the same judge ruled that charging only
males under a gender neutral statutory rape ordinance violates equal
protection 315 -equal protection at its most protective. This rule was
316
overturned, however, in Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Bigfire.
The Bigfire court's opinion is the most threatening to Protection of all
the 194 reported cases. Setting the stage for its analysis, the Bigfire
court stated that "[like most tribes, the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska
agreed to removal from their ancestral homelands and to the
acceptance of new reservation lands precisely to preserve their
separate cultural and political identity as a people. ' 317 Accordingly,
the "tribal court is free to interpret the tribal constitution
independently of the meaning afforded similar language in federal
law. ' 318 The court further explained that:
[t]his independence is not only a logical result of the sovereignty of
the tribe as a separate political community within the United States,
but also a necessary option to protect the separate and different
cultural heritage of the tribe and to adapt the meaning of legal

decision whether to prosecute may not be based on 'an unjustifiable standard such as

race, religion, or other arbitrary classification"' (citation omitted)). Interestingly, the
Dick court did not cite to any federal case law for the proposition of law, though it

cited to federal case law elsewhere in its opinion. See Dick, 22 Indian L. Rep. at 6017.
Dick, therefore, most likely is either an example of deep assimilation or of Tabula
Rasa where the tribal court intuited the federal rule.
313. Dick, 22 Indian L. Rep. at 6017.
314. See, e.g., Badgley v. Hoopa Forest Indus., 19 Indian L. Rep. 6009, 6009

(Hoopa Ct. App. 1990) (claim for failure to hire as log hauler; equal protection

violated only where person "treated differently from other persons similarly situated

on account of her marital status to a non-Indian, her race, sex or any other category");
Day v. Hopi Election Bd., 16 Indian L. Rep. 6057, 6058 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1988) (fact

that Hopi fluency requirement for candidates for public office was not enforced in
past elections does not mean that its enforcement as to several candidates in the
present election violates equal protection; question is whether at any point in time
there is unequal treatment rising to the level of "unreasonabl[e] discriminat[ion]").
315. Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Levering, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6022 (Winnebago
Tribal Ct. 1997); Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Frazier, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6021
(Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997). There had been four prosecutions under the ordinance,
and only males had been charged. See Frazier,25 Indian L. Rep. at 6021.
316. 25 Indian L. Rep. 6229, 6234 (Winnebago Sup. Ct. 1998).
317. Id. at 6230.
318. Id.
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concepts derived from Anglo-American
roots to the unique cultural
319
context of communal tribal life.

Finally, the court noted that there must be "sensitive adaptation of
such legal concepts to the precise tribal community served by tribal
law."'
The Bigfire tribal court then Subjectively Re-standardized
and Tailored, adopting the compelling interest test rather than the
intermediate scrutiny test for gender discrimination under federal law,
but finding a compelling governmental interest in genderdifferentiated application of the statutory rape ordinance."The bulk of the Bigfire opinion sought to explain why gender
differentiations constituted a compelling government interest in the
tribal context. The court stated that "in determining what constitutes
a compelling governmental interest, this Court must always look to
the preservation of tribal culture, traditions, and sovereignty and to
the promotion of the health and welfare of tribal members as the most
compelling reasons for the formation and operation of tribal
government."'
Furthermore, the court noted that "traditional
differentiations, commonly accepted and practiced by the Tribe
without pejorative or discriminatory implications.., must be
sustained as involving the compelling tribal governmental interest of
preserving tribal traditions and culture."'
The court then cited to
evidence suggesting that under tribal customs and tradition "gender
role differentiation and gender differences in legal or customary
treatment related to" roles that were deemed to be "natural and
expected" and that such "gender differences or disparities in
treatment do not signal hierarchy, lack of respect or invidious
discrimination."' 4
The court made it clear that the tribe's5
understanding of gender roles derived from tribal religious beliefs.
The court upheld the gender differentiated application of the
statutory rape ordinance because "within the Winnebago culture, the
male clearly is assigned the obligation of protecting the women. The
areas of sexual misconduct and domestic abuse were specifically
singled out as areas in which the Winnebago tradition and customary
law assigned roles and responsibilities based on gender." 6
319. Id
320. d
321. The Bigfire court correctly cited to Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), for the
proposition that federal courts utilize intermediate scrutiny to analyze gender
discrimination claims, and expressly and explicitly adopted strict scrutiny instead. See
Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rep. at 6231.
322. Id at 6231.
323. Id at 6233.
324. Id at 6232.
325. See id ("Gender differences constitute a natural part of life. Indeed, the
Earth, the Grandmother who gives life, is female. Thus, gender role differentiation
and gender differences in legal or customary treatment related to those roles are
natural and expected.").
326. Id at 6233.
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In one sense, Bigfire could be said to be unproblematically akin to
accommodations of religiously-based gender differentiations that
federal anti-discrimination law accepts. Title VII's protections against
gender discrimination, after all, are inapplicable when the employer is
a "religious corporation, association, educational institution, or
society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its
activities.""3 7 So too it could be said that the court in Bigfire simply is
making accommodations on account of the religiously-based gender
differentiations in Hopi culture.
Yet, even assuming some accommodations are appropriate, Bigfire
remains disturbing. The most troublesome aspect of the Bigfire
opinion from the perspective of Protection is that the court articulated
virtually no external limits to tribal tradition on what types of gender
differential treatment is unacceptable. As the court stated, only
traditional practices with "pejorative or discriminatory implications"
as determined by tribalstandardswill be struck down.3 s On the other
hand, whose standards should govern? The Bigfire court correctly
noted that the role of women in Ho-chunk communities "is not
analogous to the roles of females in the Anglo-American cultures. "329
Those who take issue with Bigfire must justify why contemporary
American sensibilities concerning gender should displace Ho-Chunk
sensibilities.
Answering this question requires a full-fledged
normative theory of what types of variations from ordinary doctrine
are acceptable within our liberal polity. Under the thick Rawlsian
framework I have generated, the gender differentiation upheld in
Bigfire would be acceptable because it, in all likelihood, interferes
with neither exit nor well-orderedness. 330 Bigfire's reasoning is
problematic under that framework, however, because it suggests that
the court would have upheld an educational system that deprived girls
of education pursuant to a neutral tribal tradition-a practice that
327. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1994).
328. Bigfre, 25 Indian L. Rep. at 6233.
329. Id. at 6232.
330. Exit is not implicated because the ordinance did not have the effect of
eliminating a person's ability to choose where to live. The fact that the men convicted

under the ordinance would be unable to leave Indian country during the time of their
confinement does not mean that exit is implicated; this is true of all criminal
ordinances, and incarceration pursuant to violation of rules to which people have

consented does not violate exit. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 7, at 1098-1100

(explaining this point). Nor could it be claimed that the ordinance at issue in Bigflre

was unclear; it expressly prohibited the defendants' activities. While not free from

doubt, it is likely that the Bigflre decision also does not violate the requirement of
well-orderedness insofar as the view of gender relations underwriting the opinion,
while distasteful to many in general society, likely falls within a range of
reasonableness that is not sufficiently detestable to general society so as to threaten to

unravel it.
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would violate the exit right.33 1 The Bigfire decision also threatens
Protection in that it does not take account of the requirements of wellorderedness. 332

c. Search and Seizure
There were thirteen cases concerning search and seizure. Four of
the cases resulted in decisions favoring the citizens claiming rights
against tribal governments, while most of the other cases involved
factual settings in which tribal courts simply found that probable cause
or reasonable suspicion existed.333 In several cases, courts were not
interpreting ICRA or a tribal constitution, but tribal criminal codes,
several of which have adopted almost verbatim the federal doctrines.
These latter cases are germane for present purposes for the same
reason that
tribal case law construing tribal constitutions is
334
instructive.
Search and seizure tribal case law evidences the trend of Adapted
Adoption found elsewhere in the ICRA jurisprudence. Without
exception, the doctrines found in the thirteen cases closely track
federal case law; in fact, tribal courts in all cases utilized either
Incorporation or Tailoring. This suggests that the tribal courts
engaged in assimilation, as does the fact that the tribal courts
sometimes recite the federal rules without citing to case law. One
court even adopted the federal exclusionary remedy without
appearing to have considered alternative remedies. Finally, there are
few if any Hard Cases here; the reported search and seizure cases
adopt Legal Tests that are at least as rights-protecting as federal law,
and two cases establish Legal Tests that are more rights-protecting.
The case of Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v.Pretends Eagle335 is
representative of the interpretive methodologies found in the ICRA
search and seizure case law. In PretendsEagle, a tribal member called
the police and stated "Tom Pretends Eagle just almost side-swiped
me. I think he is drunk. '336 Police located Pretends Eagle's car and
observed him, during which time there were neither traffic violations
nor erratic driving.337 Nevertheless, the tribal police stopped and
arrested him for driving under the influence.3 The issue in Pretends
331. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 7, at 1098-1103 (explaining why this
would be problematic).

332. For a fll discussion of what this might entail, see id. at 1093-97.
333. See, e.g., S. Ute Tribe v. Price, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6117, 6119 (S. Ute Tribal Ct.
1991) (driving car backwards on major road provides probable cause for a stop); S.
Ute Tribe v. Williams, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6049, 6051 (S. Ute Tribal Ct. 1990) (holding
that slow and erratic driving provides probable cause to initially stop a vehicle).
334. See supra Part III.C.
335. 24 Indian L. Rep. 6240 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997).
336. Id. at 6240.
337. Id
33& Id.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

Eagle was whether this warrantless arrest satisfied the "reasonable
cause" requirement that appeared in the Winnebago Criminal
Procedure Code. 33 9 Although the tribal court recognized that federal

constructions of reasonable cause were not binding, 3'0 it engaged in
Stock Incorporation by "adopt[ing]" the definition of "probable
cause" that appeared in Black's Law Dictionary?41 Looking to the
"facts and circumstances within an officers' knowledge" that might
lead "a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has
been, is being, or will be committed," the tribal court found that the
information provided to the tribal police "did not establish facts
sufficient to show that the defendant was driving under the influence"
but only that Pretends Eagle had almost sideswiped someone. 4 2 For
this reason the tribal court also concluded that the police did not have
authority to conduct a stop and frisk, pointing out that the tribal code
"provides for a higher standard for a stop and frisk than the Supreme
Court set out in Terry v. Ohio."' 3
The tribal courts typically engage in careful, rights-protecting
applications of the search and seizure Standards. For example, in
Hopi Tribe v. Dawahoya,2 the court decided whether an anonymous
tip, that the defendant was transporting an unknown quantity of
alcohol in a truck heading on a particular road, gave police the
"reasonable suspicion" necessary to justify an investigatory stop.
Engaging in Stock Incorporation, the court answered in the negative,
holding that the tip did not contain sufficient indicia of reliability that
could be corroborated independently by the police and "lead to the
inference that the informant had reliable access to inside information"
because the only information that could be independently verified was
5 Similarly, in In re
the street on which the defendant was headingY3
D.N.,4 the tribal court held that although asking a student to empty
his pockets and administering a pat-down search was reasonable, it
was not reasonable for a teacher to reach under a student's underwear
waistband. The D.N. court stated that a "search will be permissible
only when the measures adopted in the search are reasonably related
to the objectives of the search and are not excessively intrusive in light
339. Id.
340. Id. at 6241.
341. Id. at 6243.

342. Id.
343. Id. at 6244. The tribal court noted that Terry allows stop and frisk when a

"police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot," see id. (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1967)), whereas the tribal ordinance requires the officer to have

"probable cause." Id. This is arguably in tension with, though not flatly inconsistent
with, the tribal court's earlier analysis, where it equated reasonable and probable
cause. Id. at 6243.
344. 25 Indian L. Rep. 6107 (Hopi App. Ct. 1995).
345. Id.
346. 22 Indian L. Rep. 6071, 6072 (Hopi Child. Ct. 1995).
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of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."'
Finally, consider the case of Randolph v. Hopi Tribe.' s In Randolph,
the tribal appellate court reversed a conviction and clarified the
burdens of proof and persuasion in suppression hearings by means of
Fitted Incorporation. 319 The court canvassed the non-Indian case law,
finding two general approaches, and then considered "which
allocation of the burden of proof comports with Hopi public policy." 3m
The court concluded that the prosecution bore the burden of proof by
a preponderance of the evidence?"'
Tribal courts have adopted federal doctrine by means of
Incorporation more fully in search and seizure cases than any other
area."
As a result, tribal search and seizure jurisprudence is
completely familiar to anyone acquainted with federal criminal law.
Familiar concepts such as "reasonable suspicion, '' 3- "probable
cause," 354 "stop and frisk,"355 and others can be found. There are
several reasons why this does not undercut the importance of having
tribal courts, rather than federal courts, interpreting search and
seizure. 6 First, tribal courts sometimes conceptualize the Legal Test
as being consistent with, and advancing, tribal culture. For example,
after noting that federal decisions "are not binding upon this court,"
the D.N. court adopted the federal rule that a "school official may
conduct a search of a student's person if the official has a reasonable
suspicion that a crime has been committed or that the student is in the
process of committing an offense. ' '31 The tribal court engaged in
Fitted Incorporation, however, attributing the rule partly to the "Hopi
tradition and the Hopi's strong belief in the extended family [because]
a Hopi person who sends their child to school expects the school and
its officials to act in loco parentis.''3ss Conceptualizing the Legal Test
as being consistent with tribal culture facilitates both assimilation of
Anglo jurisprudence as well as cultural syncretism.

347. Id. at 6071.
348. 26 Indian L. Rep. 6015 (Hopi App. Ct. 1997).
349. Id. at 6017-18.

350. Id. at 6017.
351. Id. at 6018.
352. See eg., S. Ute Tribe v. Price, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6117 (S. Ute Tribal Ct. 1991)
(similar); In re D.N., 22 Indian L. Rep. 6071 (Hopi Child. Ct. 1995); S. Ute Tribe v.
Scott, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6105, 6106-07 (S. Ute Tribal Ct. 1991) (deciding two search
and seizure issues by means of Incorporation; intoxication does not per se negate
consent to a search, and roadside sobriety tests are not incident to lawful arrest).

353. See e.g., Hopi Tribe v. Dawahoya, 25 Indian L Rep. 6107, 6107 (Hopi App.
Ct. 1995).

354. See, e.g., D.N., 22 Indian L. Rep. at 6071.
355. Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Pretends Eagle, 24 Indian L Rep. 6240, 6244
(Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997).
356. See supra Part II.A.2.
357. D.N., 22 Indian L. Rep. at 6071.
358. Id

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

Second, tribal courts typically work hard to fit federal Standards
they adopt to the tribal context, a task non-Indian courts may not be
well suited to accomplish. In the Kahe case, for example, the tribal
court took account of the Hopi concept of the "welfare check" in
upholding an officer's stop as reasonable.359 Similarly, in Hopi Tribe
v. Mahape,36 the court adopted the federal rule that driveways are
only "semi-private" and that the reasonableness of a driveway search
turned on the possessor's expectation of privacy and the officer's
reasons for being on the driveway. Subsequently, the court found
"the attitude of the Hopi people to be concerned about the safety and
welfare of others" to be a relevant factor that justified upholding an
officer's search of a vehicle containing human occupants that had
been parked on a driveway for a long period of time during the
winter.361 In particular, the court noted that the cultural context of
Hopi concern for others made the officer's attentiveness to a tribal
member's "concern for the safety and welfare of her family and
neighbors, and her authorization to check suspicious activity in the
area" reasonable.362 The holdings in the Kahe and Mahape cases
constitute the greatest threat to Protection because they sanction the
most expansive searches in all the search and seizure case law. These
cases, however, likely would not strike many readers as constituting
particularly Hard Cases.
With respect to the remedy when an unlawful search and seizure
occurs, all the reported tribal court decisions have engaged in
Incorporation and prescribed the exclusionary rule upon finding
violations.363
The Pretends Eagle court employed Fitted
Incorporation, taking tribe-specific considerations into account when
it adopted the exclusionary rule.3 4 The court expressly stated that its
holding was provisional because "neither party brought to the
attention of the court any tribal customs or traditions which would
help the court in interpreting the Constitution. ' 365 The court further
explained that its holding "may be subject to review and revision by
this Court in the future upon submission of evidence as to tribal
traditions and customs."3" The D.N. court, in a testimonial to deep
assimilation, did not appear to appreciate that adopting the
exclusionary rule involved a choice. The D.N. court viewed the

359. See supra Part IV.A.4.b.
360. 21 Indian L. Rep. 6138 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1994).
361. Id. at 6139.
362. Id.
363. See, e.g., D.N., 22 Indian L. Rep. at 6072; Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v.
Pretends Eagle, 24 Indian L. Rep. 6240, 6244 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997).
364. See Pretends Eagle, 24 Indian L. Rep. at 6244.
365. Id.
366. Id.
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exclusion of evidence obtained outside of a lawful search or seizure to
be the natural outcome. 367
It is interesting to consider why tribal courts have so fully adopted
federal approaches in the search and seizure context instead of
developing independent doctrines through Tailoring or ReStandardizing as they have done with respect to so many other ICRA
provisions. There are several possible explanations. First, the federal
search and seizure case law employs particularly capacious broad
standards such as "probable cause" and "reasonable suspicion" that
allow themselves to be fitted to the Indian context. Second, the Anglo
jurisprudence of search and seizure may fit particularly well with
traditional tribal customs. Third, it is possible that the federal
doctrine approach is sound at the levels of Goal and Standard - and
may even be largely transcultural.
d. FirstAmendment Analogues

There were fourteen reported tribal court decisions construing
ICRA's First Amendment analogues of freedom of speech, the right
to petition the government, assembly, and the free exercise of
religion.37 Although the sample is too small to make any definitive
conclusions, some patterns do appear to emerge. Here, more than in
any other ICRA provisions, the tribal courts have struck out on their
own to develop ICRA doctrines that are independent of the federal
case law. This may be the case because American First Amendment
protections are more reflective of a particular Western, liberal
tradition and both shape and reflect societal values more than any
other constitutional provision. It also might be a product of the
complexity of First Amendment law, particularly free speech, which
makes recourse to the federal approach a time-consuming and
difficult project. Despite these considerations, several cases make use
of Incorporation, and when there is Adapted Adoption one still finds
367. See D.N., 22 Indian L. Rep. at 6072. In fact, the exclusionary rule is by no
means the only logically plausible remedy. See Harold J. Krent, How to Move Beyond
the ExclusionaryRule: StructuringJudicialResponse to Legislative Reform Efforts, 26
Pepp. L. Rev. 855, 877 (1999); see also L. Timothy Perrin et. al., If it's Broken, Fir it:
Moving Beyond the ExclusionaryRule, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 669,736-55 (1999) (proposing
numerous alternatives to the exclusionary rule).
368. Another reason is that search and seizures Legal Tests have been codified in
many tribal ordinances or tribal constitutions. This is not really an independent
explanation, however, insofar as it simply pushes the inquiry back one step, for the
question still arises as to why tribal law has codified and adopted federal approaches.
369. This could be true even if Fourth Amendment doctrine is an incoherent
"mess" at the more concrete level of Rulified Standard, as many commentators have
argued. Se4 e.g., Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 Duke Li. 787,787-88
(1999) (collecting commentators who concur that contemporary Fourth Amendment
doctrine is a "mess").
370. ICRA does not have any provisions paralleling the First Amendment's
Establishment clause.
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that the core First Amendment values are assimilated, even if the
Anglo values are refracted more sharply through the Indian cultural
prism here than is the case with other ICRA provisions. Also present
in this area are several cases in which tribal courts engaging in Tabula
Rasa assert that a given circumstance violates the ICRA provision
without making any effort to develop a rule. While perhaps jarring
from the perspective of twentieth-century American constitutional
law, such ipse dixit reasoning is characteristic of the common law
development of rules that characterizes constitutional adjudication.
In fact, such reasoning is characteristic of the first American Supreme
Court cases that construed due process, free exercise, and the like.371
In Chavez v. Tome,37 one of the seven cases concerning free
speech, the trial court had held that a newspaper libeled an individual
and then ordered that the newspaper print a retraction. Engaging in
Stock Incorporation, the Chavez court reversed the retraction order
due to the "right of the press to be free of governmental
intervention. ' 373 Subsequently, the Chavez court held that "[t]he
choice of material to be printed is a protected exercise of editorial
control and judgment and the government is prevented from
regulating this process. A responsible press is desirable, but it cannot
be legislated by the Navajo Tribal Council or mandated by the Navajo
'
courts."374
The court further stated that although "[t]his does not
mean that the press is free to print libelous material, because the
government does have a legitimate interest in protecting an
individual's good name, '375 all a court can do is assess damages.
Gwin v. Bolman376 is a fine example of laconic, ipse dixit reasoning
in the context of Tabula Rasa. In Gwin, a petition had garnered
sufficient signatures to trigger a so-called "recall election" to summon
from office several school board members.377 A tribal ordinance
provided that other candidates could run in the recall election, but if
the board members were to resign, the board could avoid the recall
election by appointing replacements to serve out the unexpired
terms.378 The court concluded that the ordinance transformed the
recall election into a de facto general election and that this "harms
plaintiff's First Amendment rights. ' 379 Accordingly, the court
enjoined the de facto general election and instead called for an
election in which the voters would decide the sole question of whether
371. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
372. 14 Indian L. Rep. 6029 (Navajo 1987).
373. Id. at 6032.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. 25 Indian L. Rep. 6121 (Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation
D. Ct. 1998).
377. Id. at 6122.
378. See id.
379. Id.
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the board member should be recalled. Presumably, a concern that the
ordinance burdened the board member's right to defend herself
against the recall petition animated the court's ruling, a strong rightsprotecting free speech principle. The court, however, did not provide
reasoning for its conclusion or seek to generate a legal rule that would
give guidance for future cases. In Navajo Nation v. Crockett, 1
another freedom of speech case, the issue was whether a tribal
agency's "interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees" outweighs the employees' free
speech rights to "disclose demoralizing or disruptive" but true
information about possible mismanagement and misconduct. The
court held that the agency's interests did not outweigh the individuals'
right to free speech.- s' In the course of making its ruling, however, the
court, in dicta, provided very different rules governing employee
dissatisfactions that were not matters of "public concern." - 2 These
rules subordinated the disgruntled employee's interests to the
community's interest in encouraging negotiated solutions over
litigation. The court did not cite to federal case law, but instead
proceeded via Tabula Rasa.?
The issue presented in Hopi Tribe v. Loneivolf Scott,- was whether
an ordinance prohibiting the damaging of public property interfered
with free speech when applied to protesters who had unearthed part
of the Hopi-Navajo fence. Engaging in Stock Incorporation, the court
held that the defendants' acts "constituted civil disobedience that
resulted in physical damage and was not... [protected speech and
conduct because the] activities were not speech oriented, but were
physical and allegedly destructive."'
Kavena v. Hamilton, the only reported free exercise decision, is a
fine example of Tabula Rasa being employed to help preserve
distinctive tribal institutions. The Hopi Tribe's constitution provided
that villages could alter their political organization by means of a
village-wide referendum if twenty-five percent of the "voting
members" of the village signed a petition. Kavena and a companion
case 3s7 concerned a referendum in "traditional villages" where "Hopi
religion and village organization... is virtually inseparable [and
m]embership in a village is in part religious as well as civil." The
advocates of change expressly hoped to break the linkage between
village membership and religion.
380. 24 Indian L. Rep. 6027, 6029 (Navajo 1996).

381. See id.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
1989).

Id.
See supra Part ll.A.2.
14 Indian L. Rep. 6001, 6005 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1986).
Id. (citing to federal case law for the proposition).
16 Indian L. Rep. 6061 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1988).
Kavena v. Hopi Indian Tribal Ct., 16 Indian L. Rep. 6063 (Hopi App. Ct.
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The specific question before the tribal court in Kavena was whether
a petition containing two hundred sixty-nine valid signatures satisfied
the twenty-five percent "voting members" requirement.388 An official
of the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs, who under the Hopi
constitution was responsible for "see[ing] that there [was] a fair vote,"
had determined the total number of voting members by counting the
number of village residents who had voted in a previous tribal
election. The tribal court found that this method of counting
understated the number of voting members because "[m]any village
members.., do not reside in the village of their membership."
Nonresidents could still qualify as members because "[v]illage
membership in a [traditional] village... with the traditional Hopi
organization, is a concept with much deeper meaning than mere
physical presence or residence. 3 89 The court noted that membership
"involves the maintenance of religious and cultural ties and
relationships with the village and its ceremonies" such that village
membership is "virtually inseparable" from the practice of their
religion.3" The court concluded that denying the franchise to nonresident members of traditional villages accordingly infringed nonresidents' religious freedom.39' The court then permanently enjoined
the election because a proper computation proved that less than
twenty-five percent of voting members, properly understood, had
petitioned for a referendum.319
Only limited case law construing the rest of ICRA's First
Amendment analogues exists, but these decisions have almost
uniformly been rights-protecting. One court confronted a claim that a
tribe's "one person/one caucus rule," which allowed tribal members to
attend the caucus of only one candidate for tribal council, violated the
"right of the people peaceably to assemble. '' 393 Engaging in Fitted
Incorporation, the tribal court
adopted the federal Legal Test and
3 94
struck down the tribal rule.

Several reported cases involved the right to petition for redress of
grievances. The Hudson v. Hoh Indian Tribe395 decision engaged in
388. Id.
389. Id. at 6065.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 6062.
392. Id. at 6065-66.
393. Id.
394. See Rave v. Reynolds, 23 Indian L. Rep. 6150, 6165-68 (Winnebago Sup. Ct.
1996).
395. 21 Indian L. Rep. 6045 (Hoh Ct. App. 1992). The Hudson case was unusual
because it required interpretation of a tribal constitution that by its terms appeared to
require that its provisions be construed no differently than its sister terms in the
United States Constitution. Id. at 6045-46. The Hudson court accordingly sought to
engage in Stock Incorporation, citing to federal precedent to identify the appropriate
Legal Tests. Id. at 6046. In concluding that the right to petition "must be read as a
limitation upon any sovereign immunity that the Hoh Tribe may possess," however,
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Stock Incorporation by holding that the right to petition "extends to
all departments of the government," including "access to the courts,"
and that the right to petition waived the tribe's sovereign immunity
for wrongful termination actions. Similarly, in Kowalski v. Elofson,31*
the court held that although the right to petition for redress of
grievances did not mandate judicial review of community council
actions to remove council members, it did require the existence of an
"appropriate forum" where grievances could be brought. Also, the
Southern Ute Public Housing Authority v. Pinnecoosell court
confronted the question of whether allowing counterclaims by
governmental agencies for abuse of process unlawfully burdened the
right to petition for redress of grievances. 3a1 The Pinnecoose court
looked to federal and state decisions but Re-Standardized,
synthesizing its own Legal Test from several approaches that had been
taken by lower federal and state courts.39 Interestingly, this appears
to be a rare instance of Re-Standardizing not to create doctrine fitted
to tribal needs but to create a better rule.
The one possible Hard Case in this area concerned freedom of
expression. In Brandon v. Tribal Councilfor the ConfederatedTribes
of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon, the tribal court ReStandardized and Tailored to uphold the suspension of a tribal
councilman for making a vulgar statement to his cousin in violation of
an ordinance prohibiting council members from using vulgar speech in
public. The tribal court Re-Standardized from the federal case law
allowing the regulation of obscenity and fighting words when it
formulated free speech's applicable Legal Test as requiring a "valid
and compelling reason ... to ban certain expressions or conduct upon

the part of its citizens."'" The court then Tailored this test to the
tribal context, concluding that:
the tribe has the right to expect its councilmembers to conduct
themselves in public with dignity and respect, and refrain from using
words or phrases that a normal tribal member is privileged to use.
the tribal court appeared to misconstrue the federal case law insofar as the right to
petition has not meant the end of federal sovereign immunity. Id.; see e.g, Dep't of the
Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 260 (1999) (noting that "[aibsent a waiver,
sovereign immunity shields the Federal government and its agencies from suit"
(citations omitted)).
396. 22 Indian L. Rep. 6007 (Lower Elwha Ct. App. 1993).
397. 18 Indian L. Rep. 6115 (S.Ute Tribal Ct. 1991).
39& See id
399. See id at 6117.
400. 18 Indian L. Rep. 6139 (Grand Ronde Tribal Ct. 1991).
401. Id. at 6141. The tribal court's formulation qualifies as Re-Standardizing
because the federal Legal Test is not a compelling interest Standard, which would
permit the creation of new exceptions, but instead treats fighting words and obscenity
as fixed legal categories under which new factual scenarios must fall if they are to be
immunized from ordinary First Amendment constraints. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377,382-83 (1992).
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[Moreover,] the type of language used by Mr. Brandon was arguably
"fighting words" that were likely to create a violent or hostile
situation ....Finally, the Grand Ronde Tribe has a vested interest
in protecting its reputation throughout the community. It thus has a
compelling reason to have enacted a provision in its tribal code
prohibiting tribal members from involving themselves in actions
or
42
activities that may bring discredit or disrespect on the tribe. 0
It is unlikely that a provision such as the tribe's would be found to
fall within the "fighting words" exception under ordinary federal
doctrine. 43 On the other hand, the Brandon court repeatedly stressed
that "council members should be expected to conduct themselves at a
higher level of restraint than other tribal members" and there is a
well-established branch of free speech doctrine that provides relaxed
standards for regulating the speech of government employeesc n For
example, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the Hatch
Act's bar that prevents federal employees from participating in
partisan political activities because such undertakings could
"reasonably [be] deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency
of the public service. ' 4°5 It could be argued that the Grand Ronde
ordinance is analogous because maintaining respect for political
leaders could be said to be a precondition to effective public service.
In any event, a tribal court's conclusion does not violate Protection
merely because it deviates from what would have been the likely
outcome in federal court. If, and to what extent, Brandon implicates
the values of Protection has to be determined based on a thick
political theory. Allowing a valuable yet idiosyncratic community like
Native Americans to deploy the type of limitation found in Brandon
would not be problematic under a thick Rawlsian political theory
because the ordinance implicates neither the exit right nor wellorderedness. 4°
e. Sixth Amendment Analogues
There were twenty-eight claims based on ICRA's Sixth
Amendment analogues. Ten cases involved the right to a jury trial,
402. Brandon, 18 Indian L. Rep. at 6141.
403. In fact, the Supreme Court "has not upheld a conviction on the basis of the
fighting words doctrine since Chaplinsky," the case that created the doctrine.
Geoffrey R. Stone, et al., The First Amendment 83 (1999).
404. See, e.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 550, 564 (1973) (noting that "the government has an interest in
regulating the conduct and 'the speech of its employees that differ[s] significantly
from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in
general"' and going on to uphold law barring federal employees from engaging in
plainly identifiable acts of political management and political campaigning (quoting
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,568 (1968))).
405. Id.
406. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 7, at 1093-1106.
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nine cases addressed the right to counsel, six cases involved speedy
trial claims, two cases construed the nature and cause of the
accusation clause, and one case concerned the guarantee of
compulsory process. The pattern of Adapted Adoption continues in
these cases, although there are significant deviations in right to jury
and counsel cases because ICRA's language departs from the Bill of
Rights language by creating conditions precedent to the vesting of its
rights. The tribal case law throughout the Sixth Amendment
analogues is consistently protective of rights; there do not appear to
be any Hard Cases here. Nor do any of the cases create externalities.
(i) Right To Jury Trial
Three cases presented threshold questions concerning the
applicability of the ICRA jury right. In Shippentower v. Confederated
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation of Oregon,' the issue was
whether the jury right extends to civil matters.
Relying on
straightforward statutory interpretation-the ICRA provision grants
the jury right only to persons "accused of an offense punishable by
imprisonment"-the tribal court held in the negative. Similarly, in
Nisqually Indian Community v. J.S.K.,0 a tribal court engaged in
Stock Incorporation and held that juvenile defendants who were in
juvenile court proceedings for conduct that would be criminal for
adults were not entitled to a jury trial, relying on federal Supreme
Court precedent distinguishing the rehabilitative purposes of juvenile
proceedings from the punitive purposes of criminal proceedings.
Finally, in Pueblo of Pojoaque v. Jagles,1 the tribal court concluded
that an adult defendant accused of theft was not entitled to a jury trial.
The court reasoned that because the tribe's limited resources
precluded imprisonment even if the defendant were convicted, there
was no jury right because the ICRA provision applies only to
defendants accused of offenses that are "punishable by
imprisonment." This might qualify as a Hard Case. On the one hand,
the Jagles opinion fits the pattern of the practical over the
hypertechnical; the case might not be problematic for the reasons
previously discussed.410 On the other hand, the Jagles court did not
consider the possibility that "imprisonment" may be a statutory proxy
for crimes with social consequences that are of sufficient magnitude to
demand the jury guarantee. Under this view, the mere fact that the
defendant could not have been imprisoned would not eliminate the
importance of a jury trial. Even so, Jagles is not problematic under a

407.
408.
409.
410.

20 Indian L. Rep. 6026 (Umatilla Tribal Ct. 1993).
20 Indian L. Rep. 6049 (Nisqually Tribal Ct. 1986).
24 Indian L. Rep. 6137 (Pojoaque Pueblo Tribal Ct. 1997).
See supra Part IV.B.4.a.
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Rawlsian framework, for it implicates neither exit nor wellorderedness.
Another threshold question frequently litigated in the tribal cases is
under what conditions the jury right can be waived. In contrast to the
Sixth Amendment, the ICRA right to jury trial contains, by its terms,
a condition precedent: the criminal defendant must make a "request"
for a jury before the tribe's obligation of not "deny[ing]" the request
is triggered.4" But are there any conditions that must pertain for a
defendant's failure to request a jury to be deemed permissible?
Although it is not apparent from the language of the ICRA provision,
all tribal courts presented with the question have concluded that there
must be a knowing and voluntary waiver of ICRA's conditional jury
right.
For example, in Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v.
Peone,412 the court held that the "failure of the accused to make a
request for a jury trial constitutes a valid waiver only when that failure
to request a jury trial is made knowingly and intentionally, and the
accused is aware that s/he [sic] is giving up his/her right to a trial by
jury." Similarly, in Laramie v. Colville Confederated Tribes,413 the
tribal court struck down an ordinance that required parties who had
requested a jury trial at the start of litigation to confirm ten days
before trial their desire to have a jury.414 The court gave credence to
the tribe's concern that the "difficulties of bringing in jurors over long
distances and the efficient administration of justice" required
confirmation, but ultimately rejected it. 415 The court stated that
"[w]hile we are sympathetic to the concerns of the tribe, the
fundamental right of a criminal defendant to a trial by jury cannot be
diluted because of administrative difficulties. '416 Illustrative of the
rights-protecting character of this opinion is the tribal court's rejection
of the tribe's argument that any burden on the right was cured by the
defendant's option to move to continue the trial and then renew her
demand for a jury trial, a procedural motion that both the tribe and
the defendant agreed was "routinely granted." The tribal court
accordingly reversed the defendant's nonjury conviction and
remanded the case to the lower court for a jury trial.

411.
412.
1989).
413.
414.

25 U.S.C. § 1302(10) (1994).
16 Indian L. Rep. 6136, 6137 (Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribal Ct.
22 Indian L. Rep. 6072 (Colville Ct. App. 1995).
The court's reasoning technically cannot be analyzed under the model

developed in Part II.A. because there is no constitutional analogue to the ICRA

language it was construing. Nonetheless, the court's approach can be analogized to
Stock Incorporation because it looked to federal case law concerning waiver in other

constitutional contexts.
415. Id. at 6074.
416. Id.
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Other tribal courts have more readily found waiver of the right to
jury trial. For example, in Squaxin Island Tribe v. Johns,"7 the tribal
court held that although the defendant had made a timely request for
jury, he subsequently waived it by "knowingly and voluntarily failing
to appear on two occasions without justification after assurances of
appearance were made to the court." The court noted that
"[airranging and preparing for the trial and summoning the jurors was
done at considerable expense to the court, its staff, and the tribe" and
that the defendant accordingly had "waived or forfeited his
' Similarly, in Hummingbird v. Southern
opportunity for a jury trial."418
19
Ute Indian Tribe, the tribal appellate court acknowledged that the
"right to a jury trial is a fundamental right" under ICRA, but noted
that "in order to take advantage of this fundamental right certain
procedures need to be followed." The appellate court upheld the
lower court's determination that the defendant had waived her jury
right because the defendant had been informed of the applicable
procedures-a written jury request and payment of a $25 jury feebut had not followed them.4" While Johns and Hummingbird are less
rights-protecting than Laramie and Peone, they probably do not
qualify as Hard Cases. They both require that rights be knowingly
waived; the noninevitability of such a requirement, and hence the
significance in respect of the value of Protection that tribal courts
have created waiver requirements, is underscored by the fact that the
bulk of federal constitutional rights are waivable without a showing
that the waiver was knowingly undertaken.421 Furthermore, as the
417. 15 Indian L. Rep. 6010, 6011 (Sq. I. Tribal Ct. 1987).
418. The court also held that disallowing a jury trial under these circumstances did
not violate due process. See id
419. 19 Indian L. Rep. 6067, 6067 (S. W. Intertribal Ct. App. 1991).
420. It is worth noting that the Hunmingbirdcourt did not expressly hold that the
procedures were compatible with ICRA; the appellant in Hummingbird does not
appear to have argued that the procedures violated ICRA and the tribal court only
upheld the trial court's finding that the procedures had not been followed.
One other case addressed the right to jury, but on due process grounds. The tribal
court in S. Ute Tribe v. Watts, (S. Ute Tribal Ct. 1994), came to a conclusion almost
flatly at odds with that of the Laranhe and Peone courts. At issue in Watts was
whether an ordinance that required parties to request a jury within ten days of
entering their plea, subject to the pain of losing the right, violated due process. The
tribal court found the ordinance to be an acceptable means of -protecting tribal
governmental authority." One can only speculate as to whether the outcome would
have been any different had the defendant's argument been cast in terms of the jury
right rather than due process.
421. See, e.g., Daigle v. Maine Med. Ctr., 14 F.3d 684, 687-88 (1st Cir. 1994)
(refusing to consider constitutional claim that jury right was violated because plaintiff
failed to raise it at the trial level; no showing that such waiver was knowing); Cohen v.
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 729 F.2d 59, 60-61 (1st Cir. 1984) (rejecting
assorted constitutional claims because they were not raised at trial). That the waiver
of the Sixth Amendment jury right must be knowingly made, see Godinez v. Moran,
509 U.S. 389, 396-99 (1993), does not undercut the point made above in the text that
the tribal courts' waiver requirements in respect of the ICRA provision was not
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courts in both Jones and Hummingbird pointed out, the defendants
had actual knowledge of the procedural requirements.
The final jury trail case meriting discussion, Downey v. Bigman4"
illustrates well the conceptualization of Anglo practices in Indian
cultural terms, a phenomenon relevant to deep assimilation. The
Downey court held that a judge's overturning of a jury's verdict
violates the jury right except in narrow circumstances.4z As discussed
extensively above,424 the court grounded its decision in tribal
traditions of "participatory democracy." Conceptualizing juries as
Anglo forms of tribal consensus-building and democracy is likely to
facilitate the absorption of Anglo trial values because the novel Anglo
procedure is characterized as a traditional Indian commitment. At the
same time, such conceptualization allows the Anglo values to be
reshaped in accordance with tribal values and needs, and accordingly
invites cultural syncretism. Downey showcases this as well. The tribal
court engaged in Re-Targeting, identifying community participation in
decisionmaking as the jury right's Goal, and created a novel
procedure that advanced this Goal-allowing juries to ask witnesses
questions during trial.4 5
(ii) Right to Counsel
Two types of right to counsel claims appear in the tribal case law:
waiver and ineffective assistance of counsel. With regard to the first,
the tribal case law unanimously holds that the right to counsel can be
waived. These cases are consistent with the language of ICRA, which
prohibits tribes only from "deny[ing] to any person in a criminal
proceeding the right... at his own expense to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense. '42 6 As with the right to jury trial, however,
tribal courts have required that the right be knowingly waived. Four
of the nine reported cases presented the issue of whether a particular
defendant had knowingly waived the right to counsel. In two cases
where tribal courts found waiver, there was explicit evidence that the
defendant had been "fully informed" of his right to assistance of
counsel but that he "willingly chose" to represent himself.427 In two
inevitable.
422. 22 Indian L. Rep. 6145 (Navajo 1995).
423. Namely, where "the evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the
finding ... or when the jury is confused." Id. at 6146-47; see also supra notes 74-76 and
accompanying text (discussing the Downey decision).
424. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
425. Downey, 22 Indian L. Rep. at 6146.
426. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (1994) (emphasis added).
427. Lummi Indian Nation v. Solomon, 21 Indian L. Rep. 6085, 6085 (Lummi Ct.
App. 1992); see also Hoh Idaho Tribe v. Penn, 15 Indian L. Rep. 6029, 6030 (Hoh Ct.
App. 1988) ("The defendant was fully aware and understood that he had the right to
be represented by a lawyer or spokesperson at his own expense. After being given an
opportunity to request a continuance to consult with a lawyer or spokesperson before
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other cases the defendants' insufficient effort to obtain counsel was
the basis for finding waiver. One defendant had been informed of his
right to counsel but "made no effort to contact spokespersons who
appear before the Suquamish Tribal Court to assist indigent tribal
members"' s over a period of fifteen months. In the fourth and final
case in which waiver was found, the defendant "was advised at
arraignment of her right to counsel throughout the proceedings but
failed to exercise that right until a few days before trial," eighteen
months after being informed of the right to counsel."'
All three cases in which the tribal courts found that defendants had
not made informed waivers of their right to counsel occurred in the
Hopi courts. This is due to the extensive requirements that have been
judicially created in Hopi jurisprudence to ensure "knowingo and
intelligentf" waiver. The waiver requirements were first articulated
in the case of Hopi Tribe v. Consolidated Cases of Emerson AMI,
which Tailored federal case law to the Hopi context. After noting that
the right to counsel is a "fundamental rightf]" because it "protect[s]
the defendant against the power of the Tribe," the court then
proceeded to construe a Hopi ordinance that required "knowing"
waiver of counsel. Because the term "knowing" was not defined in
the ordinance, the court looked to federal and state case law, noting
that "[a]lthough federal law is not necessarily binding in Hopi courts,
a review of federal law will provide an example of a standard
that this
Court can modify to meet the needs of the Hopi Tribe.'3
The tribal court in AMI ultimately held that defendants "must have
knowledge about the dangers associated with proceeding pro se[,]...
the charges against them, the range of allowable punishment, possible
defenses to the charges, and factors in mitigation of the charge." As is
true of the due process cases that seek to protect the indigent,4 n the
AMI court charged the trial judge with the duty of communicating this
information to defendants. The court also required the judge to
consider the defendant's "education and mental condition." The AMI
court then analyzed a "legal rights form" that was given to all
defendants to inform them of their rights, and mandated many
changes. The court also held that a defendant's signature on the form
is not sufficient to constitute a waiver and that the judge still must
make an "active inquiry" because many defendants have limited
command of English, due to the "novel, frightening and stressful
situation" of having been arrested that might further compromise
pleading to the charge, the defendant chose not to ....).
428. Suquamish Indian Tribe, v. Mills, Sr., 21 Indian L Rep. 6053, 6054
(Suquamish Ct. App. 1991).
429. Lummi Indian Tribe v. Edwards, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6005, 6008 (Lummi Ct.
App. 1988).

430. 25 Indian L. Rep. 6163, 6164-66 (Hopi App. Ct. 1996).
431. Id. at 6164.
432. See supra notes 262-71 and accompanying text.
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comprehension. The AMI court found this to be necessary because
the form provides so much information it is "probably overwhelming
to most defendants" and because "[m]any defendants may be too
embarrassed or frightened to admit that they do not understand
something. 4 33 Under these exacting standards for finding waiver, the
AMI court itself reversed three convictions, 434 and two subsequent
cases each reversed one additional conviction for invalid waiver of the
right to counsel. 35
None of the seven reported decisions concerning waiver qualifies as
a Hard Case. Though the Hopi requirements are the most stringent,
the less formalized approaches taken by the five courts that found
valid waivers show no indications of being problematic. Finally, the
fact that all tribal courts have some form of a knowing waiver
requirement is a testimonial to their having taken the right to counsel
seriously because ICRA does not expressly prescribe such a
requirement and many United States constitutional rights may be
unknowingly waived. 436
Turning to the second type of right to counsel claim found in the
tribal case law, two reported cases rejected claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, and neither is a Hard Case. The tribal court's
analysis in Navajo Nation v. MacDonald,Sr.437 is a fine example of the
jurisprudential syncretism found in ICRA case law. The decision
began by conceptualizing tribal customs in Anglo terms, stating that
the "Navajo common law" includes the "right to effective assistance
of counsel."
The court then engaged in Fitted Incorporation,
adopting the federal approach but looking to tribal custom to guide its
application. 43 8 The court concluded that the defendant "received
some very aggressive and competent representation" and that counsel
"spoke for [defendant] wisely, and with knowledge, consistent with a
'
traditional Navajo 'talking things out' session."439
The second
ineffective assistance of counsel case cited to the MacDonald, Sr.
opinion for the proposition that the federal case law provided the
applicable rules and determined that the defendant had received an
433. AMI, 25 Indian L. Rep. at 6165.
434. Id. at 6167-68.
435. See Harvey v. Hopi Tribe, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6212 (Hopi App. Ct. 1997);
Poleahla v. Hopi Tribe, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6224 (Hopi App. Ct. 1997).
436. See supra notes 426-35 and accompanying text.
437. 19 Indian L. Rep. 6053 (Navajo 1991).
438. See id. at 6055 ("The traditional Navajo 'trial' involved affected individuals
'talking' about the offense and offender to resolve the problem. The alleged offender
had the right to have someone speak for him. The effectiveness of a speaker (and

there could be more than one) was measured by what the speaker said. If the speaker
spoke wisely and with knowledge while persuading others in their search for
consensus, that indicated effectiveness. If the speaker hesitated, was unsure, or failed
to move the others, that person was not a good speaker and thus was ineffective."
(citations omitted)).
439. Id. at 6056.
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"excellent defense" in light of the briefs filed with the court and the
quality of the legal theories that the defendant had propounded.'
(iii) Speedy Trial
Six cases raised speedy trial claims. All the cases adopted the
federal Standard, under which courts are to look at the length of
delay, reason for delay, whether and when defendant asserted his
speedy trial right, and prejudice in determining if there has been a
speedy trial violation." 1 One tribal appellate court remanded the case
back to the trial court for a determination of whether the defendant's
speedy trial right had been violated." - Another reported case
clarified the point in criminal procedure at which the clock for speedy
trial purposes begins, and approved of a tribal ordinance that
provided that no delay of less than six months could be considered
unreasonable for purposes of the speedy trial right."3
Four cases found that the speedy trial right had not been violated,"
and in none of the cases do the facts suggest that the value of
Protection was compromised. The defendants did not allege prejudice
by virtue of the delays in any of the cases." s In two cases the delay
had been caused largely or exclusively by the defendant."
In the
third case, the defendant appeared to have behaved strategically,
asserting his speedy trial objection only three working days prior to a
trial that had been scheduled six weeks before and relying on the
theory that the re-scheduled trial, which was due to occur ninety-one
days after his arraignment, violated his rights because a Washington
state court rule requires that no more than ninety days could elapse
between arraignment and trial." 7 In the fourth case, the delay of six
440. Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, Jr., 19 Indian L. Rep. 6079,6082 (Navajo 1992).
441. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,530 (1972).
442. See Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota Nation v. Cloud, 21 Indian L Rep. 6115, 611618 (N. Plains Intertribal Ct. App. 1994).
443. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Cook, 22 Indian L. Rep. 6037, 6037 (Cheyenne
River Sioux Ct. App. 1995).
444. Komalestewa v. Hopi Tribe, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6213, 6214-15 (Hopi App. Ct.
1996); Stepetin v. Nisqually Indian Cmty., 20 Indian L. Rep. 6049, 6050 (Nisqually Ct.
App. 1993); MacDonald,Jr., 19 Indian L. Rep. at 6083 (Navajo 1992); Lummi Indian
Tribe v. Edwards, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6005, 6007 (Lummi Ct. App. 1988).
445. Komalestewa, 25 Indian L. Rep. at 6215 ("Appellant does not allege any
prejudice caused him by the delay in prosecution"); Stepetin, 20 Indian L Rep. at
6050 ("[N]o prejudice occurred to the defendant."); MacDonald, Jr., 19 Indian L
Rep. at 6083 ("[T]here is no indication that evidence was lost, memories were
dimmed, defense witnesses disappeared or the defense was impaired.").
446. Edwards, 16 Indian L. Rep. at 6007 (noting that the defendant caused the
eighteen month gap between arraignment and trial by twice requesting continuances
and then failing to appear at trial); Konzalestewa, 25 Indian L Rep. at 6215 (stating
that three 2 month delays were attributable to appellant's "own requests for delays
and stipulations to continuances" and five-weeks of the delay was attributable to the
government).
447. Stepetin, 20 Indian L. Rep. at 6050.
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and one half months between arraignment and trial was due to the
complexity of the case, which involved twenty-three counts of
conspiracy, aiding and abetting, bribery, and violations of the Navajo
Ethics in Government Act brought against a former Navajo council
member. 448
The speedy trial case law demonstrates the tribal courts' readiness
to consult federal case law in the absence of definite tribal customs.
For example, in Komalestewa v. Hopi Tribe,4 9 the tribal court
engaged in Fitted Incorporation and conceptualized the speedy trial
right within tribal terms in a manner that justified looking to federal
case law for guidance, stating that "Hopi custom speaks to fairness,
but it does not provide specific guidance for defining when the right to
a speedy trial has been violated. Therefore, we will consider foreign
law and apply it to the extent it is consistent with our customs,
traditions and culture."'45 Identifying the speedy trial right as being
part of the tribe's cultural ethos of fairness is probably a fast track
toward assimilation of the Anglo value. Similarly, in SissetonWahpeton Dakota Nation v. Cloud,451 the tribal court was unable to
locate tribal custom bearing on the right to a speedy trial and
determined that "this court [therefore] is permitted to look at other
decisions that define and clarify what speedy trial is." The court
identified four factors looked to by federal courts and remanded the
case back to the trial judge.
(iv) Nature and Cause of Accusation
Two cases have construed ICRA's nature and cause of accusation
clause. In Walker River Paiute Tribe v. Jake,452 the tribal court held
that the requirements of ICRA's nature and cause of accusation
clause are not waivable and that all criminal complaints must contain
this information. The Jake court employed Tabula Rasa, most likely
because it viewed the legal question as having a very simple answer,453
and dismissed the criminal complaint. In Hopi Tribe v. Consolidated
Cases of Emerson AMI,4 4 the tribal court employed Fitted
Incorporation in its conclusion that the nature and cause of accusation
clause requires a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea.

448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

MacDonald,Jr., 19 Indian L. Rep. at 6079, 6083.
25 Indian L. Rep. 6213, 6214-15 (Hopi App. Ct. 1996).
Id. at 6214.
21 Indian L. Rep. 6115, 6116 (N. Plains Intertribal Ct. App. 1994).
23 Indian L. Rep. 6204, 6207 (Walker River Tribal Ct. 1996).
This is suggested by the Jake court's one sentence analysis of the question

("This court specifically rejects any concept or notion that a criminal complaint passes
muster even though the information required by... the ICRA is omitted.") and the
fact that elsewhere in the opinion the court looked to federal law to construe other
ICRA provisions. See id. at 6205-06.
454. 25 Indian L. Rep. 6163, 6166 (Hopi App. Ct. 1996).
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(v) Compulsory Process
The one reported case applying ICRA's guarantee of compulsory
process was decided in favor of the complaining citizen. The
defendant in Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. Seaboy/55 had been
arraigned in court on May 18, 1988, and his trial was set three weeks
later for June 8. Two days before trial, Seaboy applied for, and was
granted, a continuance. No new trial date was set. At the end of
August, Seaboy was informed that his trial would take place in four
days. After Seaboy's conviction for theft, the tribal appellate court
reversed on the ground that only four days' notice of the trial date
deprived him of the right "to [have] compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses [in his favor]."45' 6 In a sophisticated analysis, the tribal court
deployed Tabula Rasa and reasoned analogically from the notice for
trials required under federal civil rules.
f. Fifth Amendment Analogues (excluding due process)
There were fifteen reported decisions construing ICRA's
guarantees against double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and
uncompensated takings. The cases were uniformly rights-protecting;
there are no Hard Cases here.
(i) Self-Incrimination
Five of the eight reported cases addressing the right against selfincrimination found violations or possible violations of the right.
Nearly all reported cases deployed either Stock or Fitted
Incorporation. As is the case with the right to jury and counsel, two of
the cases concerned interpretation of tribal ordinances that either
mirrored the ICRA provision or incorporated more detailed doctrinal
formulations found in federal case law.4
The right against self-incrimination has been assiduously guarded
by the tribal courts. For example, in MacDonaldv. Navajo Nation ex

455. 17 Indian L. Rep. 6027 (Intertribal Ct. App. 1989) (Gillette, J., dissenting).
456. Id. at 6028. In an interesting show of judicial restraint, the tribal court refused
to "legislate to the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribal Council as to the minimum amount
amount [sic] of time that is necessary to notify a defendant as to a trial date" but
suggested that criminal defendants ought to have at least as much time as civil
defendants. Id.
457. See S. Ute Tribe v. Lansing, 19 Indian L. Rep. 6091, 6092 (S. Ute Tribal Ct.
1992) (ordinance required police to inform person of rights "[bjefore any person who
is in custody is questioned or in any manner interrogated concerning any possible
criminal activity committed by that person" (citations ommitted)); Lower Elwha
Klallam Indian Tribe v. Bolstrom, 19 Indian L. Rep. 6026, 6027 (Lower Elwha Ct.
App. 1991) (noting that the ordinance "is essentially a statutory list of the decision of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)").
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rel Rothstein,458 the appellate court raised self-incrimination concerns
sua sponte, observing that although
[t]his court will not normally address errors which are not raised by
an appellant,... [w]here it is not clear that an individual has made a
knowing and intelligent choice between claiming or waiving a
fundamental privilege, and where this court sees errors to which no
exception has been taken and they would "seriously affect the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings," we
will act.
The appellate court then analyzed a lower court order that
defendant produce personal diaries and other personal documents
that did not qualify as business records. The tribal appellate court
directed the trial court to conduct a hearing to ensure that the
requested documents did not run afoul of the self-incrimination
Standards that the appellate court adopted from the Supreme Court
via Stock Incorporation.4 59
Tribal court sensitivity to the right against self-incrimination is also
well illustrated by the case of Hopi Tribe v. Consolidated Cases of
Emerson AMI.460 The tribal court in AMI explained at length why the
right against self-incrimination is a "fundamental right" of defendants.
The court stated that it
protect[s] the defendant against the power of the Tribe .... It
forces the Tribe to prove the case against the defendant and not
coerce a guilty plea from an innocent defendant. When a defendant
enters a guilty plea, he waives many of his other rights including the
right to a trial, the right to confront witnesses against him, and the
right to have his own witnesses testify. This reduces the burden on
the Tribe and makes it much easier for the Tribe to impose
punishments.461

This may be a Tabula Rasa interpretation of the right, as the court
did not cite to federal or state case law discussing the right against
self-incrimination, though it did look to federal case law to clarify
other ICRA provisions during its opinion. On the other hand, this

formulation is sufficiently similar to the federal understanding that the
decision more likely is an example of deep assimilation because the
values were sufficiently obvious to the court as not to require
citation. 462 Relying also on due process, the AMI court ultimately
458. 18 Indian L. Rep. 6003, 6007 (Navajo 1990) (quoting Johnson v. United States,
318 U.S. 189, 198, 200 (1942)).
459. See id. at 6007-08. In a subsequent case the same court engaged in Fitted
Incorporation, explaining that the right against self-incrimination is identical to a
longstanding tribal custom. See Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, Jr., 19 Indian L. Rep.
6079, 6084 (Navajo 1992).
460. 25 Indian L. Rep. 6163 (Hopi App. Ct. 1996).
461. Id. at 6164.
462. See supra Part IV.B.3.
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reversed a defendant's guilty plea, and imposed a set of requirements
on trial judges designed to ensure that defendants knowingly and
voluntarily plead guilty. In yet another case deploying Fitted
Incorporation, the MacDonald,Jr. court held that the trial court erred
and directed it to hold a hearing at which the prosecution would bear
the burden of showing that its evidence was not based on, nor derived
from, immunized testimony the defendant had given before the
United States Senate. 40
Two of the tribal courts exhibited assimilation when they
conceptualized the right against self-incrimination as reflecting tribal
values. After explaining the core of the "fundamental" right against
self-incrimination-that "an individual must not give information to
be used for his or her own punishment unless there is a knowing and
voluntary decision to do so"-the tribal court in MacDonald, Jr.'
explained:
[t]his is also a Navajo principle. Navajo common law rejects
coercion, including coercing people to talk. Others may "talk"
about a Navajo, but that does not mean coercion can be used to
make that person admit guilt or the facts leading to a conclusion of
guilt. Navajos often admit guilt, because honesty is another high
value, but even after admitting guilt, defendants in Navajo courts are
reluctant to speak.465
Similarly, in Lower Elwha Klallam Indian Tribe v. Bolstrom, the
tribal court adopted the exclusionary rule as the remedy for violations
of the right against self-incrimination, justifying it on the basis of tribal
values: "[w]hile there is no Lower Elwha Klallam statutory or case
law (this being a case of first impression) prescribing a remedy for
failing to give Miranda rights in a timely fashion, this court finds that
the exclusionary rule conforms to the spirit of fundamental fairness
inherent in Lower Elwha Klallam law."'
None of the three decisions finding no violation of the right against
self-incrimination appears to be a Hard Case. One case found no
violation because neither of the defendants had made any statements
to the officer and, accordingly, no harm resulted from the officer's
failure to advise defendants of their right to remain silent.' In the
second case, the defendant had been charged with fishing in restricted
waters. The tribal court carefully canvassed federal and state law and
engaged in Stock Incorporation when it concluded that the fight
against self-incrimination does not apply to noncriminal

463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
46&

MacDonald,Jr., 19 Indian L. Rep. at 6084.
Id
Id
19 Indian L. Rep. 6026 (Lower Elhvha Ct.App. 1991).
Id. at 6027.
Id.
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proceedings. 469 The last case employed Stock Incorporation to define
what constitutes "in custody," and found no custody when the police
asked the defendant questions at the
scene of an automobile accident
470
and in a hospital emergency room.
(ii) Double Jeopardy
There were four cases in which double jeopardy was an issue. All
of the reported double jeopardy cases were decided in favor of the
defendants, and the cases were at least as protective of double
jeopardy rights as is the federal case law. Three tribal courts engaged
in Fitted or Stock Incorporation. In an opinion reflecting assimilation,
one court utilized the concept of double jeopardy to flesh out the
meaning of a reasonableness inquiry in the context of administrative
law. There are no Hard Cases here, nor do there appear to be any
externalities.
Three of the cases presented the question of whether the double
jeopardy protection precludes the prosecution from appealing an
acquittal.
All answered affirmatively.
Deploying Stock
Incorporation, one of the three cases concerned a tribe's attempt to
prosecute defendants under a tribal regulation that was distinct from
the regulation the defendant had been tried for violating in a prior
trial, but whose elements to be proven were "identical under the facts
of this case" to what the tribe unsuccessfully had tried to prove in the
earlier prosecution.471 Another tribal appellate court determined sua
sponte that the double jeopardy provision barred the prosecution from
appealing the trial court's interpretation of the tribal ordinance after
the defendant had been acquitted. 472 Although the court did not cite
to any case law, the legal test it used is identical to the federal
approach, suggesting that the case is an example of deep assimilation
and Incorporation rather than Tabula Rasa. In the third case, Hopi
Tribe v. Huma,473 the trial judge had ruled sua sponte after a full trial
that a police officer did not have an articulable suspicion of
wrongdoing prior to making a stop and consequently acquitted the
defendant. The prosecution appealed, arguing inter alia that the trial
court did not have the power to ignore evidence to which the
defendant had not objected. The tribal appellate court relied on
Fitted Incorporation and dismissed the appeal on the ground that it
violated double jeopardy.
469. Chippewa-Ottawa Tribes v. Payment, Jr., 18 Indian L. Rep. 6141, 6141
(Chippewa-Ottawa Conservation Ct. 1991).
470. S. Ute Tribe v. Lansing, 19 Indian L. Rep. 6091 (S. Ute Tribal Ct. 1992).
471. Lummi Indian Tribe v. Kinley, 19 Indian L. Rep. 6027, 6029 (Lummi Ct. App.

1991).
472. Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6229, 6234 (Winnebago
Sup. Ct. 1998).
473. 25 Indian L. Rep. 6108 (Hopi App. Ct. 1995).
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The Huma case showcases tribal openness to embracing admittedly
foreign jurisprudential values that the tribal courts predict will have
salubrious effects on tribal life. The court noted that double jeopardy
"is an elemental principle of the United States criminal law" and
acknowledged that the tribe itself had neither "created a provision for
the Tribe to appeal an acquittal [n]or expressly rejected the
doctrine."'474

Canvassing the purposes behind double jeopardy that

have been identified in federal case law, the tribal court concluded
that double jeopardy "serves goals that will protect the Hopi people
and increase the Hopi confidence in the courts."475 In response to the
prosecutor's argument that "if the trial court has neglected its duty, it
certainly cannot hold such failure against the Tribe," the appellate
court responded "[ijf, through error, the defendant is found not guilty,
it is the Tribe which must bear the burden. In no circumstances can a
failure of the courts or prosecution be held against the defendant."' 6
It is interesting to note that the Huma rule is stricter than the federal
rule, because federal prosecutions frequently follow bungled state
prosecutions even where the second demands proof of the same
elements required in the first. This is permissible because proscribed
activities frequently are governed by both state and federal law, and
double jeopardy does not preclude federal prosecution after a failed
state prosecution, or the converse, even if the second prosecution
n
demands proof of the very elements required in the first trial.
In the final case meriting discussion, Rave, Sr., v. Ho-Chunk Nation
Gaming Commission, a tribal administrative agency had suspended
Mr. Rave's gaming license for a period of one year on the basis of an
alleged noncriminal violation. Rave appealed, and a tribal court
found that the agency had violated its own procedures and,
accordingly, ordered the agency to correct its errors and award Mr.
Rave relief. On remand, the agency denied Rave any relief and sta
sponte levied a new penalty without providing him notice or hearing.
Rave appealed again. Noting that "[i]t is a well-settled tenet of
administrative law that agency decision must prove reasonable under
the circumstances," the tribal appellate court concluded that the
agency's action was "without foundation in law," "arbitrary,"
"capricious," and an "abuse of discretion." The court further stated
that "[i]t is contrary to law. This is the administrative equivalent of
double jeopardy or to be twice punished for the same transgression.'
This case is probably best read as an importation of double jeopardy
474. Id.

475. Id.
476. Id.
477. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (holding that state
prosecution does not bar subsequent federal one); Bartkus v. Il., 359 U.S. 121 (1959)

(holding that federal prosecution does not bar subsequent state prosecution).
478. Rave, Sr., v. Ho-Chunk Nation Gaming Comm'n, 25 Indian L Rep. 6042,6044
(Ho-Chunk Nation Tribal Ct. 1997) (emphasis added).
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concepts in the service of defining "reasonableness," illustrating deep
tribal assimilation of Anglo jurisprudential values because the court
equated double jeopardy
with fundamental concepts of
479
reasonableness and fairness.

(iii) Uncompensated Takings
Three reported decisions concerned the guarantee against
uncompensated takings. In Kanzleiter v. Colville Indian Housing
Authority,n" a tribal court engaged in Tabula Rasa interpretation in
holding that the tribal housing authority's removal of "an abandoned
vehicle hulk" that had not been moved for three years and that the
authority deemed to be a "danger to inquisitive children, and an
eyesore to the community" was a taking for public use that
accordingly required compensation. In the two other decisions, tribal
courts engaged in Fitted Incorporation and held that the appointment
of counsel to represent indigents is not an uncompensated taking
because the practice of law is a privilege that can be conditioned on
the performance of pro bono representation. 481
g. Other Miscellaneous ICRA Rights
There also were several reported cases construing and applying
ICRA's protections against cruel and unusual punishment, bills of
attainders, and ex post facto laws. There do not appear to be any
Hard Cases. Nor do the cases impose externalities.
(i) Cruel and Unusual Punishment
There have been five reported decisions based on ICRA's ban
against cruel and unusual punishment. Three cases upheld sentences
against cruel and unusual punishment challenges. For example, in
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Sam,' the tribal court engaged in
Objective Incorporation by citing to an earlier tribal court decision
that had fully adopted the federal standard that cruel and unusual
punishment is violated by a punishment "so arbitrary and shocking to
the sense of justice." The court also relied on the federal rule that the
479. Alternatively, the case could be understood as a Re-Targeting of double
jeopardy insofar as it applied the protection outside the criminal context. See
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (applying double jeopardy only to criminal
assessments).
480. 25 Indian L. Rep. 6181, 6183 (Colville Tribal Ct. 1998).
481. Boos v. Yazzie, 17 Indian L. Rep. 6115 (Navajo 1990); Navajo Nation v.
MacDonald, Sr., 17 Indian L. Rep. 6124 (Navajo 1990). A takings claim was raised in
one other case. See St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Basil Cook Enters., 23 Indian L. Rep.
6172 (St. Regis Tribal Ct. 1996). The tribal court did not address the merits of a
takings claim because the tribe had not waived its sovereign immunity. Id. at 6174.
482. 21 Indian L. Rep. 6040 (Colville Ct. App. 1994).
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trial court's sentencing will be overturned only for abuse of discretion;
the tribal appellate court upheld defendants' sentence of 720 days for
multiple offenses of driving while intoxicated in light of the
defendant's "lengthy criminal history, failed attempts at
rehabilitation" and the fact that the sentence fell far short of the
statutory maximum.4s3 In Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, Sr.,I the
tribal appellate court employed Tailoring when it adjudged the
magnitude of the offense by reference to tribal values. The defendant
was a former Chairman of the Navajo Nation who had been convicted
of accepting bribes while in public office. Upholding a sentence of
2160 days imprisonment and 1800 days of labor pursuant to the
applicable tribal ordinances, the appellate court explained that
"[o]fficial corruption in public office is a serious offense, because it
robs the Navajo people of their property. Even more seriously, using
Navajo culture, it robs the Navajo people of their dignity."' s The
court went on to note that "corruption in public office through bribes,
kickbacks, and violations of ethical standards results in poor goods or
services,... favoritism to non-Navajos, and a host of other injuries to

the public good."'
In conclusion, the court stated that the parties
who paid the bribes were non-Navajos, and "[w]e are not blind to past
exploitations of the Navajo people, and the Navajo Nation Council
was not blind to them when it enacted both a revised criminal code
and an ethics code."' '
In a subsequent case the Navajo Supreme
Court relied on MacDonald, Sr. to uphold a similar sentence against
another defendant in the same public corruption case.'s"
In In re A.W., 4 the court held that the ban against cruel and
unusual punishment requires that a juvenile detention area "be
provided with a padded area to lie on, a blanket, and food to
eat...,,490The court accordingly ordered that the detention center be
closed until it was in compliance with the court's understanding of
what the ban on cruel and unusual punishment required. Similarly, in
McDonald, Jr. v. Colville Confederated Tribes,49 ' the tribal court
ordered the closure of a tribal jail because it had an inadequate
ventilation system, faulty and outdated electrical system, and the
conditions of the jail presented a danger to the health and safety of
the inmates.
483. Id. at 6043.
484. 19 Indian L. Rep. 6053 (Navajo 1991).
485. Id at 6059.
486. Id
487. Id. at 6060.
488. Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, Jr., 19 Indian L. Rep. 6079, 6084 (Navajo 1992).
489. 15 Indian L. Rep. 6041 (Navajo 1988).
490. Id. at 6042.
491. 17 Indian L. Rep. 6030 (Colville Tribal Ct. 1990). Although the tribal court
did not identify any legal provisions in the course of its laconic opinion, the source of
its authority presumably was ICRA's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
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(ii) Bills of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Laws
Five reported cases addressed claims that legislative acts constituted
either bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, both of which are
prohibited under ICRA.49 The government prevailed in all five cases.
Two cases decided bill of attainder claims. In In re Certified Question
11: Navajo Nation v. MacDonald,4" the issue was whether the tribal
council's placement of a tribal leader on an administrative leave
pending the results of a investigation into possible public corruption
qualified as a prohibited bill of attainder. After noting that "[a] bill of
attainder is apparently unknown to traditional Navajo culture," the
tribal appellate court engaged in Stock Incorporation.494 The court
then directed the trial court to apply the Standard to the
administrative leave, but made certain to point out that the trial court
should Tailor the Legal Test's Standard to the tribal context. The
court required that in determining whether the leave constituted a
"punishment," the trial court must consider not only "what
historically has been regarded as punishment for purposes of bills of
attainder and bills of pains under the law of England and the United
States" but also "what historically has been regarded as punishment
under Navajo common law. '495 In MacDonald, Sr. v. Redhouse,411 a
later appeal in the same case, the appellant argued that amendments
to the Navajo election statutes that disqualified from office individuals
convicted of crimes of corruption in public office constituted a bill of
attainder. The tribal appellate court once again engaged in Stock
Incorporation and dismissed the appellant's arguments. The court
utilized one of the Legal Tests under federal law for identifying a bill
of attainder when it took judicial notice of the fact that other possible
candidates for public office would be disqualified under the
amendments, and then concluded that the amendments did not
"target" the appellant.
Although none of the three cases deciding ex post facto claims
granted relief, none qualifies as a Hard Case. In one case, the tribal
court engaged in Stock Incorporation in holding that legislation that
prevented convicted criminals from holding public office had a valid
legislative purpose and, therefore, did not constitute an ex post facto
law. 41 In the second case, Frost v. Southern Ute Tribal Council,498 the
492. I treat bills of attainder and ex post facto laws together because they are
frequently overlapping claims. Both involve the "denunciation and condemnation of
an individual" by a legislature, "often act[ing] to impose retroactive punishment."
Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 n.30 (1977), quoted in MacDonald,
Sr. v. Redhouse, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6045, 6047 (Navajo 1991).
493. 16 Indian L. Rep. 6086 (Navajo 1989).
494. Id. at 6093.
495. Id.
496. 18 Indian L. Rep. 6045 (Navajo 1991).
497. Id. at 6046-47 (citing De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960)).
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tribal court appears to employ the Tabula Rasa technique. In Frost,
the chairman of the tribal council decided to investigate the plaintiff,
an elected member of the tribal council. A provision of the Southern
Ute Constitution provided that the council should establish
procedures and regulations for the conduct of removal proceedings,
and the tribal council enacted such regulations only a few days after
the plaintiff had been served with notice of the removal proceedings.
The Plaintiff argued that such proceedings qualified as an ex post
facto law. The tribal court rejected the argument on the grounds that
another provision of the constitution gave the council investigatory
jurisdiction and that the new regulations did not harm the plaintiff but
instead expanded his legal rights.499 The tribal court did not cite
federal case law to identify the applicable Legal Test. Another
indicator that the court employed Tabla Rasa is the existence of
federal case law that squarely decides the issue raised in the case the
same way the tribal court did; if the court had known about the
federal case law, it likely would have at least cited to it for support.5
The final case denying relief was Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Stead.5"' Three years before the Stead decision, the Supreme Court
held in Duro v. Reina5 that tribal courts did not have criminal
misdemeanor jurisdiction over Indians who were not members of their
tribes (known as "non-members"). This decision was contrary to two
hundred years of settled law, and Congress quickly responded by
enacting temporary, and ultimately permanent, legislation that
reversed Duro. The temporary legislation was enacted on November
5, 1990, and by its own terms was set to expire on September 30, 1991.
Stead, a member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, was arrested for driving
without a valid driver's license on the Colville Indian Reservation
during the time that Congress' temporary legislation was in effect.
His trial took place, however, on September 8, 1991, eight days after
the temporary legislation expired and one day before Congress
enacted a second piece of temporary legislation.5 3
The question before the Stead court was whether the trial court had
erred in denying Stead's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction on
the day of the trial. The tribal appellate court held that the trial court
had jurisdiction. The appellate court canvassed the federal case law
on ex post facto and engaged in Stock Incorporation, but the crux of
498. 23 Indian L. Rep. 6135 (S. Ute Tribal Ct. 1996).
499. Id. at 6136.
500. See Duncan v. Mo., 152 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1894) (stating that procedural
changes in the adjudication of criminal cases may violate ex post facto if they deprive
the defendant of substantial protections of law that were in effect when the crime was
committed).
501. 21 Indian L. Rep. 6005 (Colville Ct. App. 1993).
502. 495 U.S. 676, 695-96 (1990).
503. Congress ultimately enacted final legislation overturning Duro on October 28,
1991.
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the tribal court's reasoning did not turn on the niceties of ex post facto
doctrine but on the proposition that the Supreme Court decision in
Duro was incorrect ab initio and accordingly could not have
extinguished the tribe's inherent authority over non-members; only
Congress had the authority to waive the tribe's jurisdiction: 4 The
tribal court buttressed its reasoning by quoting legislative history that
stated that Congress intended to "[c]larify and reaffirm the inherent
authority of tribal government to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians on their reservations," not delegate new powers to the
tribes."' 5 The tribal court also quoted a federal court decision that
similarly had decided that tribes' jurisdiction over non-members "had
always existed and . . . continued uninterrupted, despite the Duro

decision."50 6
Even at an intuitive level, it is difficult to say that the tribal court's
decision, which turned on such a difficult legal question, violates the
value of Protection."° Nor does the analysis change when viewed
under the lens of thick political theory. With respect to wellorderedness, the equities pointed strongly in favor of the tribal court
exercising jurisdiction because Stead was on notice at the time he
engaged in the illegal acts that the tribal court had jurisdiction over
him." Nor does the case problematically implicate the exit right, for
it was not claimed that the defendant was under the impression that
driving without a valid license on the Colville reservation was
permissible, and there was no claim that the duration of incarceration
was extraordinary.

504. The tribal court made two other arguments, but they are of uncertain legal
weight. First, the tribal court noted that Stead had notice of the illegality of his act

and of the Colville tribal court's jurisdiction over him at the time he committed his
illegal acts. Stead, 21 Indian L. Rep. at 6009. While relevant to fundamental fairness,
they do not seem to bear on ex post facto analysis. Second, the tribal court stated that

Congress' amending legislation did not "disadvantage the appellant by imposing
greater punishment for the offense with which Stead was charged than at the time it
was committed." Id. While technically true, the legislation made punishment possible
insofar as under the Duro rule no court had jurisdiction to hear misdemeanor offenses
of non-members. Duro, 495 U.S. at 704-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This would
appear to run afoul of the rule of Duncan, 152 U.S. at 382-83. See supra notes 500-03
(discussing this issue).
505. Stead, 21 Indian L. Rep. at 6009.
506. Id.
507. While it is unclear whether the Stead court arrived at what would be the

correct answer as a matter of federal constitutional law, it should be kept in mind that
the tribe did not have to do so because at issue was ICRA's ex post facto provision;
that the tribal court's treatment of federal case law suggests that it tried to adopt
federal law is not relevant to whether a decision is a Hard Case.
508. Stead, 21 Indian L. Rep. at 6009.
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h. The Treatment of Outsiders

How tribal courts function when a party is either a non-member of
the tribe or a non-Indian (hereinafter an "outsider") is relevant to
Protection. After all, there is always a temptation to favor one's own,
and resisting this tendency would be a sign of commitment to the rule
of law. More cynically, one might attribute a well-behaved tribal
judiciary to political accountability or cultural affiliation with affected
parties rather than commitment to ICRA. Because these factors are
absent when an outsider's interests are involved, outsiders constitute a
control group from which inferences can be drawn as to whether
commitment to ICRA drives tribal judges.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to generalize about the treatment of
outsiders because there is only a small sample of reported cases where
outsiders have been parties -- ten in total. One of the ten reported
cases was resolved in favor of the outsider. Most of the cases are
examples of responsible and good faith interpretation of ICRA, and
none of the cases involves patently outrageous reasoning or outcomes.
Two cases resulted in arguably harsh outcomes but do not appear to
be instances in which the outcome was due to the presence of an
outsider. Two other cases, however, though readily explicable on
innocent grounds, may be instances where the reasoning and
outcomes were affected by the presence of outsiders. This subsection
reviews the cases from least to most problematic.
The case of Shohone Business Council v. Skillingst0 is the one
reported decision that found in favor of a technical outsider. After
Mr. Skillings had been adjudged to be a member of the Shohone tribe
in a trial, the tribal council passed an act stating that Skillings was not
a tribal member. The tribal court struck this down on the ground that
revoking membership rights announced by a court following a full
litigation violated due process. 511 The facts of Skillings, however,
make it unrepresentative vis-a-vis outsiders because the plaintiff had a

509. There is little case law here because tribal powers vis-a-vis outsiders are
governed largely by non-ICRA doctrines with respect to which there is federal court
review. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
510. 22 Indian L. Rep. 6050 (Shohone Ct. App. 1994).

511. See id. at 6053 ("Once litigated to final judgment, can rights created by the
general council be denied by a later general council? Certainly, succeeding councils
may change tribal policy and tribal law, applied prospectively.

And, succeeding

council may have some effect on the actions of earlier councils in some circumstances.
But to hold that a succeeding council may render void in all respects property and
other rights created years earlier and fully and finally litigated would deprive
individuals of these rights without due process of law and would subject the citizens
and residents of the Wind River Reservation to absolute uncertainty."). The Skillings
court's sophisticated analysis anticipated a similar ruling by the Supreme Court. See
Plant v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 225-27 (1995) (holding that Congress

cannot legislatively reopen a case in which an Article III court has rendered a final
determination).
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cultural connection to the tribe, as evidenced by the fact that the trial
court had adjudged him to be a member.
Five of the cases that ruled against the outsiders are not even
arguably troublesome. For example, in Muscogee (Creek) Nation v.
American Tobacco Co.,51 the tribal court approved of plaintiff's
service by mail on the outsider notwithstanding written tribal rules
that appeared to require personal service. The court held that due
process was not violated because defendants had actual notice and the
"well-established procedures of this Court provide the option of
513
service by mail for all papers, including the initial petition.
Similarly, in Means v. District Court of the Chinle JudicialDistrict1 4
the tribal court engaged in Stock Incorporation of United States
Supreme Court case law by deciding that an equal protection
challenge that the appellant, "as a nonmember Indian, is placed in the
classification 'Indian' for criminal prosecution, along with [member]
Navajos, when non-Indians are not," should be analyzed under
rational basis rather than strict scrutiny. The tribal court found strong
reasons to permit the prosecution of non-member Indians, including
the fact that about 6.39% of the population of the Navajo reservation
was comprised of non-member Indians. 515 The Means court's holding
is consistent with longstanding federal Indian law that permits tribes
to exercise misdemeanor criminal jurisdiction over non-member
Indians but not non-Indians, 516 further evidence of the reasonableness
of the tribal court's decision.
The other three wholly unproblematic cases raised equal protection
and due process challenges to tribes' exertions of power over nonmembers on the grounds that non-members did not have political
representation within the tribe. Two challenges were in the jury
context. In Sanders v. Royal Associates Management, Inc.517 and in
Hopi Tribe v. Lonewolf Scott518 the tribal courts rejected the argument
that tribal juries were inherently unfair because only insiders could be
jurors. Both courts observed that this was the only method to ensure
that juries constitute a representative cross-sample of the population,
which is a legitimate governmental interest. 519 The Sanders court also
noted that the tribe has "no enforceable authority to order non-

512. 25 Indian L. Rep. 6054 (Muscogee (Creek) Nation D. Ct. 1998).
513. Id. at 6059.
514. 26 Indian L. Rep. 6083, 6088 (Navajo 1999).
515. Id. at 6084, 6088.
516. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
517. 24 Indian L. Rep. 6068 (Chitimacha Ct. App. 1997).
518. 14 Indian L. Rep. 6001, 6003-4 (Hopi Tribal Ct. 1986). The Lonewolf court
also was presented with void-for-vagueness and free speech claims. Though the court
ruled against the outsider in respect to these arguments as well, the court's reasoning
was sound. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
519. Sanders,24 Indian L. Rep. at 6070; Lonewolf, 14 Indian L. Rep. at 6004-05.
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members to appear for jury duty and serve on" juries.12 These are
reasonable holdings that reflect the same logic that leads States to
exclude nondomiciliaries from jury service. 21 Similarly, in Iron Cloud
v.Meckle,52 the tribal court rejected the argument that tribal laws
violated equal protection and due process because non-members
could not vote in tribal elections or hold office. This holding
resonates with longstanding federal policy permitting tribes to
exercise jurisdiction over non-members for misdemeanor criminal
offenses committed on the reservation. m Such tribal powers are a
product not of consent, but of popular understandings of the inherent
nature of tribal sovereignty. For similar reasons, states are permitted
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-citizens, and the federal
government can exercise criminal jurisdiction over aliens. 4
We now move to two cases that resulted in arguably harsh
outcomes but that likely do not signal tribal court disregard of
outsiders. Because the sample of cases concerning outsiders is very
small, however, these two potentially Hard Cases suggest the need to
continue monitoring tribal court treatment of outsiders. In Gould v.
Southern Ute Indian Tribe,' the tribal court upheld against a due
process challenge a $6000 tax penalty assessed against an outsider for
failing to post a bond. The court held that due process did not require
that the tax penalty be proportionate to the actual damage incurred by
a party; in fact, the tribe admitted that it had suffered no loss or harm.
Though the outcome might be deemed harsh, the ordinance providing
for the penalty did not by its terms apply only to outsiders, and there
was no basis for believing that the outcome had anything to do with
the fact that the appellant was an outsider. The same is true in the
case of Guardianship of Jack J. Schumacher v. Menominee Indian
Tribe of Wisconsin,' in which the guardian of a non-Indian's security
interest lost the interest because he failed to perfect the interest in
accordance with tribal law. Though the tribal court noted that the
guardian had been the victim of "sharp dealing," the tribal appellate
court demonstrated that the outsider had not been treated under
tribal law any differently than an insider would have been.5"

520. Sanders,24 Indian L. Rep. at 6070.
521. See eg., Cal. Civ. Pro. § 203(3) (2000).

522. 24 Indian L. Rep. 6229 (Standing Rock Sioux Nation Sup. Ct. 1996).
523. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153; see also Mousseaux v. United States Comm'n of
Indian Affairs, 806 F. Supp. 1433, 1441-43 (D. S.D. 1992) (approving of tribal
prosecution of non-member).

524. Cf. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 707 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Nor have we
ever held that participation in the political process is a prerequisite to the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction by a sovereign. If such were the case, a State could not prosecute
nonresidents, and this country could not prosecute aliens who violate our laws.").
525. 19 Indian L. Rep. 6129 (S.
Ute Tribal Ct. 1992).
526. 24 Indian L. Rep. 6084 (Menominee Sup. Ct. 1997).
527. Id. at 6087.
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The next case did not create any harsh results -in fact the outcome
seems quite fair-but there is room to wonder whether the court
would have been less activist had no outsider been involved. In
Thorstenson v. Cudmore,52 the issue was how to construe a by-law in
the tribal constitution providing that tribal courts have jurisdiction
over "disputes or lawsuits... between Indians and non-Indians when
such cases are brought before it by stipulation of both parties." 529 The
outsider argued that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction because
his written contract with a member Indian did not contain a provision
in which the outsider had expressly stipulated to tribal court
jurisdiction. The tribal court held that the contract itself satisfied the
"stipulation" requirement. The court relied upon ICRA's due process
provision, reasoning that to require an express stipulation would
"contravene[] fundamental Lakota cultural notions of fair play that
allow people the opportunity to be heard, which includes the right to
have 'their day in court."'530 The court went on to state that to
understand the stipulation requirement otherwise would
offend[] basic notions of due process in that it potentially creates
situations in which the tribe affirmatively regulates the (civil)
conduct of private parties (both Indian and non-Indian) on the
reservation but permits or condones the inability of injured parties
to seek to enforce or to vindicate (through civil litigation) the very
legal norms the tribe expects them to comply with. You cannot, it
seems to this court, establish legal norms to regulate civil conduct,
but then effectively place the opportunity to pursue remedial redress
in the hands of the alleged "wrongdoer." If due process means
anything, it must, at its most fundamental level, mean that the duty
to obey the civil law carries with it the necessary correlative of
access to the appropriate (tribal) forum to be heard. 31
These are all reasonable arguments, but the fact remains that the
Cudmore court adopted an activist approach. One can only speculate
as to whether the tribal court's analysis was affected by the fact that
an outsider was involved. On the other hand, as shown by the
numerous tribal court cases surveyed above that employed activist
reasoning when the parties were insiders, the mere fact of judicial
activism certainly does not mean that the tribal court acted differently
because an outsider was a party.
The most problematic case, Public Service Co. of New Mexico v.
Tax ProtestPanel,5 3 resulted in a harsh outcome for the outsider. It is
528. 18 Indian L. Rep. 6051 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1991).
529. Id. at 6052 (emphasis omitted).
530. Id. at 6054.
531. Id. The court also noted that although the by-law was part of the tribal
constitution, the constitution had been prepared "almost in boilerplate fashion" by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, "without any meaningful input or discussion at the local
tribal level." Id. at 6053.
532. 18 Indian L. Rep. 6097 (Jicarilla App. Ct. 1991).
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unclear, however, whether the court's holding was due to the fact that
one of the parties was an outsider. In Tax Protest Panel, the tribal
court determined that a seven percent possessory interest tax assessed
against the value of property owned by a public utility that passed
through a reservation did not violate equal protection."' The tribal
court engaged in Stock Incorporation, adopting the rule that equal
protection precludes classification of taxpayers based on residence.
The court determined that the tax at issue classified property on the
basis of usage, which under federal law is subject to only rational basis
scrutiny, and the tribal court was able to identify rationales that
justified exemptions for retail businesses and homes.
The problem not recognized by the court was that the rationales
turned on considerations virtually metonymic with residency. For
example, the court explained that the retail business and home
exemption "seems to be intended to facilitate (or at least not penalize)
the building of homes, renovation of existing homes, and location of
jobs on the reservation" and justified the exemptions for consumer
businesses as methods to "preserve the existing services for the
community as well as to encourage location of new services into the
community.""s Thus, virtually no possessory interest tax that in effect
differentiated between insiders and outsiders would be struck down
under the Tax ProtestPanel court's reasoning. Nevertheless, the neartoothless standard adopted by the tribal court may have been a good
faith determination that, as the tribal court correctly noted and the
United States Supreme Court has held, high deference is appropriate
in the area of local taxation.5 35 High deference alone does not signal
an absence of good faith; the United States Supreme Court also
sometimes applies rational basis scrutiny in a manner that makes it
virtually impossible for a statutory scheme to be found
unconstitutional. 36
533. The tribal court also rejected a second set of due process and equal protection
arguments, but these holdings appear to be wholly unproblematic. Plaintiff outsiders
sought to challenge the tribe's 1988 and 1989 tax assessments but failed to meet
procedural requirements for challenging the 1989 payments. Plaintiff argued that
enforcing the tribe's procedural deadlines would violate due process and equal
protection because they never before had been enforced. The tribal court noted that
the tax code and its administrative procedures for challenging assessments was
"relatively new" and that circumstances that "result[ in a taxpayer becoming the first
to run afoul of a clear requirement is not cause to excuse the breach." Id. at 60996100.
534. Id at 6101.
535. See, e.g., Lehhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973)
("Unless a classification abridges fundamental personal rights or is based on
inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion or alienage, the statutory
distinction is valid if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.").
536. See, e.g., United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 187 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[B]y presuming purpose from result, the Court reduces
analysis to tautology. It may always be said that Congress intended to do what it in
fact did. If that were the extent of our analysis, we would find every statute, no matter
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In short, although there is only limited case law concerning
outsiders, the bulk, if not the entirety of the cases, conforms to the
pattern of responsible and good faith interpretation and application of
ICRA observed in insider cases. Two cases, however, may be
instances where tribal court dispositions were affected by the presence
of outsiders, and for this reason the treatment of outsiders, while not
demonstrably problematic, merits additional attention as the case law
develops over time. For purposes of this Article, however, the fact
that the bulk of the case law concerning outsiders appears to be wellfunctioning constitutes provisional additional evidence that tribal
courts have worked well because there is no indication that tribal
courts have succumbed to the temptation to favor the insider at the
expense of outsiders. Furthermore, the outsider jurisprudence
suggests that factors aside from political accountability and cultural
affiliation have led tribal courts to engage in good faith attempts to
apply ICRA, because these factors are not present when a party is an
outsider.
V. LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE ICRA STUDY

This final Part summarizes the conclusions that can be drawn from
the study of ICRA case law and then identifies the lessons that can be
learned from it, both in respect of the possibility of multiple
authoritative interpreters of American constitutional law and also visa-vis three important issues in federal Indian law.
A. Summary
There is strong preliminary evidence that ICRA is a wellfunctioning regime of multiple authoritative interpreters, although a
definitive determination requires access to more case law than is
publicly available at the present time. The ICRA regime has realized
the potential benefits of institutional diversity and sustaining valuable
idiosyncratic communities because it allows for the creation of
doctrines and institutions that protect the distinctive needs and values
of Native Americans. The regime also has let the tribes transform
their community narratives and self-understandings from mere
literature to law, lending these narratives and self-understandings the
weight, socializing power, and coercive potential that characterize law.
This also has supported tribal culture. Furthermore, ICRA has
provided extraordinary opportunities for self-governance, even
though it has constrained tribal autonomy by imposing Anglo political
values. The final potential benefit of regimes of multiple authoritative
how arbitrary or irrational, perfectly tailored to achieve its purpose."); Note,
Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection,82 Yale L.J. 123, 128 (1972)
(arguing that "[i]t
is always possible to define the legislative purpose of a statute in
such a way that the statutory classification is rationally related to it").
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interpreters, spurring general society's legal imagination, has not been
met because of unawareness of ICRA outside of a small cadre of
scholars and practitioners of Native American law.
The costs in Indian country associated with regimes of multiple
authoritative interpreters do not appear to be excessive. The review
of the legal doctrines tribal courts have created, as well as their
methods of interpretation, suggests that tribal courts have interpreted
the ICRA in good faith, a necessary though not sufficient condition
for the containment of costs to Protection. ICRA has been deployed
to require significant changes in tribal governmental practices and to
create extensive rights for individuals. Tribal courts take federal case
law seriously and tend to deviate from federal doctrines only for good
reasons. In fact, tribal courts have deeply assimilated many Anglo
constitutional values. A full analysis of whether ICRA's regime of
multiple authoritative interpreters secures or undermines Protection,
though, requires recourse to a thick political theory. Under a
Rawlsian analysis, the tribal case law has fared well. There are no
outcomes that flatly violate Protection, and only one case's reasoning
is clearly problematic. With respect to the ancillary potential costs
that attend regimes of multiple authoritative interpreters, externalities
are minimal because non-ICRA doctrines significantly curtail tribal
court jurisdiction over outsiders and because the ICRA provisions
concern conduct that is almost entirely localized within Indian
country. When tribal courts do have jurisdiction over outsiders, there
does not appear to be a pattern of abuse wvith respect to the outsiders
who are pressing the ICRA claims.
B. Multiple Authoritative Interpretersof the Constitution
Assuming for present purposes that there exists a doctrinal
mechanism for creating community-based courts that are functionally

analogous to tribal courts, 537 this Article's findings concerning the

operation of a regime of multiple authoritative interpreters are highly
relevant to the non-Indian communities that would be the
beneficiaries of such community-based courts. There is little doubt
that the benefits enjoyed by Native Americans would be enjoyed by
non-Indian communities, for it is virtually tautological that a regime of
multiple authoritative interpreters would expand institutional
diversity, extend the range of communities that could flourish,
increase the range of possible self-government, and spur the legal
imagination if knowledge of the regime's law were wvidely
disseminated.

537. I hope to provide a full treatment of the doctrinal feasibility of creating such
community-based courts in the future. See Rosen, Limited Comnunity-Based
Interpretation,supra note 7.
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The difficult question is to what extent the contained nature of the
costs observed in the ICRA regime would carry over to non-Indian
communities. While it is impossible to draw any incontrovertible
inferences concerning costs from the practice of one set of
communities to another, several factors suggest that the lessons from
the ICRA experience are transferable. Suggestive though not
dispositive, the ICRA jurisprudence actually provides more than one
example of contained costs because each tribe's judiciary has final and
authoritative interpretive power of ICRA's provisions, and the tribal
case law confirms that the tribes' courts operate largely independently
of one another. 38 While this observation does not fully answer the
question of transferability because these are all tribal communities,
consistency of cost containment across multiple independent
communities makes generalizing the phenomenon of cost containment
more plausible.
Furthermore, the contained costs cannot be
attributed to tribal predisposition to Anglo traditions. Just the
opposite is true: at the time ICRA was passed, most tribes opposed it
because it was yet another instance of federal encroachments on tribal
sovereignty1 39 The ICRA experience, therefore, cannot be explained
away as being unrepresentative of the nonconformist groups that
would likely seek the benefits of partially nonuniform
constitutionalism. Nor can it be maintained that tribal values
fortuitously coincide with Anglo values. While there is some
important overlap in respect of values of democracy and fair
processes, many tribal norms differ from federal constitutional values
in important respects." °
Another respect in which Native American tribes might be said to
differ from other communities that may seek access to regimes of
multiple authoritative interpreters is that Native Americans were not
a "single issue" group whose rulings on ICRA's provisions could be
readily predicted. By contrast, one can readily predict how some
groups would rule on certain issues were they permitted to
authoritatively
and
independently
render
constitutional
interpretations for their communities. 4 ' This difference between
538. Tribal courts only infrequently cite to other tribal courts and typically utilize
such opinions only for guidance when they do so. See, e.g., Rave v. Reynolds, 22
Indian L. Rep. 6137, 6139 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1995) (noting that other tribes'
holdings are "not binding on this court").
539. See Commission Report, supra note 99, at 8-9; Burnett, Jr., An Historical
Analysis of the 1968 'Indian Civil Rights'Act, 9 Harv. J. on Legis. 557, 557-58 (1972).
540. See Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law. The
Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts (PartII), 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 509,

511-58 (1998).

541. Consider, for example, the Rajneesh, who believed that practice of their
religion required that they live separately from others in a homogeneous society,
purchased undeveloped land, and built and incorporated a city on it, only to have the
incorporation of the city struck down under the Establishment clause. Rosen, Outer
Limits, supra note 7, at 1082-84. Had they been permitted to authoritatively interpret
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Native Americans and other communities, however, may be more
imagined than real because there are deeply held, identifiable norms
in tribal communities- 2 that provide a basis for predicting judicial
outcomes. More fundamentally, such predictability is irrelevant. The
real issue is the normative question, answered by a thick political
theory, of which groups ought to be granted significant powers of selfgovernance and to what extent. Once that is answered, it is irrelevant
if the judicial outcomes correlate to the community's readily
identifiable prior commitments.
In short, the tribal courts would appear to constitute a
representative model of how a regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters can be expected to function in practice. The benefits of
such a regime observed in tribal courts are probably wholly
Factors such as the
transferable to non-tribal communities.
numerosity and distinctiveness of tribal communities suggest that the
ICRA regime also is representative vis-a-vis the possibility of
containing the costs associated with regimes of multiple authoritative
interpreters, although the precise degree of transferability ultimately
turns on the specific characteristics of the community in question. At
the very least, however, there are good reasons to believe that the
tribal experience with multiple authoritative interpreters is not wholly
sui generis. I
C. Native American Law
This Article's findings also clarify several important issues in the
field of American Indian law. Two of the issues have arisen in the
context of the limited matters over which federal courts have subject
matter jurisdiction under ICRA. First, some federal courts have
failed to understand that legal rights such as "due process" may look
different in Indian country. For example, in response to the argument
that due process protections of Native Americans against tribal
governments are different from the due process protections of nonIndians in general American society, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit recently replied "there is simply no
room in our constitutional order for the definition of basic rights on
This Article's empirical study
the basis of cultural affiliations."'
corrects this severe misconception.
Second, even among those federal courts that have not made the
Second Circuit's error, some have held that variations from federal
doctrines are permissible only when the Indian practice being
the First Amendment, it is not difficult to predict how they would have ruled.
542- See Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 540, at 511-58.
543. Rosen, Limited Community-Based Interpretation,supra note 7, at 80-125.
544. Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 900-01 (2d Cir.

1996).
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challenged "differ[s] significantly from those 'commonly employed in
Anglo-Saxon society."'545 But when tribes adopt procedures akin to
those found in general society, these courts have held, the tribes are
subject to the ordinary federal requirements imposed by due process,
equal protection, and so forth. 6 The federal courts that have adopted
this approach have not offered a theoretical justification for it, and
this Article's analysis suggests several notable problems with it.
Because it is premised on the view that only gross variations from
Anglo approaches are of importance to Indian tribes, the approach is
mistaken; Tailoring can be very important, in that it creates important
doctrinal variations, and even Incorporation can generate important
benefits for the tribes. Further, this approach provides an incentive
for tribes to avoid procedures akin to Anglo procedures, threatening
to interfere with the assimilation and valuable cultural syncretism that
otherwise occurs.
Finally, requiring tribes to adopt federal
approaches undermines the assimilation and syncretism that
ordinarily accompany tribal court interpretation of ICRA.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, this Article's findings counsel
strongly against the proposals advanced by some commentators and
members of Congress that federal court jurisdiction over ICRA be
expanded, or tribal court jurisdiction curtailed, because tribal courts
have not responsibly interpreted ICRA. 547 The concerns purportedly

prompting these proposals are based on anecdotal evidence. 4s Close
examination of the tribal case law suggests that they are grossly
overstated if not entirely misplaced.

9

The study suggests that

545. Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court, 841 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1988)

(citation omitted).
546. Id. (due process); Howlett v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead
Reservation, 529 F.2d 233, 238 (9th Cir. 1976) (equal protection).
547. See, e.g., The American Indian Equal Justice Act, S. 1691, 105th Cong. § 7
(1998), reprinted in 144 Cong. Rec. S1,155-56 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1998) (bill introduced
by Senator Gorton to grant federal district courts jurisdiction to hear all ICRA claims
concerning nonmembers); 134 Cong. Rec. S11,656 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988)
(statement of Senator Hatch regarding proposed bill to grant federal courts
jurisdiction over ICRA claims); Carla Christofferson, Note, Tribal Courts' Failureto
Protect Native American Women: A Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101
Yale L.J. 169, 181 (1991) (advancing proposal to expand federal court jurisdiction
over ICRA claims).
548. See Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty
Indian Tribal Courts, 22 Am. Indian L. Rev. 285, 285-88 (1998) (making this point);
Christofferson, supra note 547, at 170, 178-79 (relying entirely on statement of one
woman to conclude that tribal court application of ICRA has not adequately
protected Native American women).
549. The handful of studies of tribal case law have come to similar conclusions.
One study of tribal case law that examined a small sample of ICRA jurisprudence has
concluded that "[tihe evidence suggests that efforts to strip tribes of sovereign
immunity or to greatly expand federal review of tribal courts are overbroad remedies
for an exaggerated problem, unfairly based on anecdote and cultural prejudice."
Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty
Years, 34 Idaho L. Rev. 465, 513 (1998). An article by Dean Newton that did not
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ICRA's regime of multiple authoritative interpreters has worked well.
Tribal courts have found significant individual protections in ICRA
even though they express the values of due process, equal protection,
and so on, in ways that reflect and support tribal culture. This finding
casts doubt on the wisdom of curtailing the powers of the tribal courts.
To be sure, the study's conclusions in this regard are limited due to
the restricted sample of available tribal case law. At the very least,
however, the study's findings suggest that additional research be done,
or that changes, like requiring publication of tribal court decisions, be
implemented before drastically limiting tribal court jurisdiction. 5-'
CONCLUSION

Long ago, Justice Story's majority opinion for the Supreme Court
rejected out-of-hand as self-evidently "deplorable" the prospect of
multiple authoritative interpreters of the constitution at the subfederal level. There may, however, be compelling high level
philosophical reasons to allow select communities the power to
authoritatively construe for themselves a limited number of
constitutional provisions, and there may be a doctrinal mechanism for
creating "community-based" courts that are so empowered. In light
of these considerations, probing Justice Story's untested assumption
by empirically considering what a regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters would look like in practice is critical for at least two
reasons. First, deplorable practical outcomes would weigh heavily
against creating community-based courts, even if there were high level
reasons counseling in their favor. Second, an assessment of the likely
practical consequences is relevant as a doctrinal matter to determining
the constitutionality of creating such community-based courts in the
first place.
Today's tribal courts in Indian country provide a ready laboratory
for empirically investigating what a regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters of select constitutional provisions might look like. Tribal
courts have the power to authoritatively interpret quasi-constitutional
federal provisions of ICRA, such as due process, equal protection, and
free exercise. Tribal court interpretations need not mirror federal
courts' interpretations of the Bill of Rights. Instead, the tribes'
interpretations can be based on tribal customs, values, and needs.
focus on ICRA but examined one year's reported cases in the Indian Law Reporter

concluded that tribal courts "have been highly successful" in "engraft[ing] Western
legal principles onto their consensual form of decision making." Newton, supra note
548, at 353. A student Note that examined some tribal court definitions of due

process concluded that Martinez's goal of enabling tribal courts to protect tribal
traditions "has been successfully implemented, though perhaps only at a conceptual
level." Christian M. Freitag, Note, Putting Martinez to the Test. Tribal Court
Disposition of Due Process,72 Ind. LJ.831, 833 (1997).

550. Cf. Commission Report, supra note 99, at 72-73 (making similar suggestion).
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Moreover, the tribes' opinions are almost wholly free of federal
appellate court review. These characteristics make the ICRA regime
an excellent analogue of community-based courts that were entitled to
offer independent interpretations of select constitutional provisions.
This Article created analytical tools for analyzing the costs and
benefits of the ICRA regime of multiple authoritative interpreters,
and applied these tools to thirteen years of tribal court case law. The
ICRA case law illustrates many of the potential benefits of a regime
of multiple authoritative interpreters. The ICRA regime has allowed
for the creation and maintenance of novel legal doctrines and
governmental institutions that have facilitated the well-being of the
tribal communities and their distinctive values. This regime has also
allowed the tribes to transform their community narratives and selfunderstandings from mere literature to law, thereby supporting tribal
culture by lending these narratives and self-understandings the
importance, socializing power, and coercive potential that characterize
law.
The ICRA case law also suggests that the potential costs associated
with regimes of multiple authoritative interpreters can be reasonably
contained. The tribal courts have interpreted ICRA's provisions in
good faith. The courts have created strong rights-protecting doctrines
that significantly constrain tribal governments even as the courts have
given idiosyncratic interpretations of ICRA's provisions that reflect
and advance tribal concerns. The ICRA case law displays a cultural
syncretism of Anglo and tribal values. Finally, there is strong
evidence that tribal courts have deeply assimilated many fundamental
Anglo jurisprudential values.
For these reasons, this Article's findings strongly counsel against
several proposals to sharply curtail tribal court jurisdiction under
ICRA that have been advanced by some politicians and academic
commentators based largely on anecdotal evidence. More generally,
the ICRA case law showcases the effects of granting diverse
communities the power to independently and authoritatively construe
identical legal texts. Shared texts, such as due process and equal
protection, help to create a common, nation-wide culture. Yet the
power to offer independent interpretations simultaneously allows
diverse communities the opportunity to maintain, and even advance,
their distinctive cultures. Although it is impossible to definitively
conclude that the tribal experience under ICRA would transfer
seamlessly to other communities, there are strong reasons to think
that the tribal experience is largely representative. At the very least,
the ICRA case law casts considerable doubt on Justice Story's
untested conviction that a regime of multiple authoritative
interpreters of constitutional law unquestionably would be
"deplorable."
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